

OBSERVATIONS,
VPON THE
FIVE FIRST BOOKES
OF CÆSARS COMMENTARIES.
SETTING FOVRTH THE PRACTISE OF
THE ART MILITARY, IN THE TIME OF
THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

WHEREIN ARE HANDLED ALL THE CHIEF-
fest points of their discipline, with the true reasons of
every part, together with such instructions as may be
drawn from their proceedings, for the bet-
ter direction of our moderne
warres.

BY
CLEMENT EDMUNDS.



AT LONDON,
Printed by Peter Short, dwelling on Bredstreet hill at
the signe of the Starre. 1600.

CONSERVATION
UPON THE
FIVE FIRST BOOKS

OF GEORGE'S CONSERVATION
OF THE
THE

THE FIRST ANNALS OF ALL THE CHURCHES
OF THE
BY
GEOFFREY



Printed by
GEOFFREY

TO HIS HONORABLE FRIEND AND MOST WOR-
thie knight, Sir *Francis Vere*, chiefe commander
of her *Maiesties* forces in the service of the
states, in the vnited Prouinces, and Gouver-
nour of the *Cautionarie* towne of
Briele, in *Holland*.



SIR, hauing at length ended this taske of obserua-
tions, it falleth necessarily vnder your patronage,
as well in regard of the continual incouragement,
which I receiued from the fauor you beate to such
imploiments; as also for that this worke of Cæsar
hath alwaies beene held in your particular recom-
mendation, as the *Breuiarie* of soldiers; and thought worthie of as
great regard, as euer M. Brutus attributed to Polybius, or Charles
the first to Philip de Commynes. I must acknowledge the begin-
ning of this work to haue proceeded from Sir Iohn Scot, a knight
deseruing great honour for his iudgement and skill in matter of
war, whose desire to vnderstand the true sense of this history, and
the mysterie of that discipline, first mooued me to vndertake this
labour. The obseruations which I haue taken, are such as offer
themselues to vulgar wits, vpon the consideration of such points
as are handled in this discourse: for as an old Gouvernesse well ex-
perienced in error, directeth her young charge to vertue, by such
documents as rise from her owne mistakings; so the fruit of this
worke riseth chiefly from thence, where the benefit of good di-
rection is manifest; or where ill atchieuement beareth witnesse of
an error. The specialities of greater consequence, which are either
skilfully shadowed, or necessarily implied in the historie, I leaue
to the wisdom of iudicious commanders, as an obiect fit for
such iudgments, and impertinent to conceits of an inferiour con-
dition. That which is already handled shall serue to witnesse, that
Cæsars works containe matter sufficient to entertaine the greatest
wits, and that my desire is to gratifie our souldiers with my best la-
bour, which I recommend chiefly to your Lordship, and rest

Readie to doe you service,

C. EDMVND.

* ij.

TO


Gen. 12. 10. 3 Dec. 42. Ford 1600.

TO THE READER.



Haue aduentured to entertaine our souldiers, with a relation of part of Cæsars actions, vpon that incouragement which hee himselfe gaue to a fisherman, not to despaire of a good passage because he carried Cæsar and his fortunes: wherein I haue not tied my selfe to a litterall translation of the history, but followed the sense; not daring to make any resemblance of the sweetnesse of that stile, but desirous to gratifie our better sort of souldiers, with the pourtraiture of that discipline. If my labour be accepted with that affection as I offer it, I shall thinke it well spent, and imploy more time to doe them seruice. Howsoeuer, I holde it reasonable to leaue to euery man the free censure of his iudgement, as best fitting him that readeth with profit, and not to be taken from any reader whatsoeuer: and as I looke not to be approoued of all; so I make no question but I shall finde some fauourers, which is as much as any writer can boast of, Farewell.





READING AND DISCOURSE,
ARE REQUISITE TO MAKE A SOVL-
dier perfect in the Arte militarie, how great soe-
uer his knowledge may be, which long experi-
ence and much practise of Armes
hath gayned.



WHEN I consider the weaknesse of mans iudgment in censuring things best knowne vnto it selfe, and the disability of his discourse in discovering the nature of vnacquainted objectes; choosing rather to hold any sensible impression, which custome hath by long practise inured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable perswasion: I do not maruell that such soldiers, whose knowledge groweth only from experience and consisteth in the rules of their owne practise; are hardly perswaded, that history and speculatiue learning are of any vse in perfecting of their Arte, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the vse of Armes and atchievements of war seeme to haue their chiefe being. But those puer spirits embilished with learning; and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes; wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of instructions, and the mutuall conference of thinges happened, begetteth both similitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet iointly concurring to season our iudgment with discretion, and to enstall wisdom in the gouernment of the minde: These men I say, mounting aloft, with the winges of contemplation, doe easily discover the ignorance of such Martialistes, as are only trained vp in the schoole of practise, and taught their rudiments vnder a few yeares experience, which serueth to interpret no other author but it selfe; nor can approue his maximes, but by his own authority; and are rather moued to pittie their hard fortune, hauing learned onely to be ignorant, then to enuie their skill in matter of war, when they oppose themselues against so manifest a truth as this; that a meere practicall knowledge cannot make a perfect soldier.

A i.

Which

Which proposition that I may the better confirme, giue me leaue to reason a little of the groundes of learning, and dispute from the habitude of Arts and sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the variety of that indiuiduality, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maximes of rule, vnting tearms of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diuersities by differences of properties, aptely diuiding the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions: for vnlesse the vnderstanding be in this sort qualified and able by logistickall discourse, to ascend, by way of composition, from singularitie to catholike conceptions; and returne againe the same waie, to the lowest order of his partitions, the minde cannot be saide to haue the perfection of that Arte, nor instructed in the true vse of that knowledge: but guiding her selfe by some broken preceptes, feeleth more want by that shee hath not, then benefite by that shee hath. Whereby it followeth, that a science deuided into manie braunches, and consisting in the multiplicite of diuers members, being all so interessed in the Bulke, that a Mayme of the smallest part causeth either debilitie or deformitie in the bodie, cannot be saide to bee throughlie attayned, nor conceiued with such a profiting apprehension as stealeth the minde with true iudgement, and maketh the scholler maister in his Arte, vnlesse the nature of these particularities bee first had and obtained.

And for as much as no one science or faculty whatsoeuer, in multitude and pluralitie of partes, may anie waie be comparable to the Arte militarie, wherein euery small and vnrespected circumstance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth such disparitie and difference, that the resemblance of their equall participating properties is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing partes; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the varietie of chances in the course of warre, must needes be thought a more perfect souldier, and deserueth a title of greater dignity in the profession of Armes, then such as content themselves with a fewe common precepts and ouer-worne rules: without which, as they cannot be said at all to be souldiers, so with them and no more, they no way deserue the name of skilfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meere experience, or experience ioyned with reading and discourse, doe feast the minde with more variety and choise of matter, or entertaine knowledge with greater plentie of nouelties, incident to expeditions and vse of Armes, I will vse no other reason to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius alleadgeth in his parallely, where he handleth this argument which I intreat of.

He that followeth a warre (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part onely. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned lesse then he that sawe the whole: but admit he hath seene and learned the instructions of one whole warre, he hath notwithstanding learned lesse then he that hath seene the proceeding of two such warres. And hee againe hath not seene

leene so much as another that hath serued in three leuerall warres: and so by degrees, a souldier that hath serued ten yeares, must needes knowe more then one that hath not serued so long. And to conclude, he that hath receiued 22 yeares stipend (which was the iust time of seruice amongst the Romans before a souldier could be dismissed) hath greater mearies of experience than another that hath not so long a time followed the campe, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custome: And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one or more or all these watteres, there haue happened few or no actions of seruice, which might teach a souldier the practise of Armes, that then his learning doth not counteruaile his labour. And if the warre through the negligence, or ignorance of the chiefe commanders haue bene ill caried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of militarie discipline; if the part which he followed were defeated and overthrowne, he knoweth by experience howe to loose, but not how to gaine: And therefore it is, not onely experience and practice which maketh a souldier worthis of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise from the variety of humane actions, wherein reason and error, like merchants in trafficke, enterchange contrarie euentes of fortune, giuing sometime copper for siluer, and balme for poyson, and repaying againe the like commodity as time and circumstances doe answere their directions. And this knowledge is onely to be learned in the registers of antiquitie and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caius Iulius Caesar (whose actions are the subiect of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the prouinces of Spaine, broken the strength of the Romaine Empire at Pharsalia, was held a souldier surmounting enuie and all her exceptions; and yet notwithstanding all this, the battell he had with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to haue buried the glorie of his former conquestes, in the dishonourable memorie of a wilfull overthrow: for hauing posselt himselfe of a hill of great aduantage, he began to encampe himselfe in the toppe thereof. Which Pharnaces perceiuing, (being lodged likewise with his campe vpon a mountaine confronting the Romaines) imbattelled his men, marched down from his campe into the valley, and mounted his forces vp the hill, where the Romaines were busied about their intrenchments, to giue them battel. All which, Caesar tooke but for a brauado: and measuring the enemy by himselfe, could not be perswaded that any such foolehardines could carrie men headlong into so dangerous an aduventure, vntill they were come so neere, that he had scarce any time to call the legions from their worke, and to giue order for the battell, which so amazed the Romaines, that vnlesse, as Caesar himselfe saith, the aduantage of the place and the benignitie of the gods had greatly fauoured them, Pharnaces had at that time reuenged the overthrow of Pompei and the Senat, and restored the Romaine Empire to libertie. Which maie learne vs how necessary it is (besides experience, which in Caesar was infinit) to perfect our knowlege with variety of chances: and to meditate vpon the effectes of other mens aduentures, that their harmes maie be our warnings, and their happie proceedings our fortunate directions.

And albeit amongst so manie decades of Historie, which pregnant wits haue

presented to those latter ages, we seldom or neuer meete with any one accident which iumpeth in all pointes with an other of the like nature, that shall happen to fall out in managing a warre, or setting forth of an armie; and so doe seeme to reape little benefit by that we reade, and make small vse of our great trauell. Yet we must vnderstand that in the Audit of Reason, there are many offices, which through the soueraigne power of the discursive faculty, receiue great commodities by whatsoeuer falleth vnder their iurisdiction, and suffer no action to passe without due triall of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the iudgment maie not be defrauded of her reuenues; nor the minde of her learning: for notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of formes, which seeme to cut off the priuiledge of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we haue obtained by reading, the intellectuall facultie hath authoritie to examine the vse, and looke into the inconueniences of these wants and diuersities; and by the helpe of reason to turne it to her aduantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in triall and execution it shall not appeare anie disadvantage. For as in all other sciences, and namely in geometrie, of certaine bare elements, and common sentences, which sense admitteth to the apprehension, the powers of the soule frame admirable Theoremes and Problemes of infinit vse, proceeding with certaintie of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they go, besides the strangenesse of their Architecture, that vpon such plaine and easie foundations, they should erect such curious and beautifull buildings: so in the Arte Military, these examples, which are taken from histories, are but plaine kinde of principles, on which the minde worketh to her best aduantage, and vseth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities she concludeth an equality, and of dissimilitudes most sweete resemblances; and so she worketh out her owne perfection by discourse, and in time groweth so absolute in knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions: but as Lomazzo the Milinese, in that excellent worke which he writ of picturing, saith of a skilfull painter, that being to drawe a portraiture of gracefull lineaments, will neuer stand to take the symmetry by scale, nor marke it out according to rule; but hauing his iudgment habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of shapés and proportions, his knowledge guideth his eie, and his eie directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with such facilitie of cunning, that each of them serue for a rule whereby the true measures of nature are exactly expressed. The like may I say of a skilfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his iudgment, and tuned it to the key of true apprehension.

Lib. 3.

And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblace of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well tempered spirit; yet they will by no meanes acknowledge, that those monstrous and inimitable exáples of valour & magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigall, & spendeth as though time should neuer want such treasure) can anie way auaille the maners of these daies, which if they were as they ought to be, would appeare but counterfeit to the luster of a golden age, nor yet comparable

ble to silver or brasse, or the strength of yron, but deserue no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is betweene the customs of our times, & the actions of those ancient Heroes? They obserued equity as well in warre as in peace: for vertue rather flourished by the naturall disposition of men, then by lawe and authority; the tenure of their Empire was valour in warre and concord in peace; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deedes of armes which they had achieved for their countrey, adorning the temples of their gods with picture, and their private houses with glory, pardoning rather then prosecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing injury: But the course of our times hath another bias, for conetoulesse hath subuerted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughtes, and subtilty teacheth vs to carrie rather a faire countenance, then a good nature; our meanes of getting are by fraud & extortion, and our manner of spending is by wast and prodigality; not esteeming what we haue of our owne, but couering that which is not ours; men effeminated and women impudent, vsing ritches as seruants to wickednesse, and preuenting natures appetite with wanton luxury; supplanting vertue with trecherie, and vsing victory with such impiety, as though *manum facere*, were *imperio uti*: and therefore the exemplarie patternes of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serue to be gazed vpon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtil to deale with honesty, and wanting courage to incounter valour. I must needs confesse, that he that compareth the history of Liuius with that of Guichardine shall finde great difference in the subjects which they handle; for Liuius triumpheth in the conquestes of vertue, and in euery page erecteth trophes vnto valour, making his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein vertue is described in her entire maiestie; and so sweetned with the presence & seruice of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellencie, and charmed with the loue of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more then Theseus taske to performe, being to wind through the labyrinthes of subtilty, and discouer the quaint practises of politicians, wherein in publike and open designs are oftentimes but shadowes of more secret practises, and these againe serue as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so insnared in the sleights of subtilty, that when you looke for war, you shall finde peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissentions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of Liuius fortune; and such arte is required to vnfolds the truth of these mysteties.

But to answere this obiection in a word, and so to proceede to that which followeth, I say those immortall memories of vertue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be knowne, then any stratagemes of subdler ages: for equitie and valour being truly apprehended so season the motions of the soule, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peraduenture stir vp imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practises, and diuelish deuises, when euill is reprov'd by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the

authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steppes which the present course of the world hath traced, and plaie the Cretian with the Cretian; this obiection hindereth nothing, but that historie, especiallie these of latter times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a souldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore anie man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helpes that historie doth offer to perfect the weaknesse of a short experience, especially when no worth can counteruaile the waight of so great a businesse: for I take the office of a chiefe commander, to be a subject capable of the greatest wisdomie that may be apprehended by naturall meanes, being to manage a multitude of disagreeing mindes, as a fit instrument to execute a desaigne of much consequence and great expectations, and to qualifie both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidentes which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true iudgement, which he ought to haue of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our providence cannot haue enough either from learning or experience, to preuent disadvantages, or to take holde of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our iudgment, so it serueth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as beholde the archieuments of vertue, commended to a perpetuall posteritie, hauing themselves the like meanes to consecrate their memorie to succeeding ages; wherein they may serue for examples of valour, and reape the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thinke after the knowledge of our owne fortune, and long to foresee the ende of that race which we haue taken, which is the chiefeest matter of consequence in the vse of Armes; what better coniecture can be made, then to looke into the course of former times, which haue proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like meanes, and therefore not vnlikely to sort vnto like endes?


Salust. de bello Inгур.

And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice haue the first place in this Arte, and serueth as a foundation to the rest of the building? Let Marius answer this question, who enuying at the nobilitie of Rome, saith thus. *Qui postquam consules facti sunt, acta Maiorum & Gracorum militaria precepta legere caperint: homines praposteri, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est.* Whereas (saith he) reading ought to go before practise (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading, but of some thing practised before,) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helme of government, begin to reade, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiencie of knowledge by vsing out of time that, which in time is most necessarie. This testimonie gaue Marius of reading & booke learning, being himselfe an enemy to the same, for as much as all his knowledge came by meere experience. But howsoever his iudgment was good in this point; for since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soule, and cannot well be produced, vntill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the minde, according to which pattern the outward being and sensible resemblance is duely fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed,

fed, when the minde is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrences of such natures, as are necessarily interested both in the mearies and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practise is first to be respected.

But that I may not seeme partiall in this controuersie, but carrie an equall hand betweene two so necessarie yokefellowes, giue me leaue to conclude in a word, the benefite of practise, and define the good which commeth from experience; that so nothing that hath beene spoken may seeme to come from affection, or proceede from the forge of vniust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practise giueth boldnesse and assurance in action, and maketh men expert in such things they take in hand, for no man can rest vpon such certainty, through the theorike of knowledge, as he that hath seene his learning verified by practise, and acknowledged by the testimony of assured prooffe: Besides, there are many other accomplements gotten only by practise, which grace the presence of knowledge, & giue credit to that which we haue read; as first to learne the vse and aduantage of the armes which we beare; secondly, by frequent aspect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terrour, to learne to feare nothing but dishonour, to make no difference betweene heate and cold, sommer and winter, to sleepe in all places as on a bed, and at the same time to take paines and suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custome maketh easie, and cannot be gotten but by vse and practise.

And thus at length, I haue brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeale of affection then I am able with manifest prooffe of reason, to demonstrate the necessity, that both these partes were by our souldiers so regarded, that neither practise might march in obdurate blindness without learned knowledge; nor this againe be entertained with an idle apprehension without practise: but that both of them may be respected, as necessarie partes to make a compleat nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall part giueth life and spirit to the action, and practise as the materiall substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skilfull workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore conceiued: wishing no man to despaire of effecting that by practise which the Theorike of knowledge commendeth. For *Cur desperes nunc posse fieri, quod iam toties factum est?*



1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to determine the nature of the problem. This involves a thorough understanding of the situation and the factors that may be contributing to the problem. Once the nature of the problem is understood, the next step is to identify the causes of the problem. This involves a detailed analysis of the situation and the factors that may be contributing to the problem. Once the causes of the problem are identified, the next step is to develop a plan of action to address the problem. This involves identifying the steps that need to be taken to address the problem and the resources that will be needed to implement the plan. Once a plan of action has been developed, the next step is to implement the plan. This involves carrying out the steps that have been identified in the plan of action. Finally, the last step in the process is to evaluate the results of the plan. This involves assessing the effectiveness of the plan and making any necessary adjustments.

THE SVMMME OF THE
FIRST BOOKE OF CÆSARS
COMMENTARIES, WITH OBSER-
uations vpon the same, discovering the
excellencie of Cæsars militia.

THE ARGVMENT.

IN this first booke, are contained the specialities of two great wars, begun and ended both in a summer: the first, between Cæsar & the Heluctij: the second, between him and Ariouistus king of the Germans. The historie of the Heluctians may be reduced to three principall heads: vnder the first, are the reasons that moued the Heluctians to entertaine so desperate an expedition, and the preparation which they made for the same. The second, containeth their defeate by Cæsar: and the third, their returne into their countrey. That of Ariouistus deu- deth it selfe into two parts: the first giueth the causes that induced Cæsar to vndertake that war: the second intreateth of the warre it selfe, and particularly describeth Ariouistus ouerthrow.

Snitchers.

CHAP. I.

Gallia described: the Heluctians dislike their native
seate, and propound to themselves larger territories in
the continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth
this humor, for his owne ad-
uantage.



GALLIA is diuided into three partes, differing one from an o-
ther in manners, in language, and in lawes. The first part is inha-
bited by the Belga: the second by the Celta, whom we call Galli:
and the third by the Aquitani. Belgia is the northeast part of
Gallia, bounded on the East with the riuer Rhene, and deuided
from the Celta, with the riuers Marne and Sene. The inhabitants
of this Belgia, are without comparison the stoutest and best men
at armes amongst all the Gallies: for besides, that they are far remote from the ciui-
lity of the Roman Province, and vnacquainted with traffike or entercourse of stran-
gers,

Cæsar.

*Marona &
Sequena.*

Two states in
the duchie of
Burgundie.

The lake of
Geneua.
Mont ionx.

gers, they are in continuall warres with the Germans, which maketh them hardy, expert and valorous. The Celta possesse the greatest part of Gallia, and haue the Ocean, Sene, Garum, and the upper part of Rhene for their confines. Aquitania is limited with the riuer Garume and the Perinaan hills. In each of these partes are diuers states and common weales, gouerned for the most part by the Annuall magistracie of their nobility, but all diuided into factions and partes; whereof the Hedui and Sequani, are contrarie, chiefe and opposite ring-leaders.

The chiefe reason that moued the Heluetians to forsake their country, was the good opinion they had of their owne vertue and magnanimity, and the smal capacity and circuit of their territories: For Heluetia being bounded with the famous riuers Rhene and Rhone, and with the lake Lemanus, and the high hanging rockes of the hill Iura; extending it selfe within these boundes, but 240 miles in length and 180 in breadth, seemed too narrow a roome to containe so warlike a people, that long before had overflowne the marches of their country, with the conceit they had of their owne valour, and that it heard that nature should oppose it selfe by riuers and mountaines against the Prowesse, which no enemy could euer resist: and therefore, they resolved to forsake their country, which first gaue them breath and being, rather then it should hinder a correspondent proceeding to their warlike nature. These coles of ambition were first kindled, and daily blowne, by the earnest perswasions and impulsions of Orgetorix, the chiefe man of authority amongst the Heluetians, both for his wealth and nobility, who not contented to be greatest in that manner he was; but affecting the greatnesse of princely dignity, thought no meanes fitter to shadowe the alteration of their state, then the change of their soile, and in their new seate and place of rest to laie the foundation of a new gouernment.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

TH E that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transigrations and flittings of other nations, shall finde some vn-exampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people vterly abandoned that country which nature or prouidence had allotted them; vnlesse they were driuen thereunto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or some other vniuersal, which made the place inhabitable and the people willing to vndertake a voluntarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a country were so multiplied, that the place was overcharged with multitudes of offspring, and like a poore father had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seeke new fortunes in foraine countries, and to possesse themselves of a resting seat; which might recompence the wants of their native country, with a plenteous reuenue of necessary supplementes: And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out manie Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire: And in this maner the ancient Galles disburdened themselves of their superflui-

ty, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Ilandes of the Balticke sea, and in Sulla his time swarmed ouer Germany: besides many other nations whose transmigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsooke their country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same, from whence as frō a fountaine, succeeding ages might deriue the streame of that ouerflowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moued them vnto it: for their maner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to deuide themselves into two or three parts, equall both in equality and number. For after they had parted their common people into euery companies; they deuided their nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions; and then casting lots; that part which went out to seeke new aduentures, left their landes and possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industrie they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawen vpon them. And this was the means which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of scarcety and famine:

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



E that would prognosticate by the course of these seuerall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better successe, hath greater reason to foretell happines to these which I last spake of, then to the Heluetians; vnlesse their valour were the greater, & quitted all difficulties which hatred and enuie would cast vpon them: for an action which sauoureth of necessitie, (which was alwaies vnderstood in sending out a colonie) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion: for as men can be content to tolerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gaine to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Rgetorix, thirsting after princely dignity, discovereth the humor of vaine glory. For not contented with the substance of honor, being already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, and ordering the affaires of the state by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the markes and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of maiestie are annexed: not considering that the best honour fitteth not alwaies in imperial thrones, nor weareth the diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it selfe in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles. For prooofe whereof, to omit antiquity, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particularly

larly Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest potentates of their time, being themselves but priuate gentlemen in that state, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoeuer the oportunitie of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouation; but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition: for as a multitude of that nature, can be content to attribute a great part of their happines, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly interested, to an eminent leader; and in that vniuersall extasie of ioy will easily admit an alteration of their state: so if the issue be in any respect vnfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie, but euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some object: A chiefe director is likeliest to be the marke, at which the darts of their discontent will be throwen, and then he will finde it hard to effect what he intendeth.

CHAP. II.

Orgetorix practises are discovered: his death: the
Heluetians continue the resolution of their ex-
pedition, and prepare themselves
accordingly.

Cæsar.



VT Orgetorix failed in the first entrance into his proiectes, for seeking to colour his attempt by the example of Casticus, a man of the like authority amongst the Sequani, and Dumnorix among the Hedui, (whom he perswaded) in their seuerall states to clime the same steps of ambition, he reuealed his intent, and ended it also: for being called by the Heluetians to answer that treason; before he came to triall, his body was found dead, not without suspicion of murthering himselfe. The Heluetians notwithstanding continued their determined voyage, making preparations correspondent for the same; and for their better prouision of victuals, they thought two yeares little enough to study tillage, to furnish themselves with conuenient store of cornes; and in the meane time to provide themselves of cartes and cariages, that nothing might be wanting to make the iourney easie and the end fortunate. And that no neare borderer might interrupt with newe troubles, a designe of such hope, they made peace with all their neighbour nations, and resolved for their owne aduantage, to part friendes with those, whom they had euier liued with in continuall iars. And lastly, considering the mutability of mans nature, which scarce continueth constant the space of one houre, but altereth his determinations, according as he diuersly apprehendeth the same subiect, least any of them should change their minde, and suffer the difficulties of the action to ouersway the honour that might ensue thereof: in the heate of their forwardnes they made a law, which at the ende of two yeares, commanded their departure.

THE

THE OBSERVATION.

AS these prouisoos were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of, which was to haue concealed by all mearies the time of their departure: for all the beastes of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such lyons roused themselues out of their dens, and be then very watchfull of their safety when they knewe the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needs be offered to appease their furie: Or at the least it behooued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to crosse their designements, might haue beene no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their countrey by which they might go, the one narrow and difficult betwene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the countrey of the Sequani: the other through Prouence far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoever their errour was, that after two yeares prouision to go, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to go, when they came to the point they knew not what way to go.

*The omission
in the Helue-
tian expedi-
tion.*

CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Heluetians passage through the
Roman Prouince: he fortifieth the passage
betweene the hill Iura, and the
lake of Geneva.



CÆsar proconsull of the prouince in Gallia, being then at Rome, and hearing what course the Heluetians purposed to take, made great iourneyes to hasten into the Prouince, lest it should receiue any detriment by them: and to that ende he gathered what forces he could at his first arrivall, which was but one legion, and caused the bridge at Geneva to be broken downe, to hinder their passage what he might: And then too late the Heluetians began to perceiue their omissions, for finding themselves ready to depart, they raised all their walled townes being twelue in number, and burnt 400 villages besides priuat houses, with the rest of the corne which they could not carrie with them, and appointed a day to meete all upon the bankes of Rhone, which day was the fift of the Calendes of Aprill, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinus: at their arrivall vnder-

Cæsar.

standing of the resistance which Cæsar made; they sent unto him some of the chiefeſt of their Tribes, to intreat a quiet passage through the Prouince. Although Cæsar was resolved to deny the their passport, yet for that time he thought it best to stand doubtfull of an answer; that he might the better provide himselfe in the meane time, to make good his deniall if it were refused. The reason that moued him to denie them passage, was grounded vpon the ouerthrow which L. Cæſius a Roman Consull had receiued by the Heluetians, wherein the Consull himselfe was slaine, and the souldiers sold for bodslauers: And this accident procured their hinderance for two respects; first, he thought that the people of Rome could not with the maiesty of their Empire, shewe any fauour to a nation that had so foiled them, least they should seeme to stand in feare of such as durst make head against their armies, and buckle with the strength of their legions. Secondly, he thought it impossible that the Heluetians hauing lent them such a blow, could passe through their Prouince without further violence: and therefore in this time of deliberation, hee made a ditch, and a rampier from the hill Iura to the lake of Geneua, containing 19 miles in length. The rampier was 16 foote high with an answerable latitude and depth of the ditch: and this he fortified with many castles well manned with souldiers, and stored with munition. Notwithstanding the Heluetians attended peaceably their daie of audience; and then returned and received a deniall.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis manner of prolonging of time to renforce the troupes or get some other aduantage, as it was then of great vse to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes beene practised to good purpose; so doth it discouer to a circumspect enemie, by the directions in the meane time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inuitheth him with greater courage, to take the oportunitie of that present aduantage; especially if tract of time maie strengthen the one, and not further the other, which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

His request of the Heluetians seemed to deserue a facile answer, being in effect no more then nature had giuen to the riuer Rhone, which was to passe through the prouince, with as much speed & as little hurt as they could: but Cæsar looking further into the matter and comparing things already past, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maiesty of the Roman Empire to be interessed in the answer, being either to maintaine her greatnes by resisting her enemies, or to degenerat from ancient vertue, by gratifying such as sought her ruin, which in matter of state are things

things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an vnwise courte to suffer an enemy to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to loade him with further wronges whom he hath once iniured: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an oportunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not vntill he haue added a bloudie end to an iniurious beginning.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Concerning this marvellous fortification, betweene the hill and the lake, how seruiceable such workes were vnto him in all his warres; in what sort; and in howe small time, they were made, I will defer the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Aleſia, where he gaue ſome ground of that hyperbolicall ſpeech: *An me deleto, non animaduertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, qua non ſolum vobis obſiſtere ſed etiam cælum diruere poſſent?*

CHAP. IIII.

The Heluetians failing to paſſe the Rhone, take the way through the countrey of the Sequani. Caſar haſteth into Italie, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, ouerthroweth part of them at the riuer Arar.



He Heluetians perceiuing Caſars determination, reſolued to redeeme the ouerſlip they had committed in the courſe of their proiect, with the power of their forces; and to open a way by valour and armes, where peaceable intreatie had no paſſage: and therefore, they endenoured ſome by boats, and others by fordes & ſhallowes, to paſſe the Rhone, and enter into Prouince, maugre Caſar and his legion. But being eaſily repelde by meanes of the fortification, they made a vertue of neceſſity, and tooke the narrow and difficult way, through the territories of the Sequani: of whom by Dumnorix interceſſion, they obtained a friendly through-fare. In the meane time, Caſar haſted into Italie, & there inrolled two new legions, and tooke three more out of their ſtanding camps in Aquileia: and with theſe ſiue legions returned ſpeedily into Gallia. At his returne hee underſtood, that the Heluetians had paſſed the ſtraites, and were now ſacking the territories of the Edui, a ſtate that had alwaies deſerued well of the people of Rome.

Caſar.

The

Zuricke.

The Ambari complained in like maner of the same hostilitie: and so did the Allobroges which inhabited beyond the Rhone. Caesar not thinking it convenient to linger any longer, and understanding that three partes of their troupes had already past the riuer Arar, and a fourth remained to be transported, he thought it not good to forslow that aduantage: and therefore at the third watch of the night, he marched out of his campe with three legions, to the place where they laie, and finding them scattered and dispersed; he put the greatest part of them to the sword, and the rest escaped into the woods neere adioyning. This part that was thus defeated, was named Pagus Tigurinus.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His defeat being chiefly a seruice of execution vpon such as were taken at a dangerous disaduantage, which men call vnaware, containeth these two aduises. First, not to neglect that aduantage which Sertorius by the haire of his horse taile hath proued to be very important, that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to ouercome the whole. Secondly, it may serue for a caueat, so to transport an Armie ouer a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so seuered from the bodie of the Armie, that aduantage may thereby be taken to cut them off all together, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Armie ouer a riuer, is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troupes of horse and foote, to defend the Armie from sudden assaults, as they passe ouer the water; and thus went Caesar ouer the Rhene into Germanie two seuerall times.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The manner of their watch.



Concerning the circumstance of time, when Caesar went out of his campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must vnderstand that the Romans diuided the whole night into foure watches, euerie watch containing three houres; and these watches were distinguished by seuerall notes & sound of cornets or trumpets, that by the distinction and diuersitie therof, it might easily be knowne what watch was sounded. The charge & office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefeest Centurio of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio, at whose pavilion the trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houre-glasse. The first watch began alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres, (I vnderstand such houres as the night contained, being diuided into twelue: for the Romans diuided their night as well as their day into twelue equall spaces, which they called houres) the second watch continued vntill midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewise three houres; the fourth was equall to the rest, and

and continued vntill sunne rising. So that by this phrased *de tertia vigilia*, we vnderstand that Cæsar went out of his campe in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the warches, as often as we shal finde them mentioned in historie.

CAP. V.

Cæsar passeth ouer the riuer Arar: his horsemen
incountred with the Heluetians and were
put to the worst.



THE Heluetians hauing passed the riuer, Cæsar made haste to followe after, and making a bridge he transported ouer his legions in one day, which the Heluetians could scarce doe in twentie: And sending all his horse to the number of foure thousand which he had raised in the Prouince and amongst the Hedui, to discover what waie the enemy tooke, it happened that they fell so neare vpon the reregard of the Heluetians, that they were forced to giue battell in a place of disadvantage, and by that meanes some of them were slaine and the rest put to flight. The Heluetians made insolent with this victory, for as much as 500 of their men had put to route so great a multitude, began now boldly to resist, and sometimes part of their rereward would violently assault the Roman legions. Cæsar held his men from giuing battell, thinking it sufficient for the present to keepe the enemy from pillaging, forrage, and depopulation: and so they marched fiftene daies together in such sort, that there was not aboue fve or six miles between the rereward of the Heluetians and the vangard of the Romans.

Cæsar.

THE OBSERVATION.



HIS example of the Heluetians maie lesson a commander, not to waxe insolent vpon euery overthrow which the enemy taketh, but duely to waie the true causes of a victorie gotten or an overthrowe taken; that apprehending the right cutrant of the action, he maie neither vaunt of a blinde victorie, nor be dismayed at a casuall mishappe. And herein let a heedfull warines so moderate the sequels of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and ielousie to keepe still that sweete sounding fame on foot, maie as farre surpasse the industrie, which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the continuance of happinesse doth exceede the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soule, that although from her infancy euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she

C j.

meeteth

meeteth with a counterbutte to checke her appetite, and restraine her affecti-
ons from their satisfaction; she is as much troubled in that want, as if she had
neuer receiued anie contentment at all: for our will to euerie obiect which it
seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite, which is not satisfied with a for-
mer quittance, but either seeketh present paiement, or returneth discontentment
vnto the minde. And as our soule is of an euerlasting being, and cannot thinke
of an end, to her beginning; so she seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such
things which she lusteth after: which hee, that meaneth to holde fortune his
friend, will endeouour to maintaine.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the aduantage of a hill, and so
to giue the Heluetians battell: but was put off by
false intelligence: the oportunitie being lost,
hee intendeth prouision of
corne.

Cæsar.



CÆSAR being aduertised by his discoverers, that the Helue-
tians laie vnder a hill, about eight miles distant from his campe;
and understanding that the ascent vnto the toppe of the hill, on
the further side from the enemy was readie and easie: in the
third watch he sent Labienus with two legions, to possesse them-
selues of the said hill, and he himselfe followed with the rest of the
Armie in the fourth watch. His direction to Labienus was, that
as soon as he perceiued him to charge the enemy below in the valley, that then he should
descend with as violent a shooke as he could, and so the Heluetians should bee charged
both in front and flank at one instant. But this intent was at that time frustrated
through the causelesse feare of one Publius Causidius, a man helde very skilfull in
matter of warre, for his experience first vnder Sulla, and afterward with Crassus;
who being sent by Cæsar to discover whether Labienus had tooke the Hill, was stricken
with such a terrour being so neare an enemy of that fame, that seeing the Roman en-
signes displaied vpon the mountaine, could not be perswaded but they were the Hel-
uetians, & returned that aduertisement to Cæsar: wherupon he desisted for that time
from following his purpose, and retired to the next hill, where he imbattailed his sould-
iers with aduantage of the place. This oportunitie being thus lost, because the day of
measuring corne vnto the souldiers, was within two daies: he would in no wise omit
that care (although peradventure he might haue had the like oportunitie within a daie
or two) but turned towardes Bibracte a great and opulent citie of the Hedui 18 miles
distant from his campe, and there purposed to prouide corne to paie his souldiers.

Bray in the
county of Re-
tell.

THE

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He getting of this hill as a place of aduantage, was maruellous important to the happy successe of the battel: for the aduantage of the place is not only noted as an especial cause of easy victory, throughout this historie; but in al their warres from the very cradle of their Empire; it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremitie soeuer they were put. The first reason may be in regard of their dartes and slinges, and especially their piles, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could not any waie be so available, being cast countremont or in a plaine leuell, as when the decliuitie and downfall of a swelling banke did naturally second their violent impression: Neither can the shooke at handy-blowes bee anie thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the iniurie of a rising mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course. And to conclude, if the battell succeeded not according to their desire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof, they had commonly their camps well fenced and fortified against all chances. If it be demanded whether the vpper ground be of like vse, in regard of our weapons: I answere, that in a skirmish of shot, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the nose of the peece is lower then the breech, it must needs flie at randome, and be altogether vnesfectuall: but when the nose shall be raised vpward to the side of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his owne waight, shall flie with greater certaintie and furie; considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stoppt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury. Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the shooke and incounter, to be aduantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserue as great respect, if the controuersie were decided by these weapons; as seldome times it is.

*Places of ad-
uantage in
the Roman
warres.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Y Causidius his demeanour, we see, that verified which philitions affirme, that nothing will sooner carrie our iudgment out of her proper feare, then the passion of feare: and that amongst souldiers themselves, whom custome hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flocke of sheepe into a squadron of corselets, and a few canes or osiers into pikes and lancers: which may serue to aduise a discrete General, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfect a discipline and so experienced in the service of three famous Chieffes, was so surpris'd with feare, that he could not discern his friends fro his enimies: but I wil speake more of this passion in the war, with Ariouthus.

C ij.

THE

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

*Their manner
of victualing*

IN euery relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first wordes are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparata*; as the foundation & strength of euery expedition, without which no man can manage a warre, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art military, but must be forced to relieue that inconvenience, with the losse of many other aduantages of great cōsequence: Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni that famous Admiral of France amongst other oracles of truth, wherewith his minde was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying: That he that will shape that beast (meaning warre) must begin with the belly: And this rule was diligently obserued by Cæsar, who best knewe how to expresse the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and liuely resemblance.

The order of the Romans was, at the daie of measuring, to giue come to euery particular souldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: And by the measure which was giuen them, they knew the date of the next paiement; for euery footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for if they had paid them their whole stipend in money, it might haue beene wasted in vnecessary expences; but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; and the sequell of the warre was prouidently cared for by the Generall.

The come being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they carried alwaies with them, & made into hastie cakes, daintie enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their seruants: Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for Salust reckoneth this vp amongst other dishonours, of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their come, which was giuen them by the treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of prouision had many speciall commodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualing: for it is impossible, that victualers should followe an Armie vpon a seruice, in the enemies countrey twentie or thirtie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes the Generall cannot attend aduantages and fittest oportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vnequall tearmes, or to sound an vnwilling retrain. And whereas the victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the souldiers on the other side, carelesse of the morrow and prodigall of the present, in that turbulent marmarket, where the seller hath an eie onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publike good nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion. Whereas the Romans by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publike good vpon the chiefe commander, whose dutie it was to prouide store of come for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euery priuate souldier, whome it especially

especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the common weale had in plentiful manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigalitie; which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their prouinces and the next confederate states furnished their Armies continually with corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for prouision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui: And when they were in the enemies countrey, in the time of haruest, the souldiers went out to reape and gather corne, and deliuered it threshed and clenfed to the treasurer, that it might be kept vntill the daie of payment. But to leaue this frugall and prouident manner of prouision as vnpossible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our historie, and see how the Heluetians were led, by a probable error, to their last ouerthrow.

CHAP. VII.

The Heluetians follow after Cæsar, and ouertake
the rereward. He imbattaileth his legions vpon the
side of a hill: and giueth order for
the battell.



HE Heluetians, vnderstanding of the Romans departure by fugitiues that came vnto them, were fullie perswaded that feare was the greatest cause of their retrace: for the daie before having the upper ground, they durst not vse the aduantage of the same: and hoping withall to intercept them from victuals, they followed after them with what speed they could, & as they overtook them they charged vpon the rereward. Which when Cæsar perceived, he sent his horsemen to sustaine the assault, & in the meane time he drew his forces vnto the next hill, and in the side thereof about the middle of the hill, hee made a triple battell of foure olde legions, on the toppe of the hill he placed two newe legions, which he had last inrolled in Italie, with the associate forces; and to these hee commended the baggage and impediments of the whole Armie, and filled all the rest of the hill with light armed men. The Heluetians on the other side, conuayed their carriage and impediments into one place; and hauing beaten backe Cæsars horsemen, with a thicke thronged bataillon, they put themselves into a phalanx, and so pressed vnder the first battell of the Roman legions.

Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the true sense of this triple battell, which Cæsar made vpon the side of the hill, I vnderstand it according to the ancient custome of the Romans; who in the infancie of their militarie discipline, diuided their Armie into three sortes of souldiers, *Hastati,*

C iij.

*Principes,*The manner
of their im-
battailing.

By triplex
Acies.

Principes, and *Triarij*: for I omit the velites, as no part of their standing battels, and of these they made three severall battels from front to backe: in the first battell were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole front of the Armie, and were called *Acies prima*. Behinde these in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes*, in like sort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*: and lastly in a like correspondent distance, were the *Triarij* imbattelled and made *Aciem tertiam*. Their legion consisted of ten companies, which they called cohorts, and euerie cohort consisted of three small companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Hastati*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and an other of the *Triarij*, as I will more particularly set downe in the second booke. And as these three kindes of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to backe: so was euerie battell deuided into his maniples, and these were deuided by little allies and waies, one from an other, which were vsed to this purpose: The *Hastati* being in front did euer begin the battell, and if they found themselves too weake to repell the enemy, or were happily forced to a retrait, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battell betweene the maniples of the *Principes* into the space, which was betweene the *Principes* and the *Triarij*, and there they rested themselves whilest the Princes tooke their place and charged the enemy: Or otherwise, if the commanders found it needfull, they filde vp those distances of the *Principes*, and so vnited with them into one bodie, they charged the enemy all in grosse; and then if they preuailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarij*, and so they gaue the last assault, all the three bodies being ioyned all into one.

Now if we examine by the current of the historie, whether Cæsar obserued the same order and diuisions in his warres, we shall find little or no alteration at all, for first this *triplex Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the diuision of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dreame of that ordinarie diuision, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that sence he might saie to haue made *triplicem Aciem*, let him vnderstand, that the circumstances of the diuision haue no coherence with that diuision; for in that he saith of the Heluetians, *successerunt Aciem primam*, pressed neare the first battell or vangard, he maketh it cleare that the Armie was deuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for otherwise, he would haue said, *successerint, dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*: for so were the partes of that diuision tearmed. Againe, in the retrait which the Heluetians made to the hill, when hee saith that the first and second battell followed close vpon the enemy, and the third opposed it selfe against the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, and stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the backe. It is manifest, that no other diuision can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to backe.

But that place in the first of the ciuill warres taketh away all scruple of controuersie, where he vseth the verie same, tearmes of *prima*, *secunda* and *tertia Acies*: for being to incampe himselfe neare vnto Afranius, and fearing least his souldiers

souldiers should be interrupted in their worke, he caused the first and second battell to stand in Armes and keepe their distance to the end they might shroud and couer the third battell (which was imployed in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbattailing Cæsar obserued, in most of his fights: by which it appeareth that he vseth the verie same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romans.

Concerning the auncient names of *Haslati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, which Ramus in his Militia Iulij Cæsaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole historie: I grant they are seldome vsed in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for the *Haslati*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the legionarie souldiers. The *Principes* were the lustie, and able bodied men: and the *Triarij* the eldest and best experienced. But in Cæsar's campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares, betweene the *Haslati*, *Principes* or *Triarij*, which he nameth *Prima*, *Secunda* and *Tertia Acies*; and therefore were neuer tearmed by those names, in respect of that difference. Notwithstanding in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that vertue might bee rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthie place, the said distinctions and tearmes were religiously obserued: for in the battell with Petreus at Ilerda in Spaine, he mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, *ex primo Haslato legionis quarta decima*: and in the ouerthrow at Dirrachium he saith, that the eagle bearer, being grievously wounded, commended the safetie of his ensigne to the horsemen, all the centurions of the first cohort being slaine, *prater principem Priorem*. And for the *Triarij*, there is no tearme more frequent in Cæsar then *Primipilus*, which name by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefeest Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarij*: wherby it appeareth that the maniples kept the same names in regard of a necessarie distinction, although peraduenture the *Haslati* were as good souldiers, as either the *Principes* or the *Triarij*. As touching the spaces betweene the maniples, whereinto the first battell did retire it selfe if occasion vrged them. I neuer found any mention of them in Cæsar. Excepting once here in England, where in a skirmish the Brittaines so vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Roman campe, that Cæsar sent out two other cohortes to succour them, who making distance betweene them as they stood, the court of guard retired it selfe in safetie, through that space into the campe; otherwise we neuer finde that the first battell made any retreat into the allies betweene the maniples of the second battell, but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them, as appeareth in the battell following with Ariouistus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vse of this triple battell, what can be said more then Lipsius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof as farre forth as a speculative iudgment can discern of things so farre remote from the vse of this age, which neuer imitateth this triple battell but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a vangard, a battell and a rereward: but in imbattailing, they drawe these three companies all in front, making two cornets and the battell, without any other troupes to second them. But

Lib. 1. de bello
Ciuili.

Lib. 3. de bello
Ciuili.

Lib. 5. de mi-
litia Romana.

let

let this suffice concerning Cæsar his manner of imbattailing and his *triplex Acies*, vntill I come to the second booke, where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battailions.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*A phalanx
described.*



He Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square battell of pikemen, consisting of 16 in flank and 500 in front; the souldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fift ranke were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell; the rest whose pikes were not seruiceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stood before them, and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward to holde vp the swaie or giuing backe of the former rankes, and so to make the assault more violent and vnrefistable. The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the Arte militarie, which containeth order and disposition in imbattailing, for they maintained publike professors whom they called Tactici, to teach and instruct their youth the practise and Art of al formes conuenient for that purpose. And these Tactici found by experience, that 16 in flank so ordered as they were in a phalanx, were able to beare any thocke how violently foeuer it charged vpon them: which number of 16 they made to consist of foure doubles, as first vnitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but vnitie doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled againe maketh the second order of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time maketh 8, & this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnite; and in it they staied as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is 4 the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes: for euery one of these places, the Tactici had seuerall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short obseruations: he that desireth further knowledge of them, may reade Elianus, that liued in the time of Adrian the Emperour: and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo imperator, where hee shall haue the diuisions of Tetrafalangia difalangia, Phalangia vnto a vnite, with all the discipline of the Grecians.

The chiefeft thing to be obserued is, that the Grecians hauing such skill in imbattailing, preferred a phalanx before all other formes whatsoeuer; either because the figure in it selfe was very strong, or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether Cæsar termed the battell of the Heluetians a phalanx in regard of their thicke manner of imbattailing onely, or otherwise, for as much as besides the forme, they vsed the naturall weapon of a phalanx which was the pike, it remaineth doubtfull. Brancatio in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no controuerfie, but that euerie souldier carried a pike and a target, the target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensive weapons

pons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that manie of the legionarie souldiers were wounded through the cart wheelles, with *tragulas* & *materas*, which are commonly interpreted speares and iauelins: and I take them to bee weapons longer then common dartes, but whether they were so long as the sarissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoever, this is certaine, that the Heluetians haue euer beene reputed for the true *phalangita*, next vnto the Macedonians; and that in their thicke and close imbattailing; they failed not at this time of the forme of a phalanx: for they roofed it so thicke with targets; that Cæsar saith they were fore troubled; because many of their targets were fastned and tied together, with piles darterd through them: Which argueth that their phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatsoeuer their weapon was.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away all the horses of ease:
exhorteth his men: and beginneth
the battell.



BOTH the Armies being in this forwardnesse, Cæsar to take away all hope of safetie by flight, first caused his owne horse and then all the prinate horses of ease, of the Legates, Tribunes, and the rest of the chiefe leaders, to be carried out of the battell, and vsing some motiues of courage, according as the circumstances afforded him occasion, he gaue the signe of battell. The Romans casting their piles with the aduantage of the hill, did easily breake the Heluetian phalanx; and then taking themselues to their swordes, they did second the furie of the pile with a rude and violent close.

Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



THe ancient sages found it necessary, to a faithfull and ferious execution of such an action, to prepare the mindes of their men with wordes of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceites, either of the vnlawfulnessse of the cause, or disadvantage against the enemy: for if at anie time that saying be true, that *oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For a donatiue or liberanca, can but procure a mercenarie indeuour euer yeelding to a better offer, and doe oftentimes breede a suspicion of wrong, euen amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slacke to discharge their seruice with loialtie: yea oftentimes of friendes to become enemies. But in as

Speeches of
 encouragement
 before
 they gaue
 battell.

much as speech discloseth the secrets of the soule, and discovereth the intent and drift of euery action, a few good wordes laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iustice controlled by iniquitie (for it is necessarie that a commander approue his cause, and settle an opinion of right in the minde of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seeme probable which so many offer to defend with their blood, when indeed euery man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre vp their mindes in the feruentnes of the cause, that euery man will take himselfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of equity; and the rather for that it iumpeth with the necessitie of their condition. For men are willing to doe well, when welldoing agreeth with that they would doe, otherwise the Acte may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by assent. And this maner of exhortation or speech of incouragement, was neuer omitted by Cæsar in any conflict mentioned in this historie: but he still vsed it as a necessarie instrument to set vertue on foote, and the only meanes to stirre vp alacrity: Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident, as they were at Gergobia, and at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dirrachium; he neuer would aduerture to giue battell vntill he had incouraged them againe, and confirmed their mindes in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a speech in this key, found it neuer so grauely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessarie a part, hath bred at length such an *inutilem pudorem* in our chiefe commanders, that they had rather loose the gaine of a great aduantage, then buy it with wordes to be deliuered in publike.

Lib. 7. de bello
gallico.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Roman
Pile described

IN this Chapter we may further obserue the violence of the Roman pile, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a phalanx, or any other thicke and close battell, or wherefoeuer els, the stroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the caster: for in such incounters it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keepe their order, nor answere the assault with a resisting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth that the only remedie against the pile was, to make the rankes thin, allowing to euery souldier a large podisme or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it selfe fall without hurt, or by foresight be preuented; as it shal plainly appeare by the sequell of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the places shal offer themselues to the examination of this discourse. But as touching the pile, which is so often mentioned in the Roman historie, Polybius describeth it in this manner. A pile (saith he) is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost 3 cubites long, and it hath *palmare diametrum*, a hand breadth in thicke-
ness. The staues were armed with an head of yron, equall in length to the staffe

it

it selfe: But in that sort that halfe the head was fastened vp to the middle of the staffe, with plates of yron like the head of a Halbert: and the other halfe stucke out at the ende of the staffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thicknes, and so decreasing lesse and lesse vnto the point which was barbed: This head was so slender toward the point, that the waight of the staffe would bend it as it stucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called *Pilum*, as Varro noteth of *Pilum* a Pestell, *quod Hostes feriret ut Pilum*. Lipsius finding that *Palmarum diametrum*, was too great a thicknesse to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had of both sortes, and so he maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description giuen by Polybius either in forme or waight. Patricius in his Paralleli, maketh the staffe to haue *palmarum diametrum* in the butte end, but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taper wise, vnto the head of yron, where it hath the thicknesse of a mans finger; and so it answereth both in forme and waight to a Pestell, as may be seene by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place setteth downe foure discommodities of the Pile. First a furious and hoat spirited enemy will easily preuent the darting of the pile, with a nimble and speedie close: And so we read, that in the battell which Cæsar had with Ariouistus, the Germans came so violently vpon them, that the souldiers cast away their piles, and betooke them to their swordes. And likewise in that worthy battell betweene Cateline and Marcus Petreius, they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommoditie was, that the piles being so heauie, could not be cast any distance; but were only seruiceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be cast with any aime, or as they say point blanke: And lastly the souldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them, which might easily disorder their troups, if they were not very wel experienced.

Lib. 3. de militiâ Romana.

Lib. 5.

Salust.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He last thing which I obserue in this speciality is, that the legionarie souldiers had no other offensive weapon, but one pile or two at the most, and their swordes. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes, for they came alwaies so neare before they cast their pile, that they left themselves no more time then might conueniently serue them to drawe their swordes: neither would their armes of defence, which was compleat, besides a large target which they carried on their left arme, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase whensoever a light armed enemy did make any speedy retrait, as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

CHAP. IX.

The Heluetians fainting in the battell, retire to a hill, the Romans follow after, and the battell is continued.

Caesar.



HE Heluetians were sore troubled with the Roman pikes, which stucke so fast in their shields, that they were neither able to pull them out, nor to vse their targets to any purpose: and therefore after a wearisome toile, they chose rather to cast them away, and to hazard their nakednesse upon agilitie and readinesse; then to betray their life with an vnmanageable weapon: but at length fainting with woundes, they began to giue place, and made their retrait to a hill not farre off, the better to saue themselves from the furie of the Romans. The hill being taken, and the legions following on to drine them from thence, the reregard of the Heluetians, which were the Boy and Tulingi, consisting of 15000 men stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the Romans in flanke and to inuiron them round about: which the Heluetians no sooner perceiued, but they returned and began a fresh from the hill to renew the battell, and so the legions were set vpon both in front and flanke at one instant. To remedie this difficultie, conuersa signa bipartito intulerunt, saith the history: the first and second battell fought against the Heluetians that returned from the hill, and the third battell turned themselves to beare the assault of the rereward, which stood readie to inclose them about, and to charge them on the backe. And here the fight was doubtfull and vehement for a long time, untill at length they were no longer able to indure the violence of the legionarie souldiers, part of them fled to the toppe of the hill, and the rest betooke themselves to the place, where their baggage and impediments were lodged. And hitherto, here was not one man seene to haue turned his backe in all the conflict, although the fight continued from the seuenth houre untill the euening.

Them of Borbon and Loz raine,

And

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The ensignes of the Romans



Concerning the ensignes of the Romans: we are to vnderstand that the chiefest ensigne of euerie legion was an Eagle, which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile or chiefe Centurion of the said legion. The ensigne of a maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a wolfe or a Sphinx, as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of history) by the Columne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the ensignes are figured, with such purtraitures: so that these ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore partes alwaies caried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight: and therefore in this historie, by the aspect and carrying of the ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this place

place it is said, that the ensignes of the first and second battell were carried towards the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retreat; and the ensignes of the third battell looked an other waie, towards the *Boj* and *Tulingi*, which stood of the foot of the hill: By which is signified, how the legions were diuided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning the time of the daie: we are to vnderstand that the Romans vsed not the same diuision of the daie as we commonly do: for they diuided their artificiall (which is the space between the sunne rising and setting) into 12 equall partes, which the Astronomers called vnequall or planetarie houres. The first houre of the daie began alwaies at sunne rising; the sixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was sunne setting. And as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these houres were either greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now vsed, but only at the *Aequinoctium*: so that by this manner of reckoning, *ab hora septima ad vesperum*, is meant the battell began about one of the clocke according to our Computation, and continued vntill the euening. The like we must vnderstand, throughout this whole historie, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

The diuision
of their day.

CHAP. X.

The Heluetians continue their fight, at the cariages:
but at length they left the field, and marched
towardses Langiers.



THE like courage was also shewed on either side at their baggage, the place being fortified with cartes and wagons in steed of a rampier, which so troubled the Romans that they could not winne it vntill it was late in the night: for the Heluetians being fenced with their cariages, so galled the legions with dartes and ianelins, vnder the chariots and from betwene the wheeles, that the victory was not easily atchieued. At last being able no longer to resist, they left the place and marched all that night, without any intermission; and the fourth day they came into the Confinnes of the *Lingones*, being about 230000 that escaped in the battell.

Cesar.

Langiers.

THE OBSERVATION.



IF we consider the nature of the action, and looke into the true causes of their ouerthrow, as farre as the right sense of the historie shall direct our iudgment, we shall finde valour not to be wanting in the Heluetians, but rather superlatiuey abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opi-

D iij.

nion

nion of their valiance and manhood, which carried them out of the streights of the country, to seeke larger fortunes in other kingdomes, was not so abated with the losse of the fourth part of their Host at the riuer Arar; nor with the terrible furie of those veteran legions: but it yeelded this effect, which Cæsar in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for fīue houres space or more, there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe. Their manner of imbattailing, had not the Romans beene the enemy, was vnresistable: for being cast into a phalanx, which in the plaines of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre surpasse any other forme of imbattailing (supposing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whol is deuīded into many particulars, as the violēce of a great bodie exceedeth the force and motion of his partes, when it is diuīded into smaller cantons. For as in a phalanx, many particular souldiers are by a close and compact order incorporated into one entire bodie: so their seuerall vertues are gathered into one head, and are as partes vnited into one generall force, which easily swalloweth vp the ability of many other lesser quantites, into which a greater strength is equally diuīded.

The aduantage of the place which they got by retrait, and the double charge wherewith they engaged the Romans both in front and flanke, was able in an indifferent conflict to haue made fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their side; or at the least so to haue steemed the swelling tide of victorie, which carried the Romans so violently in the chase, that they might haue beene equall sharers in the honour of the daie: had it not flowed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not so alaie the heate of the Heluetians furie; but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when they came to the place where their cariages were laide, and cost much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for they fought with that spirit and industry, as though they meant to make triall whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the daie.

The ouerthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the lesse to be maruelled at, considering they had no chiefe commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of militarie gouernment require especiall care in passing ouer a water; for then especially an Armie is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and diuīded. And therefore the Romans atchieued this victorie by the horrible vigilancie as Tully calleth it, of their commander: who alwaies watched *opportunitates rei bene gerenda*, as necessarie and speedie meanes to overcome in all his warres.

*Periculum
semper ab
hostibus gra-
uissimum su-
stinet diuisus
& inordinatus
exercitus.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar after three daies respite, followeth after the
Heluetians: he taketh them to mercie, and sendeth
 them backe againe to the country.



ÆSAR abode three daies in the place where the battell was fought, as well to burie the dead, as to refresh the wearied spirits of his ouerlaboured souldiers, that their woundes might the better be cured: and in the meane time he sent letters to the * *Lin-*
gones, not to furnish the Heluetians either with corne, or any o-
 ther provisions: for if they did, he would esteeme of them as of e-
 nemies, and take them in the number of the vanquished Helueti-
 ans; and at the three daies end, he made after them with all his forces. The Helueti-
 ans constrained through penurie and want of necessarie supplements, sent embassadors
 to Cæsar to intreat an acceptation of rendrie: who meeting him on the waie, threwe
 themselves at his feete, and with manie teares and supplications, they craued such fa-
 vourable conditions of peace, as might best comfort a distressed people and besecme the
 glory of so famous a Conquest. Cæsar first sent them word to attend his coming in the
 place where they were: and at his coming he commanded them to deliuer vnto him
 a sufficient number of hostages and pledges, 2. to giue vp all the Armes and weapons
 they had, 3. and to deliuer vp the fugitives that were fled vnto them in the time of the
 war. Whiles these thinges were a doing, part of the Heluetians to the number of 6000,
 stole out of the campe in the night, and tooke their iourney towards the Rhene, and
 the Confines of the Germans: which when Cæsar understood, hee sent presently to
 those cities, through whose territories the Heluetians had passed; and commanded
 them to bring them backe againe: which being diligently performed, he welcommed
 them with the entertainment of an enemy, and put them all to the sword. The rest he
 commanded to returne into their country from whence they came, and because they
 had neither corne nor any other sustenance, he caused the * *Allobroges* to supply their
 necessities, and willed the Heluetians to reedifie their townes and cities which they
 had before destroyed, and to inhabit in those friendly places which had giuen to their
 ancestors and themselves greater fortunes, then could elsewhere be afforded them:
 Wherein he was the more carefull, least if their country lying waste, the fertilitie of
 the soile might inuite the Germans from beyond the Rhene to tast the sweetnes which
 the Galles enjoyed, and so the prouince should be sure of an vnquiet neighbour. In the
 campe of the Heluetians was found a register, containing the particular summes of all
 that were in that iourney, amounting to the number of 358000, whereof 92000
 were fighting men: they that returned and saw the fortune of both their states, were
 110000. And thus ended that warre.

Cæsar.

* *Langres.** *Sanoyens.*

THE OBSERVATION.



He directions concerning their rendrie and returne, were very sound,
 and of good consequence. For first in that he commanded them to at-
 tend his coming in the place where they were, he tooke away al mo-
 tions

tions of new trouble which often remoues might haue caused, by the oportunitie of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the Lingones in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Cæsars displeasure, furnish the with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the Romans required of the loialty of such people as they conquered; their manner was, to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men children of the chiefeest men of that nation, whose liues depended vpon their parentes fidelitie, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion: which custome besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age, when as those children by conuersation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Roman Empire, that returning to their owne country, their actions might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be preiudiciall to the same. And least the loue of liberty and freedome should preuaile more with them, then that affection which nature had inloyned them to beare to their children: he did what he could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes and weapons as were there present: and so to become sutable to that petition of peace, which they had made. The sum of all is this. He corrected the insolencie of a furious people, & reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnes. He kept the from sacking the possessions of manie thousandes, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them backe againe to continue their name and nation in the place, where they first inhabited; which continueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so headstrong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subiect to correction and controlment.

CHAP. XII.

The states of Gallia congratulate Cæsars victorie:
*they call a councell, and discouer their inward
 griefe concerning Ariouistus, and
 his forces.*

Cæsar.



HE Heluetian warre being so happely ended, the Princes and chiefe men of all the states of Gallia, came to Cæsar to congratulate the happinesse of his victorie: and with all they besought him that with his good liking, they might call a Generall councell; wherein they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired with a common consent, to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath not to reueale the causes of their assembly, but to such as they should make choice of, to be their Oratours.

Orateurs. The councill being ended, the same Princes returned to Caesar, and in lamentable manner cast themselves at his feet, contending with as great earnestnesse, that those things which they deliuered might not be reuealed, as they did to haue their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discouerie of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull on most grieuous afflictions. Diuitiacus the Heduan was made speaker for the rest, and in effect deliuered these wordes.

That Gallia was unhappely diuided into two factions, the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two states contending manie yeares for the principalltie, the Auerni with the Sequani their Clients, finding themselves the weaker partie, hired the Germans to take their part, who at the first sent them 15000 men to strengthen their faction: but afterward tasting the sweetenesse and pleasure of the Galles, the barbarous people so liked the country, that now there were no lesse then one hundred and twentie thousand, that were come out of Germanie and seated in their Territories. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or twise fought, hoping by their promesse, both to chastice the malice of the Sequani, and to cleare their country of a barbarous enemy: but their labour effected nothing but their owne calamitie, and the utter overthrowe of their nobilitie and Senate: for they were driuen to deliuer the chiefe of their citie, as pledges to the Sequani, and to binde themselves by oath neuer to seeke their release or freedome, nor to implore the aide of the people of Rome, but euer to remaine their perpetuall bondmen: Only Diuitiacus amongst all the Hedui could neuer be brought to that thraldome, but vying that libertie which his resolution afforded him, he went to Rome and boldly opened his distressed case vnto the Senate. But in the ende, the victorie became as grieuous to the Sequani, as to the Hedui. For Ariouistus king of the Germans, was already possessor of the third part of their Territories, and at that instant he commanded them to let go another third part: for there were 24000 Germans come newly vnto him, that were allotted to that inheritance. If this violent course were not staid by the opposition of some greater motion, the Galles would soone be driuen out of their country, and be forced to imitate the Heluctians in seeking new habitations and seates of rest, farre remote from the crueltie of the Germans. Caesar might by his owne authoritie, or by the presence of his Armie, or by the renowne of his late victorie, or by the name of the people of Rome, keepe the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia.

The people
of Auvergne.

THE OBSERVATION.



IN this relation, there are diuers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to be directed by other mens misaduentures. As first into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirstie fauourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soule, & setting such vnbrideled motions on foot, as carrie men headlong into most desperate attempts: for as it had deserued commendation in either faction so to haue carried their emulation, that by their owne meanes and strength appli-

ed to the rule of good gouernment, their authority might wholly haue swaied the inclinations of the weaker states; so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in forraigne forces to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor, and in the ende were accordingly rewarded. Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrell which ciuill dissention hath broched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastlie, the often discontents of these states shew the force of a present euill, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the soule, that any other calamity either already past or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tollerable and easie in regard of that smart which the present griefe inflicteth. So the Sequani chose rather to captiuate their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage nation, then to indure the Hedui to take the hand of them: and againe, to make themselues vassals to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping cruelty of the Germans: and finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present euill in mens affections, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgment.

CHAP. XIII.

The reasons that moued Cæsar to vndertake
this warre.

Caesar.



O these petitions of the Galles Cæsar made an answer, comporting the milanesse of his naturall disposition, promising them his best furtherance in the cause, and doubted not but that Ariouistus would be intreated in any reasonable matter: and so he dismissed the assembly. Amongst many inducements, there were two of especiall importance, which urged him to vndertake this warre: the first was the dishonour and blot of infamie, wherewith the present age might haue noted the Roman Empire, if vpon complaint and imploration of aide, they should haue suffered a barbarous nation to haue held the Hedui in thraldome, who in the maiesty of their Senate had oftentimes been called their brethren and kinsmen, and graced with such titles of respect, as by the tenure of loyalty and sincerity of affection, might command greater dueties then these which were required. The second reason was the feare he had, least the Germans accustoming more and more to transport the superfluitie of their increasing families ouer the Rhene, and to plant them in the fertile seates of the Galles, the Roman Province might at length be endangered, and Italie it selfe attempted. And therefore it seemed best vnto him, to send embassadours to Ariouistus, to will him to thinke of some conuenient place of parley, where they might meete to intreat of matters concerning the publike good.

THE

THE OBSERVATION.

Maike here take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the authoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be verie large, considering that Cæsar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this historie) did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legions, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allot the gouernment of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend vnto him the careful managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered gouernment, are as well external and forraigne, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had beene to small purpose to haue giuen him onely authoritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome gouernment at home, and no meanes to take awaie such oppositions, which forraigne accidentes might set vp against him: And so we see that Cæsar vndertooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: And this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiplie in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee endangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els. they thought conuenient for the aduancement of the common weale, did wholly rest vpon their direction: *republice gesta*, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we thinke that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of busineses, as that which absolutely commandeth without controlment, and proceedeth according to the oportunitie of time and occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoever the Roman affaires were distressed and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoever power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gaue waie to the greatnes of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weale. And yet notwithstanding this absolute gouernment, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumspect soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as farre forth as his meanes and industrie could atchieue it. For olde M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigor of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrocitorem fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam vt pecunia eos multaret: ca-*

The authori-
tie of the Ro-
man Generals

Linie lib. 8.

pite anquisitum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse. The people (saith he) in whome the soueraigne power of thinges consisteth, neuer shewed greater displeasure against such, as had lost an Armie either by rashnesse or vnskillfulnesse, then imposing a fine vpon them: but to bring the life of a Generall in question for failing in his indeuours, was neuer heard of to that daie.

*Lib. 3. de bello
Cinili.*

The condition of the inferiour officers of their campe, was farre otherwise in regard of militarie discipline: for prescription guided them in all their seruices, and the chiefeest part of their duetie was obedience; although they saw euident reason to the contrarie, & found their directions vnperfect in that behalfe: And therefore Cæsar saith vpon that occasion: *alia sunt legati partes atque imperatoris, alter omnia agere ad præscriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a legate or lieutenant, differeth from that of a generall: The one doing all things by prescription; and the other freely deliberating of whatsoeuer may concerne the cause. And this course the Romans helde, concerning the authoritie of their Generals.

CHAP. XIII.

Ariouistus his answere: a second embassage, with the sucresse thereof.

Cæsar.



O that embassage Ariouistus answered, that if his occasions had required Cæsars assistance, he would haue furthered them with his owne presence. And he thought it as reasonable that if it were in his meanes to pleasure the Romans, Cæsar ought not to thinke much of the like labour: for his owne part, he durst not come into those quarters without an Armie, neither could he leuise an Armie without great charge. The thing that he most wondered at was, what the Romans had to doe in that part of Gallia, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance. Vpon the returne of this message, Cæsar framed a second embassage, the purport whereof caried this sense: For as much as he thus requited the honour wherewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignitie (for in Cæsars Consulship by that controlling authoritie of their Empire, they had vouchsafed to esteeme of him as a king in his dominions, and as a friend vnto their state) that he disdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the common good: let him knowe that these were the thinges which he required to be performed by him. First that he should not suffer any more sauge troupes of the Germans to be transported ouer the Rheine into Gallia: secondly, that he should deliuer vp those Hostages which he had from the Hedui and Sequani, and should cease to molest them with further iniuries. These things if he did performe, Cæsar would assure him of a gratefull acceptation, in the behalfe of the people of Rome: otherwise for as much as he himselfe was Procanfull
of

of the Prouince in Gallia, his charge extended by the same commission to the defence of their associates and friends; and therefore he would not neglect the iniurie of the Hedui.

To these mandates Ariouistus thus answered: the lawe of Armes kept this tenure among all nations, that a conquerour might gouerne a subdued people according as he thought best for his owne safetie. The people of Rome did not direct the course of their gouernment by another mans prescript, but by their owne arbitrement: and as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to hinder the course of his proceedings. The Hedui hauing tried the fortune of the war, and hauing hazarded their life and libertie in the casuallie of many battels, were by right become stipendarie to his Empire, whose Hostages he would retaine according to the couenants by which they made their peace. If Cæsar would needes undertake that quarell; let him know that no man euer contended with Ariouistus, but to his owne destruction. Tise when hee would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germans, that for 14 yeares space were neuer couered with any other rooffe then the Heauens.

THE OBSERVATION.

And thus farre proceeded Cæsar with Ariouistus, in debating the wronges and agreeuances of the Hedui: Wherin appeareth the difference betweene a matter handled, according to morall ciuilitie in tearmes of mildnesse and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, and dependeth rather vpon the plainnesse of the proiect, then suted with wordes fit for perswasion. For that which Ariouistus alleadged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrarie vrged by Cæsar. But as the Lacedemonian said of one, that he spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariouistus answere, that it wanted that sweeting humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it selfe; for as much as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controll the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true iudgment; but rather seasoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth couertly complaine of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing deliuerie. And therefore how great soeuer the controuersie be, that partie which exceedeth not the boundes of modestie, but maketh mildnesse his chiefeft aduocate, will so preuaile in any auditorie, that albeit equitie doth disallow her title; yet the maner of his cariage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he vseth the sequels of innocencie to proue his interest in that which he demandeth. But to leaue this circumstance, as only to be noted; let vs proceed to the war it selfe, which I made the second part of this historie.

CAP. XV.

The Treuiri bring newes of one hundred townships
of the Sweui that were come to the Rhene. Cæsar
taketh in Befanson: his souldiers are surpris-
ed with an extreame feare of
the Germans.

Cæsar.
* Triers.
* The country
about Cöstæce
in Germanie.



* Le doux.

At the same instant, as this countermessage returned from Ariouistus, there came messengers from the Hedui and * Treuiri unto Cæsar: the Hedui complained that the * Harudes, which were lately come into Gallia, did sacke their country and spoile their territories: neither could they conclude any peace with Ariouistus; but by giving sufficient pledges for their alleageance. The Treuiri brought newes of one hundred townshippes of the Sueui that were come unto the riuer Rhene to seeke a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimberius two brethren. Whereat Cæsar being moued thought his best means of preuention to consist in celerity; least the difficultie of resisting should grow greater, when those newe forces of the Sueui were ioyned with that power which was already with Ariouistus. And therefore having provided corne, he made haste to seeke the Germans, and having gone three daies iourney on his way, he had intelligence that Ariouistus with all his forces was going to take in Befanson, and that he was three daies iourney on his waie already. Cæsar knowing how much it imported him to prevent that disadvantage (for as much as the scite of the towne was of that strength, that he that commanded it might prolong the warre at his owne pleasure, being incircled with the riuer * Alduabis, excepting a small space of 600 foote; which was fortified with an exceeding high hill, and the hill strengthened with a wall, and so ioyned to the towne) made at the haste he could to take in the towne, & left a strong garrison in the same. And as he rested there a few daies to make prouision of corne, his whole Armie was surprisid with such an extraordinarie feare, that their mindes were not a little troubled therewith. For the Romans enquiring of the Galles and marchantmen, concerning the quality of the Germans, understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage inuincible, and of great practise and experience in seates of Armes: Whereof the Galles had oftentimes made triall, for when they incountred them they were not able to indure so much as the sternenes of their countenance, or the fearce-nesse of their looks: whereat the whole Armie conceived such a feare, that the courage of his men was wonderfullie appalled. The feare began among the Tribunes, and Prefects, and such other as accompanied Cæsar in this iourney, and had small or no skill in matter of warre, these men faining some one excuse, and some an other of verie earnest businesse which called them home, desired leave to depart. The rest whom shame would not suffer to forsake the campe, bewraied the like passion by their countenances and hauiour: For hiding themselves in their tentes, they either bewailed their destiny secretly

secretly to themselves; or otherwise with their acquaintance and familiar friends, they lamented the danger they were all like to fall into: so that throughout the whole campe there was nothing but making and signing of testaments. And through the talke and fearefulnesse of these men; the olde souldiers and Centurions and such as had great experience in the campe, began by little to apprehend the terror, where-with the rest were amazed: and those that would seeme to be lesse fearefull, said they feared not the enemy, but the narrownesse of the waies, the greatnesse of the woods that were betweene them and Ariouistus; or otherwise they cast doubtles where they might haue provision of corne; and manie stucke not to tell Caesar, that whensoever he should giue commandement to march forward or to aduance the standarts, the souldiers would refuse to doe it.

OBSERVATIONS.



Herein, for that we finde a strange alteration, no waie answerable to that courage, which a late gotten victorie doth finally breede in noble spirits; it shall not be amisse a litle to insitt vpon the quality of the accident, and to gather such breefe instructions from their weakenesse, as may best serue to qualifie the amasement of horror, and mitigate the frensie of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of nature cannot promise any such learning, as may discouer the true meanes and secret motions, whereby a fore conceiued feare doth trouble the senses and astonish the minde; yet since the historie offereth it to our scanning, giue me leaue only to note the strangenes of the circumstance, & rudely to delineat the picture of a beast oftener scene then well known, vsing the vnweldie pile for my pensile, and siting my speech to a warlike audiorie. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receiue intelligence of an eminent euill, which may either dispossesse the soule of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein she resteth: the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their soueraigne mistresse, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secreter pauillions of the body, where the chiefe part of the soule is most resident, and so they leaue the frontire quarters of her kingdome naked and vngarrisoned, the better to strengthen that capitall citie of the heart, out of which the life cannot flie but to the vtter ruine and destruction of the whole body. For feare is not onely a perturbation of the soule, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some euill to come, but it is also a contraction, and closing vp of the heart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward partes, to assist that place which giueth life and motion to all the rest. In this chaos and confusion of Humors and spirits, when the multiplictie of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their seruice, and by the order of nature should be disposed into seuerall instruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the minde, which presently rise from these aduertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many seuerall properties, and are stifled as it were in the

The nature of
feare.

*So here is nothing so old but bebrayning
of the furor which reason offeth.
wisdom of 17. words. 11.
the thing of 17. words. 11.
the thing of 17. words. 11.*

the throng, before they can be transported to our iudgment, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate vniformitie of place which nature requireth in the powers of the minde. And hence proceedeth that amazednesse and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of men when they are taken with this passion, that because the soule giueth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremitie of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour in an ouerthrow which hee had given him by the Hagerans, was stroken with such an excessiue feare, that he could not betake himselfe to flight, *Adeo pavor etiam auxilia formidat*, vntill one of his chiefe commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deepe sleepe, threatened him with present death if he would not preuent the ruine of the Empire, by vsing that meanes, which was only left for his safetie.

Againe, if in that turbulent consistorie, the spirits chance distinctly to receiue any apprehension proceeding from the forging facultie of the soule, they carie it presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemencie, that they leaue no place for better aduice and reknowledge. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremitie of feare to auoide one euill we run headlong into a worse, and finde a greater danger in the meanes we vse to auoide a lesse, because reason did not first trie the apprehension before it was deliuered to externall agents. And so we finde in the battel betweene Germanicus and the Almaines, that two grosse troupes of souldiers were driuen into such an extasie of feare, that taking contrarie courses to auoide one and the same danger, they either of them fled to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they bee aduised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedie.

And albeit reason be called to counsell, when a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of it selfe concludeth to betraie vertue to dishonour; and so to purchase peace with the losse of the soules chiefe treasure: which ought euer to be estimated at a higher rate, then any other happinesse which can betide the minde. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused feare, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there anie miserie greater, or any bondage more shamefull, seruile, or vile, then this which maketh men very abiects, of all other creatures, to redeeme the euill which the danger threatneth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggrauate the burthen of the sinne with loathsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment, adding oftentimes aloes to wormewood, and making the end grieuouser then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed feare, and feare yeeldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame being alwaies mingled with wrath and anger, reuengeth it selfe vpon it selfe, and bringeth more perill then the first danger could threaten. Wherby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another: so on the contrarie part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for as enuie, hatred and anger, rise oftentimes of loue; so is ioie lessened with griefe, enuie with mercie, and feare with shame.

But

But for as much as all such perturbations proceede of ignorance and inconsideratenesse, whereby we thinke that the euill is greater then indeede it is; let vs consider what disposition of our iudgment best moderateth the violent heate of these affectiōs. And first touching the passages, whereby the soule receiueth her aduertisements, as they are of diuers natures, the chiefest whereof are the eie and the eare, so are their auisos different in qualitie, and require a seuerall consideration to bee rightly discerned. The intelligence by the eie is more certaine, then that which commeth by the way of hearing: forasmuch as the eie is a witnes it selfe of euery action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceived in her proper object: and therefore the iudgment is not much troubled, to determine definitiuely how great or how small the danger is, when the relations eatie alwaies that certainty. And albeit the eare in like manner be not deceived in her proper object, for it faithfully giueth vp that sense, which sound hath deliuered vnto it: yet for as much as the fantasie hath greater scope to coine her vaine conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessarie that the discourfing facultie be called for an assistant before the iudgment can truly determine: and then it will appeare, that the truth doth not alwaies answere the report which is made thereof, in as much as diseased spirits will not sticke to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themselues are tuned. And therefore this first commeth to bee considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was receiued. But concerning the iudgment it selfe this is most certaine, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affectiōs of the soule: And againe, the purer the iudgment is, and the higher it is lifted vppe from earthly natures, being no further interessed therein, then to holde a resolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affectiōs, which trouble and molest it; for then it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or euil that is in thinges.

To redresse this inconuenience, Caesar betooke himselfe to the fittest & most proper remedie, which was by the authoritie of his speech to restore reason to her former dignitie, & by discourse which feare had interrupted in them, to put downe a vsurping passion which had so troubled the gouernment of the soule; recalling it to the meane of true resolution, which was to moderat audacity with warines, but not to choake valour with beaulty cowardice: for these Oratorie inducing perswasions were not the least point of their discipline, considering how they framed the inward habite of the minde (being the fountaine and beginning of all motion) to giue life and force to those actions which the seuerity of outward discipline commanded. For as lawes and constitutions of men inforce obedience of the bodie: so reason and perswasions must winne the soules consent, according to that saying, *homines duci volunt, non cogi.*

CAP. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Armie, concerning
this feare.

Cæsar.



ÆSAR calling a Councell of war, wherein the Legates, Tribunes and Centurions of all the orders and degrees were assembled, he greatly blamed them: First, that any man should bee so inquisitiue as to imagine to himselfe, whither and vpon what seruice they were carried. Concerning Ariouistus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulshippe, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome; and why then should any man misdeeme, that he should so vnadvisedly goe backe from his duty? For his owne part he was verelie perswaded, that if Ariouistus once knew his demandes, and vnderstood the reasonable offers that he would make him, that he would not easily reiect his friendship, nor the fauour of the people of Rome. But if he were so madde, as to make warre vpon them, why should they be affraid of him? or why should they despaire either of their owne prowesse, or of Cæsars circumspectnesse? For if it came to that point, the enemye that they were to incounter, had bene tried what he could doe twise before. First, in their fathers daies, when the * Cimbri and the Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, and now of late againe in Italie, at the insurrection of the bondmen, who were not a little furthered through the practise & discipline which they receiued of the Romans, whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute: in as much as whom for a time they feared without cause being naked and vnarmed, the same men afterwarde (although well armed and Conquerors withall) they nobly ouercame. And to be short, these were no other Germans, then those whom the Heluetians had vanquished in diuers conflicts, not onely in their owne country where the Heluetians dwelt themselves, but also euen at home at their owne doores; and yet the same Heluetians were not able to make their partie good against our Armies. Concerning the Galles, they were overcome more by cunning & pollicie, then by force; which although it tooke place against sanage and vnskilfull people, yet was not Ariouistus so simple as to thinke that he could ensnare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that fained the cause of their feare to be the difficultie of prouision of corne, and the dangerousnesse of the way, they tooke more vpon them then became their place, in presuming to teach their Generall what he had to doe, as if he had not knowne what pertained to his duty. The Sequani and Lingones had vndertooke that charge, and what the waies were, should shortly be scene: Whereas it was reported that the soldiers would not obey his mandates, nor aduance their standarts, he little esteemed it; for he was well assured, that if an Armie refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought vnfortunate in his enterprises; or els for that hee was notoriously conuicted of Auarice: but the whole course of his life should witnesse his innocencie, and the overthrow of the Heluetians his happines. And therefore that which he was minded to haue put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence,

that

* Cimbri, a nation came out of Germanie and droue out the Aduatici and are now the Zelanders. Teutoni, Germans.

that without further delay he might vnderstand, whether shame and respect of dutie would preuaile more with them; then feare and cowardice. And though he wist that no man els would follow him: yet notwithstanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of which he doubted nothing, and would accept it as the chiefe band and guard of his person. Vpon the making of this speech, the mindes of all men were wonderfully changed: for it bred in euery one a great alacritie and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to giue him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him of their readinesse to set forward to the warre.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the speech it selfe are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and militarie instructions, which deserue examination; amongst which I note first, the extraordinarie number admitted to the Councell, *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibit* *Centurionibus*: Whereas there were vsually no more admitted to their councell of warre but the Legates, Quæstor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first orders, which I vnderstand to be the first *Hastate*, the first *Princeps*, and the first *Pilum* of euery legion. And this is manifestly proued out of the fift Commentarie where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix, in which amongst other there were two valiant Centurions, Pulso, and Varenus: betweene whom there was euerie yeare great emulation for place of preferment, *Et iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion, and were very neare the dignitie of the first cohort, wherein as in all the rest there were 3 maniples, and in euerie maniple two orders.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe first motiue which he vseth to recall their exiled iudgment, discovered their breach of discipline: for contrarie to the course of militarie gouernment, they had presumed not only to make inquirie, but to giue out whither, and vpon what seruice they were caried; which in the rigour of campe pollicie, could not passe without due punishment: for what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer to be measured with the vulgar conceit? or waied in the ballance of such false iudgements? especially when those weake Censors are to be Actors, and executioners of the designe: for then euerie man will sute the nature of the action according to his own humor, although his humor be led with blindnesse, and haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehension of profit or disaduantage. And in this case there cannot be a better president then nature hath prescribed: for as natural Agents, whilst they concur to produce a worke of absolute perfection, neither know what they doe, nor can discern the things they looke vpon; but yeeld themselves to be guided by a moderator

of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their abilitie to the direction of some wise and prudent captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the losse of many particulars, with the health and safetie of the publike good. For if euery man should prescribe, who should obay? *Tam nescire quædam milites, quam scire oportet*, saith Otho in Tacitus vpon the like disorder: and againe, *parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando res militares continentur*; which proueth that the greatest vertue which is required in a souldier is obedience, as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Whether men
haue greater
courage in
their owne or
in a strangers
country.

IN the reason which he vseth to proue their disparitie of valour, in regard of the Romans, being superiour to the Heluetians that had oftentimes ouerthrowen the Germans; he strengtheneth the argument with the aduantage of the place, and saith that the Heluetians had put them to the worst, not onely where the Heluetians dwelt themselves, but euen in their owne country, and at home at their owne dores: as though an enemie were charged with greater furie in the presence of a mans own country and dearest friendes, then in a strange and yknowne land. This question was handled in the Roman Senate, by Fabius Maximus, and Scipio surnamed Africanus, when they sate in counsell how to ridde their country of that subtille Carthaginian, that for sixteene yeares space had fretted like a canker the beautie of Italie, wasted the land and brought it to desolation: sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duety, ouerthrowen their Armies, slaine their Consuls, and threatned their imperiall cittie with ruine and destruction. Fabius vpon the motion to make warre in Africke, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let warre be set on foot in Africke; and first let them be without feare themselves, before they went about to terrifie others: for those forces afforded little hope of victorie in another kingdome, that were not able to free their owne country from so dangerous an enemie. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian common weale with the like counsell: and concerning Hannibal, let them be sure of this, that they should finde him a forer enemy in his owne country, then in an other kingdome. Scipio on the other side, caried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for he shewed that Agathocles the Syracusan king, being a long time afflicted with the Punicke warre, auerted the Carthaginean from Cicily, by transporting his forces into Africke: but how powerfull it was to take awaie feare, by retorting danger vpon the oppressor, could there be a present example then Hannibal? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betweene the spoile and wast of a strangers country, and to see their owne natie country wasted with sword and destruction: *plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti*, for he that inuadeth an others kingdome, easily discouereth both the aduantage which may

may be taken againſt the enemy, and the ſtrength whereupon he reſteth: And amongſt the variable euent of warre, many vnexpected occaſions ariſe which preſent victory to him that is ready to take it; and many ſtrange chances ſo alter the courſe of thinges, that no foreſight can diſcerne what may happen. With theſe and the like reinonſtrances, this queſtion of no leſſe doubt then importance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captaines, whoſe mindes as it ſeemed, were intangled with ſuch particular affections for the preſent, as might rather draw them to wreſt reaſon to their owne humor, then to determine in ſincerity of iudgment, vpon what ſpecialities the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their poſitions. But to leaue other commodities or diſadvantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will only ſet downe ſome reaſons to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated; by the accidents which riſe in a warre of that nature. And firſt this cannot be denied, the teſtimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the property of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victorie, and hope conceiueth ſuch ſpirites as naturally follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becommeth hardie and reſolute in victorie: ſo on the other ſide diſadvantage and danger breede feare, and feare ſo checketh valour, and controlleth the ſpirits, that vertue and honor giue place to diſtruſt, and yeelde vp their intereſt to ſuch directors, as can afford nothing but diffidencie & irrefolution: Neither can it be denied, but he that ſetteth vpon an enemy in a ſtrange country, and ſo preuenteth ſuch attemptes as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giueth life vnto action, and ſteeleth his enterpriſe with reſolution; for beſides the commoditie of leauing when he liſt, and proceeding as far forth as he ſhall finde his meanes able to fortunate his attemptes; hee knoweth that the ſtrife and controuerſie is not for his native country, which he quietly enioyeth, and is reſerued at all times to entertaine him, howloeuer fortune ſhal fauour his deſignes: but for a ſtrangers kingdome which his ambition thiſteth after; wherein for as much as the riches and wealth of that ſtate are laide before them as the recompence of their labour, beſides the honour which is atchieued thereby, euerie mans valour ſoareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increaſed without any trouble or diſturbance of the other faculties of the minde. But when a Prince ſhall be aſſaulted in his owne kingdome, and in the ſight of his ſubiectes haue his land conſumed with ruine and deſtruction: the danger will ſo diſturbe the powers of the ſoule, that through the turbulent diſorder of the weaker partes, the better faculties will loſe their prerogatiue of aduiſing how the enemy may be beſt reſiſted; when as euery man ſhal apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it. And albeit the preſence of ſuch thinges as are deareſt to his ſoule, as the pietie and reſpect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are ſufficient to raiſe valour to the higheſt point of reſolution: yet the motiues are of ſuch waight as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth as vnſufficient to maintaine ſo great a cauſe, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: for as much as the terrour and feare of ſo great a danger will preſent a greater meaſure of woes to their minde, then the hope of victory

can afforde them ioy. Hence therefore groweth the difference betweene him, that seeketh to maintaine that estate which he hath in possession by force of Armes; and an other, that seeketh to increafe his meanes by valour. For the former is presented with the danger of loosing all his estate, which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him; and the other looketh vpon the aduantage, which he gaineth by ouercomming; which much increaseth his valour, without any losse or disaduantage, if he chance to be put to the worst. And therefore there is alwaies great ods betweene him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that meanes become desperate, hauing nothing further to loose; and another, that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to loose it: for feare will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his owne ability, then entertaine a resolution of valour. To proue this, we neede not seeke other examples, then those imperiall cities, in whose cause this controuersie was first moued. For when Hanniball was come into Italy and had defeated Sempronius the Consull at Trebeas, the Romans were driuen into such an extasie of terror, that they beleued verely that the enemy was then comming to assault the citie; neither had they any hope or aid in themselues to keepe or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africke, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the citie had been already taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which Hanniball by a conquering Armie in Italy had confirmed for sixteene yeares together, preuaile in the apprehension of so imminent a danger. And then that which Fabius borrowed of nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their own, before they seeke other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all speed they sent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therefore other things be correspondent, as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either nation to be considered, I take it much better for a Prince to inuade an enemy in his owne country, then to attend him at home in his owne kingdome.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



He last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it selfe peraduenture as faultie as any other: wherein he shewed great arte and singular wisdom. For he that hath once offended and is both burthened with the guilt of conscience, and vpbraided with the reproch of men, can hardly be perswaded that his fault can bee purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but still remaineth to cast dishonour vpon the offender, and to accuse him of disloialtie: And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an error being once rashly committed, through despaire of remission admitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere scelus luendum est*; or maintaineth his error by wilfull

wilfull obstinacie: as it is saide of the Lyon that being found by hunters in a caue, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his propertie is thus expressed; *ingrediendo cæcus, exeundo proteruus*. This did Cæsar wisely preuent, by cleering the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Armie, which made them so much the more earnest to answere his expectation, in as much as they were witnesses to themselves of a common error: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacrity in the sequell of the warre, and to deserue more then the iudgment of the Emperour had imputed to their fellowes.

CHAP. XVII.

The treatie betweene Cæsar and
Ariouistus.

HE rest of the legions in like manner dealt with their Tribunes and chiefe Centurions, to satisfie Cæsar of their obedience, affirming that they neuer doubted nor feared, no nor so much as thought that it belonged to them, to determine any thing concerning the course of the warre, but that it was onely left to their Emperour; their purgation accepted, and good instructions being taken by Diuitiacus, in the fourth watch he marched forward according to the purport of his former speech. The senenth day as he continued on his journey, his espialles brought him word, that Ariouistus with all his forces was within 24 miles of that place: who alsoone as he vnderstood of Cæsars comming, sent embassadours vnto him, declaring that forasmuch as he was come somewhat nearer and that he might doe it without danger, he was content to admit of a parlee, vpon this condition, that Cæsar would bring no footmen to the meeting (for he feared to be surprised by treacherie) but onely horsemen, and in that sort he would meete him. Cæsar accepted of the condition, hoping at length that he would harken to reason and desist from wilfull obstinacie: and because he durst not commit himselfe to the French horsemen, he thought it best to take their horses, and to set the souldiers of the tenth legion vpon them, that if he stood in neede he might haue a faithfull guard of his friendes about him. There was a great and open plaine, and in the middest thereof a rising mount, and thither they came to the parlee: the legion which Cæsar had brought with him on horsebacke, he placed 200 paces from the said mount; and likewise the horsemen of Ariouistus stood in the same distance: Ariouistus requested that they might talke on horsebacke, and bring each of them ten persons to the parlee. Their expostulations were the same in effect, with those messages which were carried betweene them by embassadours. Much unkindnes tooke by Cæsar, considering the friendship which the Romans had shewed vnto Ariouistus, that he would not vouchsafe to treat with them: and on the other side as great iniurie conceived by him, forasmuch as the law of nations gaue no such prerogatiue to any one people that they should challenge in other countries by

Cæsar.



desert:

desert: but that generally it had giuen dominion to valour, and kingdomes to conquering armies. But while the treatise thus continued, it was told Caesar that Ariouistus his horsemen were comming neerer vnto the mount, and that they began to skirmish with his soldiours; whereupon Caesar brake off the treatie, and withdrew himselfe to his men, commaunding them that they shoulde not cast a weapon at the enemy: for although hee perceived that without perill of his legion hee might haue incountered with Ariouistus men, yet he would not giue occasion by putting them to flight, to haue it said, that he had entrapped them vnder pretence of parlee. At his returne, when it was reported to the common soldiours, howe arrogantly Ariouistus had caried himselfe in the treaty, forbidding the Romaines all Gallia, and that his men of armes did offer to assault the legion, insomuch that the treaty was thereby broken off; the soldiours were more desirous of battell then before, and by these degrees they obtained it. Two daies after Ariouistus sent againe to Caesar, to haue those thinges persited which were begun in the treaty. Caesar thought it not good to make any further meeting in his owne person, and the rather because the Germanes had no state of themselues the daie before, but they threw darts and stones at his men; and whome soeuer of his men hee should send vnto him should go into great danger, as cast into the hands of a sauage people. The best way he could thinke of was, to send Valerius Procillus, a well accomplished yong man, that spake the French tongue well, and had no waie offended the Germanes, and with him he sent Marcus Titius, a man well knowne to Ariouistus, vsing sometimes to resort as a guest vnto him: To these he gaue in charge that they should diligentlie marke, and in stie report vnto him what Ariouistus said; But as soone as Ariouistus sawe them in his campe, hee cried out to them in the presence of his army, asking them what they had to do there, and whether they came as spies? And as they went about to make their answer, he would not heare them, but caused them to be cast into irons. The same day he removed, and incamped vnder the side of a hill 6. miles from Caesars campe; the next day he came two miles beyond Caesar, neerer to the middest of Gallia, of purpose to cut off all corne and conuoie as should be sent vnto the Romaines, by the Hedui and Sequani. From that day forward, by the space of five daies together, Caesar imbattailed his men before his campe, to the intent that if Ariouistus pleased to giue battell, he might haue libertie when hee would; but Ariouistus all this while kept his armie within his campe, and daily sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romaines. This was the manner of fighting which the Germanes had practised: there were 6000. horsemen, and as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had selected out of the whole host, euerie man one for his safegard; these they had alwaies at hand with them in battell, and vnto these they resorted for succour; if the horsemen were ouercharged, these euer stept in to helpe them; if anie one were wounded and vnhorsed, they stood about him and succoured him: if the matter required either to aduenture forward, or to retire speedilie backe againe; their swiftnesse was such through continuall exercise, that hanging on the horse maine by the one hand, they would run as fast as the horses.

THE OBSERVATION.

Footemen
intermingled
amongst
horsemen.

IT may seeme strange vnto the soldiours of our time, that the footemen should be mingled pell mell amongst the horsemen, without hurte and disadvantage to themselues: so vnlikely it is that they shoulde either succour the

the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some haue imagined that these footmen in the incounter cast themselves into one bodie, and so charging the enemy assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I wil alleage to this purpose, plainly euince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist euery particular man as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore the choise of these footmen, was permitted to the horsemen, in whose seruice they were to be imployed, that euery man might take his friend in whom he reposed greatest confidence: When they were ouercharged these stept in to helpe them; if anie man were wounded or vnhorsed he had his footman ready to assist him; and when they were to go vpon any speedie seruice, or suddainly to retire vpon advantage, they staid themselves vpon the maine of the horses with one hande, and so ran as fast as the horsemen could go: which seruices they could not possible haue performed without confusion and disorder, if the footmen had not seuerally attended vpon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election. The principall vse of these footmen of the Germanes consisted in the aide of their owne horsemen vpon any necessity, not so much regarding their seruice vpon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practised the same Arte to a more effectuell purpose, namely as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troupes of horse, then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memory which history mentioneth, is recorded by Liuius in the second punicke war, at the siege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better; so their caualry was alwaies put to the worst: & therefore they inuented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in force. Out of the whole army were taken the choisest young men, both for strength & agilitie, and to them were giuen little round bucklers, and seuen darts apeece in steed of their other weapons; these soldiours practised to ride behind the horsemen, and speedily to light from the horses at a watchword giuen, & so to charge the enemy on foot. And when by exercise they were made so expert that the nouelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horsemen went forth to incounter with the enemy, euery man carying his foot soldior behinde him, who at the encounter suddainly alightning charged vpon the enemy with such a fury, that they followed the in slaughter to the gates of Capua: And hence saith Liuius grew the first institution of the Velites, which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this strategem is said to be one Q. Nauius a Centurion, & was honorably rewarded by Fuluius the consull for the same. Salust, in the history of Iugurth, saith, that Marius mingled the Veelites with the Caualrie of the associates, *ut quacunq; inuaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent*. The like practise was vsed by Cæsar, as appeareth in the thirde booke of the Ciuill warre; sauing that instead of the velites, hee mingled with his horsemen 400. of the lustiest of his legionarie soldiours, to resist the caualrie of Pompei, while the rest of his armie passed ouer the riuer Genusum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dirrachium, *qui tantum profecere*, saith the text; *Vt eque-*

Lib. 6.

Lib. 3. de
excid.

Lib. 3.

De bello A-
fricano.

stri pralio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent. Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times strengthened their caualrie with footemen dispersed amongst them. The Romaine horsemen, (saith Polibius) at the first caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, and a little round buckler; but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians, which Iosephus affirmeth to bee a strong launce or staffe, and three or foure darts in a quiner with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their launce was most effectuell when they charged in troupe, pouldron to pouldron; and that maner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle footmen: but when they vsed their darts, euerie man got what aduantage of ground he coulede, as our Carbins for the most part do, and so the footemen might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they woulde easilie make place for the footmen to serue among them: But howsoever it was, it appeareth by this circumstance howe little the Romaines feared troupes of horse, considering that the best meates to defeate their horse was by their foote companies. But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two; the one out of Liuiue, to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to footemen: the other out of Hirtius, to shewe the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen, In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius: Valerius hauing fortunatelie ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines, wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines reserued 2000. of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the leste corner of the Romaines, as they were in conflict; which tooke such effect, that the legionarie footemen of that corner were forced to retreat. Which the Romaine horsemen beeing in number 600. perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy; they presently forooke their horses, and made haste to make good the place on foote; wherein they caried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and the betooke themselves againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point. The Numidians, as Cæsar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that euer hee met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Germanes did, mingling among them light armed footemen: an Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the history saith, that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle.* And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rerewarde of the armie, according to the manner of the Numidian fight; the historie saith, *Cæsariani interim non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani sese conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad unum terga vertebant.* So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legionariam militem commodius sustinebat.* And euer as he marched hee caused 300. soldiours of euerie legion to bee free and without burthen, that they might be ready vpon all occasions, *Quos in Equi-*
tatum

tum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legionarij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire caperunt. I allege the verie wordes of the hiltorie, to take awaie all suspicion of falsifying, or wresting anie thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this disparitie, he shall finde it to be chiefly the worke of the Roman pile, an vnresistable weapon, and the terrour of horsemen, especially when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, and fell so thicke, that there was no meanes to auoid them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troupe of horse, then the Cavalry of their owne partie, although they bare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and readie they were, that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with farre greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For as the force of all the engines of olde time, as the *Balista*, *Catapultæ* and *Tolenones*, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth as the onely strength and life of the engine; so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmenes & stay, which nature by the earth or some other vnmooueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that listeth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heauier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heauier then his bodie. The footmen therfore, hauing a surer staie to counterpoise their forced motion, then the horsemen had, cast their dartes with greater violence, and consequently with more certaintie.

CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar preuenteth Ariouistus of his purpose, by
making two Campes. *The superstition*
of the Germans.



*W*HEN Cæsar perceiued that Ariouistus meant nothing lesse then to fight, but kept himselfe within his campe; least peraduenture he should intercept the Sequani and other of his associates, as they came with conuoies of corne to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans abode about 600 paces from their campe; he chose a ground meete to incampe in: and marched thither in three battels, commanding two of them to stand readie in Armes, and the third to fortifie the campe. Ariouistus sent 15000 footmen, and all his horse to disturbe the souldiers, and to hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding Cæsar as he had before determined, caused two battels to withstand the enemy, and the third to go through with the

Cæsar.

G ij.

worke:

worke: which being ended, he left there two legions, and part of the associate forces, and led the other foure legions backe againe into his greater campe, and so he rested secure concerning the conuoyes from the Sequani, and by his greater campe cut off the passages betweene Ariouistus and the Rhene. The next day Caesar according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his camps, and marching a little from the greater campe, he put his men in aray and profered battell to the enemies; but perceiuing that Ariouistus would not stir out of his trenches, about noone he conuaid his Armie into their seuerall camps. Then at length Ariouistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser campe: the incounter continued very sharpe on both parts, untill the euening; and at sunsetting after many woundes giuen and taken, Ariouistus conuaid his armie againe into their campe. And as Caesar made inquirie of the captaines what the reason was, that Ariouistus refused battell: he found this to be the cause. The Germans had a custome, that their women should by casting of lots, and southsaying, declare whether it were for their behoofe to fight or no, and that they found by their Arte, the Germans could not get the victorie if they fought before the newe moone.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Ifst we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans obserued, and by which they conquered so many nations: for besides the safetie which it afforded their own troupes, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage, and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselues, or impeach the enemy by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking vp his campe, besides many other aduantages, all auerring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: *dolabra vincendum esse hostem*: a thing long time neglected, but of late happely renewed by the commanders of such forces as serue the states in the vnited prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vse of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoeuer, which maie bee thought worthie executioners of the deedes of Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



IN the second place we may obserue, that there was no nation so barbarous (for I vnderstand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion as any knowne nation of that time, being in a Climate so neare the North, that it afforded no contemplation at al) that could not make vse in their greatest affaires, of that superstition to which their minde was naturally intralld; and forge propheties and diuinations as well to stir vp as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best

best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæsar let slip the occasion of making vse of this their religion: for vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbad them to fight before the newe moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieuing might preiudice their resolution to returne conquerers: Which may serue to proue that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueniencies, which industry or fortune may discouer to their ouerthrow. It is recorded that Columbus, being Generall of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Castile sent to discouer the west Indies, & suffering great penury for want of victuals in the Ile of Iamaica: after that he had obserued how the Ilanders worshipped the moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he tolde the inhabitants that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appeare towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darkenesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, stricken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might assist their enemies to depopulate, and ouer runne their owne countrie.

CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to giue them battell, and the
Germans dispose themselues therunto.



*C*ÆSAR foreflowed not that aduantage: but the next daie in the morning leauing a sufficient garrison in each of his camps, for as much as the number of his legionarie souldiers was small in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed at the auxilinarie troupes, for a shew before the lesser campe, and putting his legions into a triple battell, he marched towards the campe of Arionistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting euery tribe & people by it selfe, in a like distance and order of battell, and inuironing their whole Armie with their cartes and cariage, that there might be no hope at all left to saue any man by flight, that durst not abide the fortune of the battell: In these chariots they placed their women, that they by their outstretched handes and teares mouing pittie, might implore the souldiers as they descended by course into the battell, not to deliuer them, the authors of their life and being, into the bondage and thraldome of the Romans. Cæsar assigned to euerie legion a Legate and a Questor, that euerie man might haue an eie witnesse of his valour: and he himselfe began the battell with the right cornet; for as much as he perceined that part of Arionistus Armie to be the weakest.

Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE Romaines euen from the infancie of their state were euer zealous admirers of true honour, and alwaies desired to beholde with the eye, to what measure of vertue euerie man had attained; that the young with greater feruency of spirit might founde out the celebration of *Macte virtute*, which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom, considering that the most pretious things that are, loose much of their worth, if they be not suted with other correspondent natures, whose sympathie addeth much more excellencie then is discerned, when they appeare by themselves without such assistance. For how small is the beauty which nature hath giuen to the eie-pleasing diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall forme? or what perfection can the forme giue without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auaille all these where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an heart to embrace it? such a vnion hath nature imprinted in the diuersitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whose carriage there is a far greater exactnes of correspondency required to approue them honorable, then was requisite to make the iewell beautiful. And this did Cæsar in all his battels; amongst the rest that at Alesia is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominia ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Liuius would expresse how valiantly an action was caried, he saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*, which is as much to saie, that forasmuch as the Romaines were diligent obseruers of euerie mans worth, rewarding vertue with honor, and cowardice vvith reproch; euerie man bent his vvhole indeuour to deserue the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that duty which he owed to the common wealth, with all loyalty and faithfulness of spirit.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell, the first was called *Acies recta*, when neither the cornets nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most vsuall manner of im-battailing.

The second forme of the front was called *obliqua*, when as one of the cornets was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the rest, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right cornet: for the right cornet of an army had great aduantage against the left of the enemies, in regarde of

of their weapons and furniture: But Cæsar did it in this place, because hee perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemy is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an army: for so favorable are mens iudgements to that which is already happened, that the sequell of euery action dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning, *Dimidium facti qui bene cepit habet*, (saith a Poet) and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the ende must needs erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qualitie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good ende without a good beginning: for although the beginning bee oftentimes disastrous and vn lucky, and the end fortunate and happie, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy ende in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his armie to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front is called *Sinuata*, when both the cornets are aduanced forward, and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best soldiours were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old soldiours in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuersie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called *gibbosa* or *gibbera Acies*, when the battell is aduanced, and the two cornets lag behinde. This forme did Haniball vse in the battell of Cannas, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his soldiours, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romaines following the retreit of the battell, which was easily repeld, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

CHAP. XX.

The battell betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.



HE signe of battell was no sooner giuen, but the Romaines charged vpo the enemy so fiercely, as though they ment to giue themselves the lye: for seeming to acknowledge that they once conceiued any feare of the Germanes; and the enemy on the other side returned so speedie a counterbusse, that the legions had no time to cast their Piles, and therefore they speedilie betooke them to their swordes. But the Germanes putting themselves according to their manner into a Phalanx, receiued the force of their swordes, without any daunger or losse at all. In the battell there

Cæsar.

there were many legionarie souldiers, that were seene to keepe vpon the phalanx, & to pull vp with their hands the targets that couered it, and so to wound & kil those that were underneath: and by that means, they brake & dispersed it, and so the left cornet of the enemy, was ouerthrowne & put to flight. Now while the right cornet was thus busied, the left cornet was ouercharged with an vnequall multitude of the Germans, which young Crassus the Prefect of the horsemen no sooner perceined (hauing more scope and libertie then any of the commanders that were in the battell) he sent tertiam Aciem, the third battell, to rescue and aide their fellowes that were in danger, by meanes whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight and neuer looked backe untill they came to the Rhene, which was about fve miles from the place where they fought; where some few of them saued themselves by swimming, others found a few boates and so escaped; Arionistus lighting vpon a little barke tied to the shore, with much a doe recovered the other side of the Rhene, and so saued himselfe: the rest were all slaine by the horsemen. As Caesar pursued the German horsemen, it was his chance to light vpon Valerius Proculus, as he was drawne vp and downe by his keepers bound with three chaines, which accident was as gratefull to him as the victorie it selfe, being so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, whom the barbarous enemy, contrarie to the law of nations, had cast into prison; & in his own presence had three severall times cast lots vpon his life, whether he should be then burned or reprimed vnto another time; and still he was saued by the fortune of the lots: and Marcus Titius was found in like manner and brought vnto him. The fame of this battell being caried beyond the Rhene: the Suevi that were come to the bankes of Rhene, returned home againe, whom the inhabitants belonging to the saide riuer pursued, and slew a great number of them. Caesar hauing thus ended two great warres in one sommer, he brought his Armie into their wintering camps, somewhat sooner then the time of the yeare required.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His phalanx here mentioned, can hardly be proved to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to vnderstand it to be so teamed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the Heluetian phalanx. Secondly, I obserue, that Cæsar kept the olde rule concerning their discipline in fight: for although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his historie; yet he omitted not the substance, which was, to haue *primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should begin the battell, and the second should come fresh and assist them; or peraduenture if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were ioyned together, and so charged vpon the enemy with greater furie and violence: but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in subsidio, as they teamed it, to succour any part that should be ouercharged; which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For if we either respect the incouragement of the souldiers, or the casualtie of fortune; what could be more added to their discipline in this behalfe, then to haue a second & a third succour, to giue strength to the fainting weaknes of their men, and to reparaire the disadvantage which any accident

accident should cast vpon them? or if their valour were equally balanced, and victorie stood doubtfull which of the two parties shce should honour, these alwaies stept in, being fresh, against wearie and overlaboured spirits, and so drew victorie in despite of casualltie vnto themselves.


THE SECOND OBSERVATION.




Concerning use of lots, it shall not be amisse to looke into the nature of them, being in former times so generall, that there was no nation ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affaires, by the sentence of lots. As we may not refuse for an vndoubted truth, that which Salomon saith the 16 of Prouerbs: The lots are cast into the lap: but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lords: Through the knowledge whereof, Iosua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Jonas, and the Apittles, to consecrate Matthias. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth could direct them no further then to senselesse superstition, and put them in minde of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destenie, and as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull. Aristotle the wisest of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that euent casuall, or proceeding from fortune; of which the reason of man could assigne no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause: So that whatdoeuer happened in any action besides the intent of the agent and workeman, was tearmed an effect of fortune, or chance of habnab. For all other effects which depended vpon a certaine and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casuall or subiect to the inconstancie of chance: And because manie and sundrie such chances daily happened, which like *terra filij* had no father, and could not be warranted, as lawfull children, either to nature or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of fortune; as the principall efficient and soueraigne Motor of all such v unexpected euents, that is, they made nothing else the gouernesse, and directresse of many things: which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity naturall causes, and was deified with celestiaall honour, as the Poet saith, *Nos te facimus fortuna deam caloque locamus*. By the prouidence of this blinde goddesse which held her deity by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all casuall actions directed, and especially lots; the euent whereof depended onely vpon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, & the euent could not haue been called *Sors*, but must haue been reputed in the order of necessary effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cause. Whereby we see vpon how weake an axletree, the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, hauing irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the *intelligentie*, that gouerned their reuolutions. All herein all sortes of men, (although in diuers respectes) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken vnto them, and reuealed the mysteries of fatall destinie.

The use of
lots.

Rome directed the maine course of her government, by the fortune of this mocke destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancie with the free choice of their commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authority: yet the publike affaires, which each Consull was feuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemy were entered into their confines to depopulate and wast their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the government of the cittie; and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war. If forces were to be sent into diuers prouinces and against feuerall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Consull his taske: but their peculiar charges were authorised by lots. If any extraordinarie action were to be done in the citie, as the dedication of a temple, the sanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, *Sors omnia versat*, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weake foundation of this practise in their Theologie & deepest diuinitie) we may not thinke but these skilfull Architects of that absolute government, wherein vertue ioyned with true wisdom, to make an vnexampled patterne: we may not thinke I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be preuented, but by the vse of lots. For when things are equally leuelled betweene diuers obiects, and run with indifferencie to equall stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towardes one coast, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of nature be not inuerfed, nor a well established gouernmēt disturbed: So the state of Rome casting many things with equall charge vpon her two soueraigne magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented to interesse the one in that office and to discharge the other, then to appoint an arbiter, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be saide why it was so, but that it was so: for if the wisdom of the Senat had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily haue burst out into ciuill discord, considering the often contentions between the Senat and the people, the factions of Clients, & the constant mutabilitie of euery mans priuate affections necessarily inclining vnto one, although their worth were equal & by true reason indiscernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peraduenture he had not, and cast the other lower then would haue well becomed his vertues: And therefore to cut off these, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; which without either reason or will might decide such controuersies. By this it appeareth how little the ancient law-makers respected the ground & reason of an ordinance, so the commoditie were great, and the vse important to the good of the state: for as they saw the thing it selfe to be casuall, so they saw that casuall thinges are sometimes more necessarie, then demonstratiue conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculative consideration of lawes and statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the common weale flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Caesar his warre in Gallia.





THE SECOND COMMENTARIE OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

LIke as when a heauy bodie lyeth vpon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it couer but a small parcell of the whole surface; yet the other quarters are burthened & kept vnder with a proportionable measure of that waight; and through the vnion and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one totalitie, feele the same suppression which hath really seased but vpon their fellow part: In like maner the Belgæ, inhabiting the furthest skirt of that triple continent, seemed to repine at that heauy burthen, which the Romaine Empire had laide vpon the Prouince, the Hedui, and other states of that kingdome. And least it might in time be further remoued and laide directly vpon their shoulders, they thought it expedient whilest they felte it but by participation to gather their seuerall forces into one head, and trie whether they coulde free their neighbour nations from so greuous a yoak; or at the least keepe it frõ comming any neerer vnto themselues: And this is the Argument of this second booke, which deuideth it selfe into two partes: the first containing the warres betweene Cæsar and all the states of Belgia vnited together: the secõd recording the battailes which he made with some of the states thereof in particular, as time and occasion gaue him meanes to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar hasteth to his army, marcheth towards the confines of the Belgæ, & taketh in the men of Rheims.



TH E report of this confederacie being brought vnto Cæsar, whilest he wintred beyond the Alpes, as wel by letters from Labienus, as by the common hearesay of the worlde: hee leuied two new legions in Lumbar die, and sent them by Q. Pedius into Gallia, and as soone as there was any forrage in the fieldes he himselfe came to the armie. At his arriuall, vnderstanding the Sebones and the rest of the

H ij.

Cæsar.

the

the Gales that bordered vpon the Belgæ (to whom he gaue in charge to learne what was done amongst them,) that there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of soldiers, and gathering their forces into one heade: he thought it not safe to make anie further delaie, but hauing made prouision of corne, he drew out his army from their wintering campes, and within fiftene daies he came to the borders of the Belgæ. Assoone as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the uttermost of the Belgæ, next adioining to the Celta, thought it best to entertaine a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the cheefe men of their state, vnto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had, to the mercy of the Romaine Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsel of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracie against the Romaines: For prooffe wherof they were ready to giue hostages, to receiue them into their towns, and to furnish them with corne or what other thing they stood in neede of. That the rest of the Belgæ were al in armes, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their madnesse was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold backe the Sueffones from that attempt, being their brethren and kinsmen in blood, and vsing the same lawes and customes as they did, hauing both one magistrate and one forme of gouernment; but they would needs support the same quarrel which the rest of the Belgæ had undertaken.

THE OBSERVATION.



Might heere take occasion to speake somewhat of a particular reuolunt in a generall cause; and howe a confederate state may in regarde of their owne safetie forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer the vniuersall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale: but that I onely intende to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onlie I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine gouernment, that such cities as yeilded to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasury (howsoeuer they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that state, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

CHAP. II.

The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar.



Cæsar inquiring of the Ambassadors which came from Rheimes what the states were that had taken armes, and what they were able to do in matter of war: found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germanes; who passing ouer the Rhene time out of minde, drue away the Gales and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these only of al the Gales kept the Cimbri and Teutoni from entering into their

their country: and in that regard they challenge a to themselves great authority; & vaunted much in their feats of armes. Concerning their number they had these aduertisements; the ^a Bellouaci exceeded all the Belgæ in promise, authority, and number of men, and promised 60000. men; and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. The ^b Sueffones inhabiting a large and fertile countrey, and having 12. walled towns promised to set out 50000. The ^c Nerui as many; the ^d Atrebaty 15000. the ^e Ambiani 10000. the ^f Velocassi, and ^g Veromandui as many; the ^h Morini 25000. the ⁱ Menapij 7000. the ^k Caleiani 50000. the ^l Catuaci 10000. the ^m Eburones, Condrusones, and others 40000. Caesar incouraging the men of Rheimes to persist their faithfulness to the Romaine Empire, propounded unto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commanded all their senate to come before him, and bring with them their noble men, sonnes to be giuen up for hostages, which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And hauing receiued two especial aduertisements from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood; hee provided for the first by perswading Diuitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those busineses, to keepe asunder the powre of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from shaking a head, that so he might auoide the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easilie be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the marches of the Bellouaci, and sacke their territories with sword and confusion, which Diuitiacus promised to performe, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Vpon the second aduertisement which presented unto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he resolved not to be too hasty in giuing them battell, but first to proue by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowesse could do; and what his own men durst doe.

^a The country about Beau-
nois.

^b The country about Soissons

^c The people about Turnai

^d Arras.

^e Amiens.

^f Vermandois.

^g Terroene

^h Leige.

ⁱ 296000. in al.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis rule of making triall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obserued by prudent and graue commanders, as the surest principle whereon the true iudgment of the euent may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the worde *non putabam* was neuer heard out of a wise mā's mouth, haue any place in the course of humane actions, it ought especiallie to be regarded in managing these main points, whereon the state of kingdomes and empires dependeth. For vnlesse we be perswaded that blind chance directeth the course of this worlde with an vncertaine confusion, and that no foresight can swaie the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not by al means indeuor to grounde our knowledge vpon true causes, and leuel our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things the selues. And this is the rather to be vrged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equalitie of number; referring their valour to bee tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of itselfe cannot

discerne the difference betweene two champions of like presence and outward carriage, vnlesse it see their strength compared together and waied as it were in the scale of triall: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to obserue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For besides his owne satisfaction, it gaue great incouragement to his men, when they sawe themselues able to counter-match an enemie, and knew their taske to be subiect to their strength: Neither did he obserue it onely at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for we finde that he neuer incountered any enemie, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour to make head against them: which equality of strength, being first laide as a sure foundation, he vsed his owne industrie and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as aduantages to ouer-throw his aduersarie: and so drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himselfe, and seldom failed in any of his battels.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth his Armie ouer the riuer *Axoua,
leauing Titurius Sabinus incamped on the
other side with sixe cohorts.

*La disie.

Cæsar.




AS SOONE as Cæsar vnderstaod, as well by his discoverers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of the Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towardes him no great distance off, he made all the haste he could to passe his Armie ouer the riuer Axona, which deuided the men of Rheimes from the other Belgæ. Wherby he brought to passe, that no enemie could come on the backe of him to worke any disadvantage: and that corne might be brought vnto him from Rheimes, and other citties without danger. And further, that he might command the passage backe againe, as occasion should serue to his best aduantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the riuer, with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to incampe himselfe on the other side of the riuer with sixe cohortes, commaunding him to fortifie his campe with a rampier of 12 foote in altitude, and a trench of 18 foote in breadth.


OBSERVATION.



IF it be demanded, why Cæsar did passe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe; and did not rather attend the enemie on the other side, and so take the aduantage of hindering him, if he should attempt to passe ouer? I will set downe the reasons in the sequell of this warre, as the occurrences shall fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time let vs enter into the particularitie of these fixe cohortes, that wee maie the better iudge of such troupes which were imploied in the seruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of souldiers these



Cariadges.



CÆSARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand



these fixe cohortes did containe, it seemeth expedient, a little to discourtse of the companies and regiments; which the Romans vsed in their Armies.

And first we are to vnderstand, that the greatest and chiefeest regiment in a Roman Armie, was termed by the name of Legio: as Vatro saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*: or as Plutarch speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent milites*; so that it taketh the name Legio of the choise and selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making euery legion to containe 3000 soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000 to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hanniball came into Italie, and then it was augmented to 5000, but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, when Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonie to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300 horse. Out of Cæsar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was short of that number: for he himselfe saith, that in this warre in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the ciuill war, where he saith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohortes, which amounted to the nûber of 55000 men: And being manifest as well by these number of cohortes, as by the testimonie of diuers authors, that Pompei his Army consisted of 11 legions; if we deuide 55000 into 11 partes, we shall finde a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vsuall rate of a legion, the Romans alwaies expresse the strength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said, that Cæsar had eight legions, which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, and such as necessarily attended the Armie. Further we are to vnderstand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and distinguished from the rest, and that it tooke either from their order of muster, or inrolment; as that legion which was first inrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we reade in this historie, the seuenth, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleuenth and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *legiones Germanica, Panonica, Britannica*, and such others; and sometime of their Generall, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vitelliana, legiones*, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident or qualitie, as *Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera* and such like. And this much of the name and number of a legion, which I must necessarilie distinguish into diuers kindes of souldiers, according to the first institution of the olde Romans, and the continuall obseruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller partes, whereof a legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that after the Consuls had made a generall choise and sworne the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place

*A legion
what it was.
Lib. 4.
De vita Ro-
muli.*

Lin. lib. 22.

*Tacitus 3.
hist.*

Velites.

in

in regard of the other souldiers was both base & dishonorable: not only because they fought a farre off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forelorne hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choise of them which they called *Hastati*, a degree aboue the *Velites*, both in age and wealth, and rearmed them by the name of *Hastati*, forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of *Iauelin*, which the *Romaines* called *Hafta*: but before *Polybius* his time they vsed *Piles*; notwithstanding their ancient name continued vnto the latter time of the Empire. The third choise which they made was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called *Principes*; the rest that remained were named *Triarii*, as *Varro* saith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur*: These were alwaies the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third diuision of the battell, as the last helpe and refuge in all extremity. *Polybius* saith, that in his time the *Velites*, *Hastati*, and *Principes*, did consist of 1200 men a peece; and the *Triarii* neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legion were augmented: wherof *Lypsius* allegeth these reasons. First because these *Triarii* consisted of the best of the souldiors, and so might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it seldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controuerisie grew very doubtfull. Lastly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinarie folowers, ranged themselves amongst these *Triaries*, and so made the third battell equal to either of the former; but howsoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in *Polybius* his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this diuision of their men consisted the ground of that well ordered discipline; for in that they distinguished them according to their yeeres and abilitie, they reduced their whole strength into feuerall classes; & so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall cōposition of their whole bodie euery part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth vvas answerable to the same: & so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties, that from euery accident which met with any part of the armie, the iudgement might determine how much or howe little it imported the whole bodie: besides the great vse vvhich they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no smal consequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The souldiours, at their inrolement beeing thus deuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they deuided the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, each of them into 10 companies, making of those 3. sortes of souldiours 30. small regiments, vvhich they called *Manipuli*: And againe, they subdeuided euerie maniple into two equall parts, and called them *Ordo*, vvhich was the least companie in a legion; and according to the rate set down by *Polybius*, contained 60. souldiours. In euerie *Ordo* there was a *Centurion*, or *Captaine*, and a *Lieutenant*, whom they named *Optio* or *Tergiductor*. The maniples of the *Triarii* were much lesser then the maniples of either the *Hastati* or the *Principes*;

Hastati.

Principes.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 1. de mil. Rom.

The vse of this diuision.

The distinction of their companies. Manipuli.

Ordo.

cipes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii were called *subsignanos milites*, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not devided into bandes; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that euery Maniple had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history heere mentioneth.

The worde *Cohors* in latine doth signifie that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a court; and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioined together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of feuerall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euerie legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these 3. maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiours, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3. of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarii, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde maniple in euery kind, that could not haue been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarii; and so al the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; & euery cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of al those sortes of soldiours that were in a legion. So that making a legion to containe 5090. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titurius Sabinus, contayned 3000. soldiours: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200. which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520. soldiours in these fixe cohortes.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of soldiours, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained 3. maniples; & euery maniple 2. orders; and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenant, that stood in the taile of the troupe.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making jointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and so euerie fiue files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how great soeuer the army were.

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, knowne by the name of *Primus ordo*: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commaunded the whole maniple. And so wee finde that the Centurion of the

Cohors.
Lib. 3. de re
rust.

A legion ranged in battell.

The first order

3. De bello
civil.

Prima cohors

first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense Cæsar is to be vnderstood, where hee saith, that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, *prater principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities, first; the prioritie betweene the Centurions of the same maniple: for a cohorte consisting of 3. maniples, vwhereof the first maniple were Triarij, the second Principes, and the thirde Hastati; and euerie maniple containing two orders; and euerie order a Centurion: he saith, that all the Centurions of this cohort were slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing vvhich I obserue, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, vwhereof a legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that vvhich was held the vvorthiest in the censure of the Electors; tooke the prioritie both of place and name, and was called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; & so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

Neither did the legions want their degrees of preheminece, both in imbattailing & in incåping, according either to the seniority of their inrolement, or their fauor of their General, or their own vertue: And so we read that in these vvars in Gallia, the tenth legion had the first place in Cæsar's army: And thus much concerning the diuisions, and severall companies of a legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

The benefis of
this discipline

Vpon this description it shall not be amisse, briefelie to laie open the most apparant commodities depending vpon this discipline; the excellency vvhich of more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order, vvhich nature hath obserued in the frame of her vvorthiest creatures: for it is euident; that such workes of nature come neereft to perfect excellencie, vvwhose material substance is most particularlie distinguished into partes, and hath euerie part indued vvith that proprietie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For beeing thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed vvith fitting abilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discover the vvorth of an excellent nature: vvwhereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse fauour in natures forge, being as abortiues, or barbarously composed, vvwanting the diuersitie both of partes and faculties; are no vvay capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the former that are directed vvith so many properties, and inabled vvith the power of so wel distinguished faculties. Vvhich better workes of nature the Romans imitated in the Architecture of their army, deuinding it into such necessary & seruiceable partes, as were best fitting all vses and imployments: as first into legions, and legions into cohortes, and cohortes into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein euerie man knewe his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion. And thus the vniuersall multitude was by order disposed into partes, vntill it came vnto a vnitie: for it cannot bee denied, but that these centuries were in themselves so sensiblie distinguished, that euerie Soldiour caried in his minde the particular Mappe of his whole centurie: for in imbattailing, euerie centurie was disposed into 5. files, con-
tayning twelue in a file, vvwhereof the leaders were alwayes certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other especiall occasion: and euerie leader

leader knew his follower, and euerie second knewe the third man, and to consequently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and difrankt to rallie them into any forme, when euery man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imploied vpon sudden seruice, the generall Idea of the Armie being so deeply imprinted in the minde of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such conuenient troupes, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safetie of the Armie, or nature of the action: At all occasions and oportunities, these principles of aduantage offered themselves, as readie meanes, to put in execution any desigine, or stratagem whatsoeuer; the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euerie man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of euerie such part, their sodalitie was sweetened, or rather strengthened with the mutuall acquaintance, and friendship one of another, the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the middest, and the lieutenant in the rereward, and euerie man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend; which bred a true and vnfaigned courage, both in regard of themselves, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no small meanes to cutte off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissention: for here euerie man knew his place in the file, and euerie file knewe his place in the Centurie, and euerie Centurie in the Maniple, and euerie Maniple in the Cohort, and euerie Cohort in the Legion, and euerie Legion in the Armie; and so euerie souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and euerie place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall government of this age, with bloudshed and murthers; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English forces that haue bene sent thither to appease their tumults: for through defect of this order, which alloteth to euerie man his due place, the controuersie grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir Iohn Bowrowes, the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue been negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troupes, in the seruice of the states in the vnited prouinces, where they are very curious in appointing euerie man his place in the file, and euerie file in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point, I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, and the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troupes stand best appointed for disposition and array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shocke, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for the principall

I ij.

things

*The benefite of
small battailions:
and the
disaduantage
of great squadrons.*

things which are required in setting of a battell, are so to order the troupes, that the depth in flanke may serue conueniently to withstand the assault, taking vp no more men then may well serue for that purpose; and giuing meanes to the rest to fight with the enemy; and in these two points, were both their defensiuie and offensiuie considerations comprehended. But smaller troupes and battailons afforde this conueniencie better then great squadrons, which drowne vp manie able men in the depth of their flankes, and neuer suffer them to appeare, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butcherie of the enemy. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I haue noted in the first booke, neuer carried about 16 in flanke, and brought 500 to fight in front. And these little battailons (considering them as they stood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the 2 and 3 battell, which alwaies were to succour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thicke and close imbattailing admit any such succour behind them. Now if we cōpare the aduantages & discommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great ods betweene them. These great squadrons are not faisable, but in plaine and open places; where they may either stand immoueable, or make easie and flow motions without shaking, or disordering their bodie: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or wooddie, leuell or vneuen, or of what site or quality foeuer. And to conclude, if two or three rankes of these great battailons chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disorder, as the said rankes are; and hath lesse meanes to rally it selfe, then any other lesser companie: but if any violence chance to rout a maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Armie, then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disfranking of any one part, betraie the safetie of the Armie to disorder and confusion; for as much as their distinction serued to cut off such inconueniences, and yet no waie hindered the generall uniting of their strength into one body. More may be said concerning this matter, but I onely point at it, and leaue the due consideration therof, to the iudgment of our commanders, & returne to our history.

CHAP. IIII.

The Belgæ attempt the surprise of * Bibrax:

Caesar sendeth succour vnto it.

* Bray in the
country of Re-
tell.



Here was a towne called Bibrax, belonging to the state of Rheimes, about eight mile from Casars campe; which the Belgæ thought to haue surprised, as they came along to meete with Caesar, and suddenly assaulted it with such furie, that the townesmen could hardly hold out the first daie. The Celta and Belgæ vse one and the same manner, in assaulting a towne: for hauing beset the whole compasse of the wall with rankes of souldiers, they neuer cease slinging of stones untill they finde

finde the wall naked of defendantes; and then casting themselues into a Testudo, they approach to the gate and vndermine the walles. Alsoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rheimes, a man of great birth and authoritie in his countrey, who at that time was gouernour of the towne, and had beene before with Caesar, to treat and conclude a peace: sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to holde out any longer. The same daie about midnight (vsing the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, and slingers of the Iles of Baleares, to relieue the towne; by meanes whereof, the townesmen were put in good hope to make their partie strong, and the enemy made hopeles of winning the towne: and therefore after a small stay, hauing populated their fieldes, and burned their villages and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards Caesars campe, and within lesse then two miles of his Armie, they incamped their whole host: which, as was gathered by the smoake and fire, occupied more ground then eight miles in breadth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to obserue two circumstances: The first is, the manner they vsed in a sudden surprise: The second is, the forme and quality of a Testudo. Although Caesar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a towne, as peculiar, to the Galles; yet wee maie not thinke but that the Romans vsed it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any cittie: but because the Galles knew no other means to take a towne but this, therefore he setteth it downe as peculiar vnto them. The Romans called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere urbem corona*: for as much as the souldiers inclosed the towne with a circle, and so resembled a crowne or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of souldiers, which incompassed a towne: And Iosephus telleth of Iorapatam, which the Romans besieged *duplici peditum corona*: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen vtmost of all. There is no further matter to be obserued but this, that in surprising a towne, they incircled it round about with thick continued ranks of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could:

To take a
towne by sur-
prise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is liuely described in Liuius, after this manner. In the Amphitheater, where the people did often assemble to see strange sightes and publike shewes, were brought in (saith he) 60 lustie young men, who after some motion, and seemely march, cast themselues into a square troupe, & roofing their heads close with their targets, the first ranke which made the front of the Testudo, stood vpriight on their feete; the second ranke bowed it selfe somewhat lower;

A Testudo
described.
Lib. 44.

the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequentlie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground, and so they made a bodie resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this Squadron thus strongly combined together, came two soldiours running some fiftie foot off, and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimbly vp the side of the rooffe; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would haue entred vpon it; sometimes againe incountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steddily as if they had been vpon firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other soldiours, that stood vpon the said wal to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiours that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; but couered their bodies with them, and so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, coulede any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vpon the Testudo, it quicklie glided downe by the decliuitie of the rooffe, without anie hurte or annoyance at all.

Thus far Liuij goeth, neither doe I know what to saie further of it: the chiefest vse thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were throughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention serued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that ende they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the soldiours climed vpon the wall, *super iteratam testudinem*, by one Testudo made vpon an other; and this was the ancient forme and vse of a Testudo in a suddain assault or surprise.

Lib. 49.

Dio Cassius in the actes of Anthonie, saith, that beeing galled with the Parthian Archers, hee commanded his whole armie to put it selfe into a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romaines at a watch-woorde giuen, rose againe with such a furie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the faide Testudo after this manner, They placed, saith hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the middest; and those heauie armed footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles nexte vnto the enemy; the reste which bare large Ouall Targettes were thronged together throughout the whole troupe, and so couered with their Targets both themselves and their fellowes, that there was nothing discerned by the enemy but a rooffe of Targets, which were so tiled together, that men might safely go vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselves into a Testudo, to breake through an enemy, or to route and disranke a troupe. And this vse the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regarde of the strength, for that it couered

covered and sheltered, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Hirdly we may obserue, how carefully Caesar provided for the safetie of such succours, as he sent vnto Bibrax: for hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best and surest guides in that iourney, least peraduenture through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers: a matter of no small consequence in managing a warre, but deserueth an extraordinarie importunitie, to perswade the necessitie of this diligence. For a Generall that hath perfectlie discovered the nature of the countrey, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousnesse of turnings, the nature of the hils and the course of the riuers, hath all these particularities as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy: And in this point Hanniball had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the commanders of his time in making vse of the way, by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an army, by an vnknown and vndiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disadvantages, as the other hath opportunitie of good fortune. Let euery man therefore perswade himselfe, that good discoverers are as the eyes of an army, and serue for lightes in the darkenesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good prouidence, and make the path of safetie so manifest, that we neede not stumble vpon casualties. Caesar in his iourney to Ariouistus vsed the helpe of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in whome amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence to discover the waie, and acquaint him with the passages; and before hee would vndertake his voyage vnto * Britanie, he well enformed himselfe by marchants and traualiers, of the quantity of the lland, the quality of the people, their vse of warre, and the oportunitie of their hauens: Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but hee sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of warre, to see what hee could further discover, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that hee neuer caried his army, *per insidiosa itinera*, vnlesse he had first well discovered the places.

Concerning the order, which skilfull leaders haue obserued in discoveries, we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one in vnderstanding the perfect description of the countrey; and the second in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we finde as well by this as other histories, that the Romans vsed the inhabitants of the country for guides, as best acquainted with their natie places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; provided alwaies, that their owne scoutes were euer abroad to vnderstand what they could of themselues, that they might not altogether relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the enemy were obserued by the horsemen, and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter of

*The necessitie
of good disco-
uerie.*

** Now Eng-
land.*

*The order
which is to be
observed in
discovery.*

of warre, and so the generall receiued sound aduertilements; and yet they were not too forward vpon any new motion, vnlesse they found it confirmed by diuers waies: for some espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Heluetian warre. If therefore the vse and benefit, which prudent and wise commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought vpon the ignorant, haue any authoritie to perswade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath beene spoken may be sufficient, for this point.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.

*Slingers with
their arte
and vse.*



He souldiers which Cæsar sent to relieue Bibrax, were Archers of Creta and Numidia; and slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kinde of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceites are held vp with the furie of these fierie engines; I will in brieft discouer the nature and vse of this weapon.

The Latines (saith Ildore) called this weapon *funda: quod ex ea fundantur lapides*. Plinie attributeth the inuention thereof to the Insulairs called Baleares. Florus in his third booke and eighth chapter, saith, that these Baleares vsed three sortes of slings, and no other weapon besides: for a boy had neuer any meate giuen him, before he had first strooke it, with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sortes of slings, which the Baleares vsed; and saith that they had one sling with long raines, which they vsed when they would cast a farre off: and another with short raines, which they vsed neere at hand: and the third with raines of a meane size, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in *Columna Antonina* at Rome, he obserued that the Balearian was made with one sling about his head, another about his bellie, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinarie manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold, the first was hempe or cotton, the second haire, and the third sinewes: for of either of these stufes, they commonly made them: the forme and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the midst, with an Ouall compasse; and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or raines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twise or thrise about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgill speaking of Mezentius saith,

Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.

But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound waight, which agreeth to these daues in Cæsar, *fundas, librales*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the warre with Iugurth; and by Liuius, where he saith, that the Consull prouided great store of arrowes, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst diuers nations, as well in regard of the readines, & easie reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fledde verie farre, with great violence: the distance which

which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse,

Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.

Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foote: Their violence vvas such, as the same author affirmeth in his first booke and sixteenth chapter, that neither helmet, gaberdine, nor corselet could beare out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slaine *sine inuidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ouid, and Lucan, three of the Latine Poets saie, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling, went with such violence that it melted as it flew: vvhwhereof Seneca giueth this reason, motion (saith he) doth extenuate the aire, and that extenuation or subtilitie doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoever, Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Balearean slingers brake both target, headpiece, or any other armour vvhathsoever.

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Liuius; and the other by Vegetius: that in Liuius is called *Cestrophendo*, vvhich cast a short arrowe with a long thicke head: the other in Vegetius, is called *fustibalus*, vvhich was a sling made of a coard and a staffe. But let this suffice for slinges and slingers, vvhich were reckoned amongst their light armed souldiers, and vsed chiefly in assaulting, and defending townes, and fortresses, vvhwhere the heauie armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Hargebusiers, which in their proper nature, are *leuis armatura milites*, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

Lib. 2.

Lib. 2. naturæ
question.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronted the Belgæ in forme of battell, but
without any blow giuen: the Belgæ attempt the
passing of the riuer Axona; but in vaine, and
to their losse: they consult of breaking vp the warre.



CÆSAR at the first resolved not to giue them battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame and opinion conceiued of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his owne men durst doe. And when he found that his men were nothing inferiour to the Belgæ, he chose a conuenient place before his campe and put his Armie in battell: the banks where he was incamped rising somewhat from a plaine leuell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steepe, and the front rose a slope by little & little, vntill it came againe to a plaine, where the legions were imbat-tailed. And lest the enemy abounding in multitude, should circumuent his men and charge them in flanke as they were fighting, he drew an ouerthwart ditch behind his Armie, from one side of the hill to the other, 600 paces in length, the ends whereof

Cæsar.

K i.

he fortified with bulwarkes, and placed therein store of engines: and leaving in his campe the two legions which he had last inrolled in Lombardie, that they might bee readie to be drawne forth when there should neede any succour, he imbattailed his other sixe legions in the front of the hill, before his campe. The Belgæ also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There laie between both the Armies a small Marish, over which the enemy expected that Caesar should haue passed; and Caesar on the other side, attended to see if the Belgæ would come over, that his men might haue charged them in that troublesome passage. In the meane time the Canallie on both sides incountered betweene the two battels, and after long expectation on either side, neither partie aduenturing to passe over, Caesar hauing got the better in the skirmish betweene the horsemen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the incouraging of his owne men, and the contesting of so great an Army, and therefore he conuaid all his men againe into their campe. From that place the enemy immediately tooke his way to the riuer Axona, which laie behinde the Romans campe, and there finding foordes they attempted to passe over part of their forces, to the ende they might either take the fortresse which Q. Titurius kept, or to breake downe the bridge, or to spoile the territories of the state of Rheimes, and cut off the Romans from prouision of corne. Caesar hauing aduertisement thereof from Titurius, transported over the riuer by the bridge all his horsemen and light armed Numidians, with his slingers and archers, and marched with them himselfe: the conflict was hoat in that place, the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slewe a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, aduenturing to passe over upon the dead carkases of their fellowes, were beaten backe by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got over the water, and slewe euerie man of them.

When the Belgæ perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes, of winning Bibrax, of passing the riuer, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their owne prouisions began to faile them: they called a councill of war, wherein they resolued, that it was best for the state in generall, and for euerie man in particular, to breake vp their campe, and to returne home vnto their owne houses: and into whose confines or territories soeuer, the Romans should first enter to depopulate and waste them in hostile maner, that thither they should hasten from all parts, and there to giue them battell, to the end they might rather trie the matter in their own countrie, then abroad in a strange and unknowne place, and haue their owne household prouision alwaies at hand to maintaine them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Dimitiacus with a great power of the Hedui, approached neare to the borders of the Bellonaci, who, in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their countrie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Ifst we may obserue the Arte, which he vsed to counteruaile the strength of so great a multitude, by choosung out so conuenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the sides of the hill so steepe, that the enemy

enemy could not ascende nor clime vp, but to their own ouerthrow; hee made the backe part of the hill strong by Art, & so placed his soldiours as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred securitie and safetie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardie resolution, which fauoreth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisdom: for hee ~~eu~~er thought it great gaine, to loose nothing; and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that deliuered vp the army safe vnto the euening; attending, vntil aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Caesar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vs hee made by passing his army ouer the riuer, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rheimes: for by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the lande, his forces were readie to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: & yet notwithstanding, hee lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of the, as they passed ouer the riuer. For by the benefite of the bridge which hee had fortified, he transported what forces he woulde, to make heade against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer coulde afford him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd heere the reader may not maruel, if when the hills are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soone is the courage of this huge army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? But beeing hastily caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed vpon the sight of an enemy, which is no strange effect of a suddaine humour. For as in nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slowe and temperate progresion; so the resolutions of the minde that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and fauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish awaie euen with the smoake thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance: and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering, that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraith their indiscreet intemperace, in the hote pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemy, or had oportunitie to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for their mindes were so caried away with the conceite of warre, that they had no leisure to provide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinewe of the warre: It was sufficient for euery particular man, to be knowne for a soldiour in so honorable an action, referring other matters to the care of the state. The states

in like manner thought it inough to furnith out forty or fiftie thousand men a peece, to discharge their oath, and to saue their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, beeing directed by as vnskillful gouernours, neuer looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man relied vpon an others care, and satified himselfe with the present garbe; so many men of all sortes and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seeme in greatest forwardnesse; were motiues sufficient to induce euerie man to go, without further inquiry, how they should goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, considering the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogether vpon his prouidence, and ingaged in the defence of their state and country; he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their error, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worfe by ill handling it, then it was before we first tooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other ende, then to giue Cæsar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that hee should not in all likelihood, meet with the like strength againe, in the continuance of that warre. And this was not onely *grauius bellum successori tradere*, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to drawe a dangerous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

CHAP. VI.

The Belgæ brake vp their Campe; and as they
returne home, are chased and slaughtered
by the Romaines.



Cæsar.

HIS generall resolution beeing entertained by the consent of the whole Councell of warre; they departed out of their Campe with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or gouernement: euerie man pressing to bee foremost on his iourney in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away: Whereof Cæsar hauing notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiuing the reason of their departure, he kept his armie within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, vpon certaine intelligence of their departure, hee sent first his horsemen to staie the rereward, commaunding Labienus to followe after with three legions; these ouertaking the Belgæ, and chasing them manie miles, slewe a great number of them: And while the rereward staied, and valiantlie receiued the charge of the Romaines, the vanguard being out of danger, and vnder no gouernment,

as soone

as soone as they heard the alarm behind them, brake out of their ranks and betooke themselves to flight; and so the Romaines slewe them as long as the sunne gaue them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retrait, they returned to their campe.

OBSERVATION.

THath beene an olde rule amongst soldiours, that a great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. We read of Fuluius a Legate in the Romaine armie, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike durie: the Tuscans tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could draw the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine soldiours, attired like shepherdes, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine army, who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe; whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discovered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent: In like maner Cæsar not perswaded that men should bee so heedles, to carry a retrait in that disorderly and tumultuous maner, would not discampe his men to take the oportunity of that aduantage, vntill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was vnlikely. And thus 296000. Belgæ were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of gouernment and order in their departure.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth * Nouiodunum.



THE next day after their departure, before they could recover themselves of their feare and flight; or had time to put themselves againe in breath: Cæsar as it were continuing still the chase and victorie, led his armie into the countrey of the * Sueffones, the next borders vnto the men of Rheimes: and after a long iourney came vnto Nouiodunum, a towne of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he vnderstoode, that it was altogether vnfurnished of defensue prouision, hauing no forces within to defende it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and heighth of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore hauing fortified his campe, hee began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were receiued into the towne: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought vnto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built; the Gallies being amazed at the highnes of the workes, such as they had

* Noyon:

Cæsar.

* Soissons.

neuer scene nor heard of before, and the speede which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Cesar, to treat of giuing up the towne, and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their suite.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this relation we may obserue the industrious art, which the Romans vsed in assaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three sortes of engines described, Vineæ, Agger, and Turres.

* Lib. 4.
A vinea or
vine descri-
bed.

Vineæ is thus described by Vegetius: A little strong built house or houell, made of light wood, that it might be removed with greatest ease; the rooffe was supported with diuers pillars of a foote square, vvherof the formost were 8 foot high, and the hindmost 6; and betweene euerie one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was alwaies made with a double rooffe; the first or lower rooffe was of thicke planks, and the vpper rooffe of hurdles, to breake the force of a waight, without further shaking or disioyning the building; the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the soldiers that were vnder it: the vvhole length vvvas about 16 foot, and the breadth 7: the vpper rooffe vvvas commonly couered vvith greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning. Many of these houels vvvere ioined together in ranke, when they went about to vndermine a vval: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which vvvere thrown vpon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the foure sides and groundfils, had in euery corner a wheele, & by them they vvvere driuen to any place as occasion serued: the chiefest vse of them vvvas to couer and defend the souldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a vval. This engine vvvas called Vineæ, which signifieth a vine, for it sheltered such as vvvere vnder the rooffe thereof, as a vine couereth the place vvwhere it groweth.

Agger or
mount.

Agger, vvwhich vve call a mount, is described in diuers histories to be a hil or eleuation made of earth and other substance, vvwhich by little and little was raised forward, vntil it approached neare vnto the place, against vvwhich it vvvas built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an aduantage of height. The matter of this mount, vvvas earth and stones, fagots, and timber. Iosephus saith, that at the siege of Ierusalem, the Romans cut downe al the trees vvwithin 11 mile compasse, for matter and stuffe to make a mount. The sides of this Agger vvvere of timber to keepe in the loose matter; the forepart vvwhich was towards the place of seruice, was open without any timber worke: for on that part they stil raised it & brought it nearer the wals. That vvwhich was built at Massilia vvvas 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80 foot high and 30 foote broad. Iosephus and Egesippus writ, that there was a fortress in Iudea, 300 cubites high, vvwhich Sulla purposing to vvvin by assault, raised a mount 200 cubites high; and vpon it, he built a castle of stone 50 cubites high, and 50 cubites broad; and vpon the said castell he erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, and so took the fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a hauen, and commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that so they might fight with much aduantage.

Amongst

Amongst other engines, in vſe amongst the Romans, their moueable Turrets were verie famous; for they were built in ſome ſafe place out of danger, and with wheeles put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne. Theſe Turrets were of two ſortes, either great or little: the leſſer ſort are deſcribed, by Vitruuius, to be 60 cubites high; and the ſquare ſide 17 cubites; the breadth at the top was a fift part, of the breadth at the baſe; and ſo they ſtood ſure without any danger of falling: the corner pillars were at the baſe, 9 inches ſquare, & 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 ſtorie in theſe little turrets, & windowes in euerie ſtorie. The greater ſort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the ſquare ſide was 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fift part of the baſe; and in euerie one of theſe were commonly 200 ſtorie. There was not one and the ſame diſtance kept betweene the ſtorie, for the loweſt commonly was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the higheſt ſtorie 5 cubites, and the reſt 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of theſe ſtorie, were ſouldiers and engines, ladders, and caſting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of theſe Turrets were couered with yron, and wet couerings, to ſaue them from fire. The ſouldiers that remoued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the ſquare thereof, and ſo they ſtood out of danger. The new water-worke by broken Wharfe in London much reſembleth one of theſe towers.

*Towers or
Turrets de-
ſcribed.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Pon the building of theſe mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Sueſſones ſubmitted themſelues to ſuch powerfull induſtrie. For whatſoever is ſtrange and vnusuall; doth much affrighte the ſpirits of an enemy, and breede a motion of diſtruſt and diffidencie, when as they finde themſelues ignorant of ſuch warlike practiſes: for noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder, in as much as the true reaſons and cauſes being vnknown, we apprehend it, as diuers from the vſuall courſe of thinges, and ſo ſtand gazing at the ſtrangenefſe thereof: and wonder as it addeth worth to the noueltie; ſo it inferreth diffidencie, and ſo conſequently feare, the vtter enemy of martiall valour.

CHAP. VIII.

Caſar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the
Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.



CAESAR taking for pledges the chiefeſt of their cittie, vpon the deliuerie of all their Armes, receiued the Sueſſones to mercie: and from thence led his Armie againſt the Bellouaci; who hauing conuaid both themſelues and their goods into the towne, called Bratiſpantium, and vnderſtanding that Caſar was come within ſixe mile of the place, all the elder ſort came forth to meete him, ſignifying their

Caſar.

The Bellouaci taken to mercie.

their submission, by their lamentable demeanour. For these Diuitiacus became a mediator (who after the Belga had broken up their campe, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Caesar) the Hedui (saith he) haue alwaies found in the Bellouaci, a faithfull and friendly disposition to their state: and if they had not beene betrayed by their nobilitie, (who made them beleue, that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romaines, and suffered all villanie and despight at their handes,) they had neuer withdrawn themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romaines. The authors of this counsel, perceiuing into what great miserie they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherfore not onelie the Bellouaci, but the Hedui also in their behalfe besought him to vse his clemencie towards them. Caesar in regarde of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promised to receiue them to mercie; but forasmuch as the state was verie great and populous, hee demanded 600. hostages: Which being deliuered, and their armour brought out of the towne, he marched from thence into the coast of the Ambiani, who without further lingering, gaue both themselves and al that they had into his power. Vpon these bordered the Neruij, of whom Caesar found this much by inquirie, that there was no recourse of marchants vnto them; neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tende to riot, to bee brought into their countrey: for they were persuaded, that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned that these Neruij were a sauage people, and of great valour, often accusing the rest of the Belga, for yeelding their neckes to the Romaine yoke, openly affirming, that they would neither sende ambassadors nor take peace vpon any condition.

The Ambiani
yeeld up
themselves.

The Neruij.
Sabro neere
Namours.

Caesar hauing marched three daies iourney in their countrey, he understood that the riuer* Sabas was not past ten miles from his campe; and that on the further side of this riuer, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romaines: with them were ioined the Atrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had persuaded to abide the same fortune of warre with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aduatici; the women and such as were vnmeet for the field, they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any armie, by reason of fens and bogs, and marshes. Vpon this intelligence, Caesar sent his discoverers and Centurions before, to choose out a fit place to incampe in.

Now whereas many of the surrendered Belga, and other Galles were continuallie in the Romaine army, certaine of these (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obseruing the order which the Romaines vsed in marching, came by night to the Neruij and tolde them, that betweene euerie legion went a great sort of carriages; and that it was no matter of difficultie, as soone as the first legion was come into the campe, and the other legions yet a great way off, to set vpon them, vpon a suddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages; and so to ouerthrowe them: which legion being thus cut off, and their stufte taken, the rest would haue smal courage to stande against them. It much furthered this aduice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the caualrie of their borderers, whensoever they made any roade into their marches; their manner was to cut yong trees halfe asunder, & bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thornes and briers planted between them, they made them so thicke, that it was impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them; so that, when by this occasion, the passage of the Romaine army must needs be hindred, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The

The place which the Romaines chose to encampe in, was a hill, of like leuell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the riuer Sabis: and with the like leuell, on the other side, rose an other hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200 paces; the bottome whereof was plaine and open, and the upper part so thicke with wood, that it could not easilie be looked into: within these woods the Neruians kept themselves close, and in the open ground, by the riuer side were onely seene a few troupes of horse, and the riuer in that place was about 3 foot deepe.

Caesar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the manner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Nerui: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand; Caesar (as his custom was) led 6 legions alwaies in a readines, without burthen or cariage of any thing, but their armes: after them hee placed the impediments of the whole army. And the two legions which were last inrolled were a reeward to the army, and garded the stufte.

OBSERVATIONS.



His trecherous practise of the surrendered Belge, hath fortunatelie discovered the maner of Caesars march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconveniencies, and capable of the greatest arte that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet cariage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered, that Caesar principally respected safetie: and secondly conveniency. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, hee was content in regarde of conveniency, to suffer every legion to have the oversight of their particular cariages, and to insert them among the troupes, that every man might have at hand such necessities as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publike discipline. But if he were in danger of any sodain attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy, hee then omitted convenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disadvantageous to their safety: & caried his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their cariages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoved by their military rules, & the ancient practise of their fortunate progenitors.

The old Romaines observed likewise the same respects, for in unsafe & suspected places, they caried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, which as Livi^{us} seemeth to note, was free from all cariage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sodaine alarm. Neither doth that of *Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Caesar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci, that 3 legions marched in front, & after them came all the cariages, to which the 10. legion served as a reeward; & so they marched, *per agmine quadrato*. *Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of *agmine quadrato*, where he saith, that where an enemy is expected, wee ought to march *agmine quadrato*, ready to fight. The most material consequence of these places alledged is, that as ofte as they suspected an onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing

L j.

differed

The maner of the Romaine march.

The two respects which Caesar had in ordering a march.

1. Safety.
2. Conveniency

Agmen quadratum.

Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

* 60. Epistle.

differed from their vſuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum*, or a ſquare march, inaſmuch as it kept the ſame diſpoſition of parts, as were obſerued in *quadrata Acie*. For that triple forme of imbattailing, which the Romaines generally obſerued in their fights, hauing reſpect to the diſtances between each battel, contained almoſt an equal dimension of front and file: and ſo it made *Acie quadratam*; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*.

Lib. 6.

Polybius expreſſeth the ſame in effect, as often as the place required circumſpection; but altereth it ſomewhat in regard of the cariages: for he ſaith that in time of danger, eſpecially where the countrey was plaine and Châpion, and gaue ſpace & free ſcope to cleere themſelues, vpon anie accident, the Romaines marched in a triple battel, of equal diſtance one behind an other, euery battel hauing his ſeuerall cariages in front: And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themſelues according to the oportunity of the place, either to the right or left hande, and ſo placing their cariages on the one ſide of their army, they ſtood imbattailed ready to receiue the charge.

Agmen longum

The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more ſecurity, & gaue ſcope to conueniency, they named *agmen longum*; when almoſt euery maniple or order, had their ſeuerall cariages attending vpon them, & ſtroue to keep that way which they found moſt ealie, both for theſelues & their impediments. Which order of a march, as it was more commodius then the former, in regard of particularity, ſo was it vnſafe and dangerous, where the enemy was expected: And therefore Cæſar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, when they were deluded by Ambiorix, *longiſſimo agmine*; as though they had receiued their aduertilements from a friend, and not from an enemy.

Lib. 5. de bel. Gallico.

The ſeſe that may be made of this in our moderne wars

And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in quality, frõ them of ancient times; yet in this point of diſcipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obſerued, as the two poles of their motions, ſafety and conueniency: whereof the firſt dependeth chiefly vpon the prouident diſpoſition of the leaders; and the other will eaſily follow on, as the commodity of euerie particular ſhal giue occaſion.

Concerning ſafety in place of danger, what better courſe can bee taken then that maner of imbattailing, which ſhall be thought moſt conuenient, if an enemy were preſent to confront them? for a well ordered march muſt either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the diſtinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of ſtrength, which the fitteſt diſpoſition can afford it. Firſt therefore, a prudent and circumſpect leader, that deſireth to frame a ſtrong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obſerue the nature and vſe of each weapon in his army, howe they may be placed for greateſt vſe and aduantage, both in reſpect of their different and concurring qualities, as alſo in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will conſequentlie inferre the beſt and exacteſt diſpoſition of imbattailing, as the ſaid forces are capable of; which if it may be obſerued in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnes of imbattailing wil not admit conuenient carriage of ſuch neceſſarie adiuncts, as pertaine to an armie; the inconuenience is to bee relieued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary

a warie iudgment shall be found expedient: that albeit the forme be somewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their strength and safetie consisteth, maie still be retained.

Neither can any man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practises of manie great and experienced commanders; what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the rest of the cariage was bestowed, according as their seuerall iudgments thought most expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that obserued this rule before prescribed, did seldome miscarrie through an vn safe march. Let a good Martialist well know their proper vse in that diuersity of weapons in his Armie; how they are seruiceable or disaduantageous, in this or that place, against such or such anemie: and he will speedily order his battell, dispose of his march, and bestow his cariages, as shall best fall out both for his safetie, and conueniencie.

Cæsars custome was, to send his Caurtie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to discouer and impeach anemie; for these troupes were nimble in motion and fit for such seruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayle of the Armie, and gaue securitie where there was most cause of feare. But if it happened that they were found vnfit to make good the seruice in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numidians: he then removed them, as he best found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie souldiers, which were the sinewes and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horsemen could not performe. And thus he altered the antique prescription, and vniformitie of custome, according as he found himselfe best able to disaduantage anemie, or make waie to victorie.

CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their campe: but are interrupted by the Neruij. Cæsar maketh haste, to prepare his forces to battell.



HE Roman horsemen, with the slingers and archers, passed ouer the riuer, and incountered the Caurtie of the enemy: who at first retired backe to their companies in the wood, and from thence sallied out againe vpon them: but the Romans durst not pursue them further then the plaine and open ground: in the meane time the sixe legions that were in front, hauing their worke measured out vnto them, began to fortifie their campe. But assoone as the Neruij perceiued their former cariages to be come in sight, which

L ij.

was

Cæsar.

was the time appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbattaile within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen: which being easily beaten backe, the Nervij ranne downe to the river, with such an incredible swiftnesse, that they seemed at the same instant of time to bee in the woods at the river, and charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence, having passed the river, they ranne up the hill to the Roman campe, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Caesar had all partes to plaie at one instant, the flagge to be hung out, by which they gaue the souldiers warning to take armes, the battell to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the souldiers to be recalled from their worke, and such as were gone farre off to get turfe and matter for the rampier, to bee sent for; the battell to be ordered, his men to be encouraged, and the signe of battell to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sudden assault of the enemye.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The description
of the Ro-
man campe,
with all the
parts belong-
ing unto it

AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes; so especially in their campe-discipline, they stroue to be singular: for it seemed rather an Academie, or a citie of ciuill gouernment, then a campe of souldiers: so carefull were they both for the safetie, and skilfull experience of their men at armes. For touching the first, they neuer suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were inclosed with ditch and a rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any newe inuention or late found out custome in their state, but in vse amongst the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kinges; their manner of incamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centuri-
ons made
choise of the
place.

The Prato-
rium.

The Centurions, that went before to choose out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit situation for their campe, first assigned the standing for the Emperours pauillion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the campe; from whence he might easily ouerview all the other partes, or any alarum or *signum pugnae*, might from thence be discovered to all quarters. This pauillion was knowne by the name of *Pratorium*, for as much as amongst the auncient Romans the Generall of their Armie was called Prator: in this place where the *Pratorium* was to be erected, they stucke vp a white ensigne, and from it they measured euerie waie 100 foote, and so they made a square containing 200 foot in euerie side, the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the forme of the *Pratorium* was round and high, being as eminent amongst the other tentes, as a temple is amongst the priuate buildings of a cittie: and therefore Iosephus compareth it to a church. In this *Pratorium* was their Tribunal or chaire of the estate, and the place of diuination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of maiestie and authoritie.

The lodging
of the legions.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the pauillion laie most commodious for forrage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions; every legion deuided one from another by a street or lane of 50 foote

foote in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that euerie legion had in the Armie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towards the sides, which was of meaner reputation. And againe, according to the place of euerie cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pauillion of the Emperour, towards the harte of the campe; and so consequently euerie maniple tooke place in the cohort, distinguishing their preheminence, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outdieward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions, there went a streete of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the middest of all the legions, vvhich was called *Quintana*; for that it deuided the fift cohort of euery legion from the sixt.

Quintana.

Betweene the tentes of the first maniples in euerie legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a waie of 100 foote in breadth throughout the whole campe; which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice; the souldiers exercised themselues at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publike place of meeting; and it was helde for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decencie. On either side the Emperours pauillion, in a direct line to make even & straight the vpper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their tentes pitched, euerie Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: about them, towards the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the campe was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie.

*Principia.**The tentes of the Tribunes.*

Polybius describing the manner of incamping which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as manie associates, placeth the *Ablecti* and *extraordinarij*, which were select bandes and companies, in the vpper part of the campe; and the associates on the out-sides of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole campe about, was 200 foote distant from any tent: vvhreeof Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the campe in battell array, might there dissolue themselues into maniples, centuries, and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And againe, if occasion vvere offered to sallie out vpon an enemy, they might verie conueniently in that spacious roome, put themselues into companies and troupes: and if they vvere assaulted in the night, the darts and fire vvorke, vvhich the enemy should cast into their campe, would little indammage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tentes.

The space betweene the tentes and the rampier.

Their tentes were all of skinnes and hides, helde vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11 souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euerie tent, and that societie was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefe was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contubernij*.

Contuberniū.

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions, euerie maniple hauing his part measured out, and euerie Centurion ouerseeing his Centurie; the

The ditch and the rampier.

approbation of the whole worke belonged to the Tribunes. Their maner of intrenching was this: the soldiours being girt with their swords and daggers, digged the ditch about the campe, which was alwaies 8 foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not farre off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling focuer was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottome as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in heighth, and sometimes foure, made after the maner of a wall, with greene turfes cut all to one measure, halfe a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfe; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughes and fagots, that it might be strong and wel fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung ouer the ditch, they vsed to stick with thicke and sharpe stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firme; and these for the most part were forked stakes, which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith, that the front of the rampier thus stucke with stakes, was called *vallum*, a *varicando*, for that no man could stride or get ouer it.

Agger.

Vallum.

Prætoria porta.

Porta Decumana.

*Porta principales.
Læua.
Dextra.*

*Castra
Æstiuæ.*

Hiberna.

The campe had foure gates, the first was called *prætoria porta*, which was alwaies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did vsually looke either toward the east, or to the enemy, or that way that the army was to march. The gate on the other side of the campe opposit to this, was called *Porta Decumana* a *decimis cohortibus*, for the tenth or last Cohort of euery legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the soldiours went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were caried to execution. The other two gates were called *Porta principales*, forasmuch as they stooode opposit to either ende of that so much respected place, which they called *principia*, onely distinguished by these titles, *læua principalis* and *dextra*, all these gates were shut with doores, and in standing Campes fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistæ, Catapultæ, Tolenones and such like.

The Romaines had their summer Campes, which they tearmed *Æstiuæ*, and their winter Campes, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*: their summer camps were in like maner differenced, according to the time, which they continued in the. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called the *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called the *Æstiuæ* or *Sedes*. And these were more absolute, as wel in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, then the former, wherein they staid but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna*, had greater labor & coost bestowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them frõ the vvinter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hospital, & other publike houses. These câps haue bin the beginning of many famous towns, especially whẽ they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did vpon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, & the Rhene. The

order

order which they alwaies obserued in laying out their camp, was so vniforme, & well knowne to the Romaines, that when the Centurions had limited out euery parte, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the soldiours entered into it, as into a knowne and familiar Citie: wherein euerie societie or small contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euery particular man coulde assigne the proper station of euerie companie, throughout the whole armie.

The vse and commodity of this incamping, I briefly touched in my first booke: But if I were worthie any way to commend the excellency thereof to our moderne soldiours, or able by perswasion to reestablish the vse of incamping in our warres; I woulde spare no paines to atchieue so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, then if my sense had compassed a new found out meanes; and yet reason would deeme it a matter of small difficultie, to gaine a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especiallie when my discourse shall present security to our forces, and honour to our leaders, maiestie to our armies, and terrour to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victorie to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and foole-hardinesse, contempt of vertue, and derision of good discipline, to repugne the designs of honour, and so far to ouermaister reason, that it suffereth not former harmes to beare witnesse against error, nor correct the ill atchieuements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to vrge this pointe any further, I will leaue it to the careful respect of the wise.

The commodity of this incamping.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He fury of the enemy, and their sodaine assault, so disturbed the ceremonies which the Romaine discipline obserued, to make the soldiours trulie apprehend the waight and importance of that action, which might cast vpon their state either soveraignty or bondage, that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here noted vnder these titles, the first was *vexillum proponendum, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret*: for when the Generall had determined to fight, hee caused a skarlet coate or red flag to bee hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the soldiours might be warned, to prepare themselves for the battell; and this was the first warning they had, which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes; as the onlie meanes to waken out their owne safetie, and purchase eternall honour. The second was *Signum tuba dandum*; this warning was a noise of manie trumpets; which they learned by the name of *classicum a calando*, which signifieth calling; for after the cie was filled with species suitable to the matter intended; they then hastened to possesse the care, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, and fill them with resolute thoughts, that no dissident or base conceits might take hold of their mindes. The third was, *milites cohortandi*, for it was thought convenient to confirme this valour, with motiues of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions.

The ceremonies which they used in their preparation to battell.

The

the vie and benefit whereof I somewhat enlarged in the Heluetian warre, and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commoditie of this part, if my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthe regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was *signum dandum*; which, as some thinke, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselves from their enemies: Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Cæsar gaue the word *Felicitie*; Brutus and Cassius gaue *Libertie*; others haue giuen *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like wordes, as might be ominous to a good successe: Besides these particularities, the manner of their deliuerie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Cæsar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may bee much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants ad much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth farre meaner and of lesse regard.

CHAP. X.

The battell betweene Cæsar and the
Neruij.

Cæsar.

IN these difficultie, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was, the knowledge and experience of the souldiers: for by reason of their practise in former battels, they could as well prescribe vnto themselves, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Cæsar had giuen commandement to euerie Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, untill the fortifications were perfected; yet when they sawe extremitie of danger, they attended no longer vnder Cæsar: but ordered all thinges as it seemed best to their owne discretion: Cæsar having commanded such thinges as he thought necessarie, ranne battellie to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion, where he vfed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemy was no farre off, then a weapon might be cast to incounter them, he gaue them the signe of battell, and shewing from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the incounter. For the time was so short and the enemy so violent, that they wanted leasure to put on their deadpieces, or to vncoise their targets: and what part they lighted vnto from their worke, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they staid, least in seeking out their owne companies, they should loose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Armie being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the declinitie of the hill, and the brinitie of time, then according to the rules

And therefore I rather take it to bee something else then a word.

of

of art; as the legions incountered the enemy in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindered by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: & therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles with the aduantage of the hill, did driue the *Attrebatij*, breathless with running & wounded in the incounter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swordes: Neither did they sticke to follow after them ouer the riuer, and aduenture into a place of disaduantage, where the battell being renewed againe by the enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like maner two other legions, the 11 and the 8, hauing put the *Veromandui* from the upper ground, fought with them upon the bankes of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the campe was well neere left naked. For in the right corner were the 12 and the 7 legions, where as all the *Neruij*, vnder the conduct of *Boduognatus*, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possesse themselves of the highest part of the campe.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the enemy, as they were entering into the campe, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driuen to flie out another way. In like manner, the pages and souldiers boies, that from the *Decumane* port and toppe of the hill, had seene the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their campe; betooke them to their heeles as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the *Treuirij* (who for their prowesse were reputed singular amongst the *Galles*, and were sent thither by their state, to aide the Romans) first when they perceined the Roman campe to be possessed by a great multitude of the enemy, the legions to be ouercharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and *Numidians* to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they took their waie homeward, and reported to their state, that the Romans were utterly ouerthrowen.

Caesar departing from the tenth legion, to the right corner, found his men exceedingly ouercharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the 12 legion so thicke thronged on a heape, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the sauerth cohort being slaine, the ensigne bearer kild and the ensigne taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slaine, or sore wounded, amongst whom *Pub. Sextus Baculus*, the *Prinipile* of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded, that he could scarce stand upon his feete; the rest not verie forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile and forsaking the field; the enemy on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any meanes or succour, to relieue them: he tooke a target from one of the hindmost souldiers (for he himselfe was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battell, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemy, and the *Maniples* to be enlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swordes.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The place
and office of a
primipile.



His Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefeſt Centurion of the 12 legion, being the firſt Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the firſt Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greateſt dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or ſimplie *Primipilus*, and ſometimes *Primopilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly publiſhed, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the reſt of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar enſigne of euerie legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignitie, without ſpeciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authors. We reade further, that it was no diſparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not vpon what occaſion, that no Tribune ſhould afterward be Primipile. But let this ſuffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Target
deſcribed.



And heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may, and therefore I will take occaſion to deſcribe it in Cæſars hand, as in the place of greateſt dignitie, and much honouring the excellencie thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, overthwart the conuex ſurface thereof; and the length foure foote, of what forme or faſhion ſoeuer they were of: for the Romans had two ſortes of Targets amongſt their legionarie, the firſt caried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Ouall, a figure of an vnequall latitude, broadest in the miſt, and narrow at both the endes, like vnto an egge, deſcribed in *Plano*: the other ſorte was of an equall latitude, and reſembled the faſhion of a guttertile; and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one faſtened vpon another, with lint and Buls glew; and couered with an Oxe hide, or ſome other ſtiſſe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the miſdeſt there was a boſſe of yron or braſſe, which they called *Vmbo*. Romulus brought them in firſt amongſt the Romans, taking the vſe of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the moſt part either fallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reaſon, for as much as theſe trees are colde and wateriſh, and therefore any blow or thruſt that was made vpon the wood, was preſently contracted and ſhut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of ſuch reputation amongſt the Roman Armes, and challenged ſuch intereſt in the greateſt of their Empire, let vs enter a little into the

Lib. 16. c. 40.

the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian

Weapons.

Promised in my sixth book that I would make a comparison, between the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies; how they do differ one from another: & in what regard, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I wil now with diligence endeavour to performe. And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by ouercomming the armies as wel of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa as all the Easterne countries of Europe: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times seene triall, both of their battailes and forces; that knowing the reason why, the Romans do ouercome, and in their battailes carie awaie the better: we doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteeme them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue them their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgment. Concerning the battels betweene Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no neede that I speake much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entreated therof when we made mention of the battels themselves, and the end it selfe of that warre doth especiallie confirme this our opinion. For vwhen they had gotten a captaine equall vvith Hanniball, euen consequentlie vvith all his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, hee trained his Armie to their weapons, and so taking them vp in the beginning, he continued them on vnto the ende.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding it serued him not to get the victory, but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtfull: concerning whom it were not vnfit, that I should saie something, least in being altogether silent, it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the disposition, and forces proper to it,

M ij.

nothing

nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it, or to sustaine the violence thereof; as maie easily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an array of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scantling sixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniencie of them, 14 cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betweene the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butte ende thereof, vvhiles he standes in a readinesse to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I saie, it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites doth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his handes he doth aduance it readie to charge the enemy: By vvhich meanes it followeth, that some of the pikes doe not onely extend themselues before the second, third, and fourth ranke, but some before the formost, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thickeesse, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behinde, as Homer maketh mention vhen he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortifie another; one headpiece is ioyned to another, that they maie stande vnited and close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe, it must follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themselues two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betweene themselues: by which maie evidently be seene the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16 rankes in depth, or thickeesse; the excesse of which number of rankes aboue foue. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselues beyond the formost rankes, they grow vterly vnprofitable, and cannot man, by man, make any impression, or assault: but serue onely, by laying their pikes vpon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former rankes, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firme and sure; and with the thicknes of their pikes they doe repell all those dartes, which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those rankes which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe so presse vpon the former, that they doe make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the formost rankes should giue backe.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speake on the contrarie part, touching the properties and differences, as well of the armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell. For euerie Roman soldier for himselfe, and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himselfe with his target; and mutually moouing whensoever there is occasion offered. But those which vse their swordes, do fight in a more thinne and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foote more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to bellie, that they maie vse their weapons with the better commoditie. And hence it commeth to passe, that

that one Romaine soldiour taketh vp as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Romaine is as it were to oppose himselfe against tenne pikes, which pikes the said one soldiour can neither by any agilitie come to offende, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behinde him, are not onely vnable to repell their force, but also with conueniencie to vse their owne weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battaile being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romaines do ouercome, and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victorie? (Euen from hence) that the Romaine armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, whereto it may profitablie applie it selfe: so that if it were of necessitie, that their enemy shoulde incounter them at that instant, especiallie with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only, not without danger, but in all probability likelie, that the phalanx should euer carrie away the better. But if that may be auoided, which is easily done: shal not that disposition then, be vtterlie vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther euident, that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine & champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and riuers: for all these may hinder & disioine it. And it is almost impossible to haue a plaine of the capacity of 20. *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall bee found none of these impediments. But suppose there bee found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the enemy refuse to come vnto them, and in the meane time, spoile, and sacke the cities, and countrie round about; what commodity, or profit shal arise by an army so ordered? for if it remaine in such places, as hath bene before spoken of; it can neither relieue their friends, nor preserue themselves. For the Conuoyes which they expect from their friends, are easily cut off by the enemy, whiles they remaine in those open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the enemy. But suppose, that the Romaine army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not aduēture it selfe in grosse at one instant; but would by little & little retire it selfe, as doth plainly appeare by their vsual practise. For there must not bee a coniecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they do not so equally frame their battaile, that they doe assault the enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stande, and parte charge the enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx doe presse them, that come to assault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is dissolued. For whether they pursue those that retire, or flie from those that do assault them, these doe disioyne themselves from part of their armie; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their enemies, standing and attending their opportunitie: so that nowe they neede not anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth: but to assault where the breach is made, both behind, and vpon the sides. But if at any

time the Romaine armie may keepe his due proprietie; and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place, being not able to doe the like: doth it not then manifestlie demonstrate the difference to be great, betweene the goodnes of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may bee added the necessities imposed vpon an army, which is to march through places of all natures, to encampe themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege, and to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in viewe of the enemy: For all these occasions necessarilie accompanie an armie; and oftentimes are the especial causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: Forasmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a conuenient place, are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Romaine army is apt for all these purposes. For euery soldiour amongst them, beeing once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time, nor occasion; keeping alwaies the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the army, or particularlie by himselfe, man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is aduantageous: so the end doth answere the expectation.

These things I thought to speake of at large, because many of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to bee ouercome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should bee put to the worst by the Romaine army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth Polibius, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romaines, with the vse of armes amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike trulie, and exactlie ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue most aduantage to the vse thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee see they doe not) they fall so much shorte of that strength, which the wisdom of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed vnto it. But suppose wee could allow it that disposition, in the course of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the said maner of imbattailing is tied to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kinde of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practise of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woody countries, such as Ireland is; where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtles, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike & Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of the in euery company, as there is; for commonly halfe the company are pikes, which is as much to saie in the practise of our wars, that halfe the army hath neither offense nor defense weapons, but only against a troupe of horse. For they seldom or neuer come to the push of pike, with the foot companies, where they may charge & offende the enemy: & for defence, if the enemy think it not safe to buckle with the at hand, but maketh more aduantage to play vpon the a far off with shot; it affordeth smal safe ty to shake a long pike at them, and stand faire in the meane time, to entertaine

a volleie of shot with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some seruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my selfe, there are weapons if they were put to triall, that would counteruaile the pike euen in those seruices, wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoeuer, aswell in regard of the diuers and sundrie sortes of imbattailing, as the qualitie of the place wherfoeuer: for their vse was as effectuell in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troupes and great companies; in thinne and spacious imbattailing, as in thicke thronged Testudines. Neither could the nature of the place make them vserviceable; for whether it were plaine or couert; leuel or vnequall; narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight; the Target was as necessarie to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conueniency, which accompanieth the Target in any necessitie imposed vpon an armie, whether it bee to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedie retraite, to incampe themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with manie other occasions which necessarilie accompanie an armie. The vse of this weapon hath beene too much neglected in these latter ages, but may be happily renewed againe in our nation, if the industrie of such as haue laboured to present it vnto these times, in the best fashion, shall finde anie fauour in the opinion of our commaunders. Concerning which Target, I must needes saie this much, that the light Target will proue the Target of seruice, whensoeuer they shall happen to be put in execution: for those which are made prooue, are so heauie and vnielddie, (although it be somewhat qualified with such helpes as are annexed to the vse thereof,) that they ouercharge a man, with an vsupportable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight disproportionable to his strength. For our offensive weapons, as namely the Harquebussiers and muskietiers, are stronger in the offensive part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for seruice. Neither did the Romans regard the prooue of their Target furthes, then was thought fit for the readie vse of them in time of battel, as it appeareth in many places, both in the ciuill warres and in these Commentaries: for a Romaine pile hath often times darted through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and fastened them both to the ground, which is more then a musket can wel do; for the bullet commonly resteth in the bodie. And although it may be said that this was not comon, but rather the effect an extraordinary arme; yet it serueth to proue, that their Targets were not prooue to their offensive weapons, when they were well deliuered and with good direction. For I make no doubt, but in their battailes there were oftentimes some hinderances, which woulde not suffer so violent an effect, as this which I speake of: for in a volley of shotte, wee must not thinke that all the bullets flie with the same force, and fall with the like hurt; but as armour of good prooue will hardly hold out some of them; so slender armes and of no prooue, will make good resistance against others. And to conclude, in a battell or encounter at hand, a man shall meete with more occasions, suting the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then such as will aduantage
the

the heauie Target of prooffe, or counteruaile the surplus of waight, which it carieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of prooffe, in some places and in some seruices: which I deny not to those, that desire to bee secured from the extremity of peril: but this falleth out in some places and in some particular seruices, and hindereth not but that the vniuersal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sworde of the Targetiers, that according to the practise of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance: And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must bee verie short, otherwise it will neuer bee readilie drawne out. I saie that the sworde of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, wil easily discover. But let this suffice concerning the vse of the pike and the Target.

CHAP. XI.

The battell continueth, and in the ende

Caesar ouercommeth.

Caesar.



*A*t the presence of their Generall, the soldours conceined some better hopes, and gathering strength and courage againe, when as euery man bestirred himselfe in the sight of the Emperour, the brunt of the enimie was a litle staied. Caesar perceiuing likewise the seventh legion, which stood next vnto him, to bee sore overlaid by the enemy, commaunded the Tribunes by little and litle, to ioin the two legions together, and so by ioining backe to backe, to make two contrarie fronts; and beeing thus secured one by another from feare of being circumuented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the meane time the two legions, that were in the rerewarde to guard the cariages, hearing of the battell, doubled their pace, and were discried by the enemy vpon the top of the hill. And Titus Labienus, hauing won the campe of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the riuer, sent the tenth legion to helpe their fellowes, who vnderstanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what daunger the campe, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose coming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that euen such as were sunke downe, through extreame grieve of their woundes, or leaned vpon their Targets, began againe to fight afresh, and the Pages and the boies perceiuing the enimie amazed, ran vpon them unarmed, not fearing their weapons: the

the horsemen also striving with extraordinarie valour, to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionarie souldiers. Howbeit the enemy in the utmost perill of their liues, shewed such manhood, that as fast as the formost of them were ouerthrowen, the next in place bestrid their carcases, and fought upon their bodies: and these being likewise ouerthrowen, and their bodies heaped one upon another, they that remained, possessed themselves of that mount of dead carcases as a place of aduantage, and from thence threwe their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them againe to the Romans. By which it be gathered, that there was great reason to deeme them men of hautie tourage, that may durst passe over so broad a riuer, climbe vp such high rockes, and aduenture to fight in a place of such inequalitye. The battell being thus ended, and the nation and name of the Neruij being well neare swallowed up with destruction, the elder sort with the women and children, that before the battell were conuained into Islands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, sent ambasadours to Caesar, and yeelded themselves to his mercie; and in laying open the miserie of their state affirmed, that of 600 Senatours they had now left but three; and of 60000 fighting men, there was scarce fve hundred that were able to beare Armes. Caesar, that his clemencie might appeare to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting vnto them the free possession of their townes and country, and streightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or iniurie at all.

OBSERVATIONS.

ANd thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battell, which Ramus complaineth of, as a confused narration: much differing from the direct and methodicall file, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule holde good, which learned Rhetoritians haue obserued in their Oratorie, that an vnperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect maner; then by Ramus leaue, if any such confusion do appeare, it both sauoureth of eloquence, and wel suteth the turbulent cariage of the action, wherein order and skill gaue place to fortune, and prouidence was swallowed vp with peraduenture. For that which Hirtius saith of the ouerthrow he gaue to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this; that he got the victorie, *plurimum adiuvante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus belli casibus intersunt, tum praeipue ijs quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.* For so it fell out in this battell, and the danger proceeded from the same cause, that brought him to that push in the battell with Pharnaces: for he well vnderstood that the Neruij attended his comming on the other side the riuer Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his camp in the face of an enemy, without feare or danger, as we haue scene in his war with Ariouistus; when he marched to the place where he purposed to incamp himselfe with 3 battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in armes to receiue any charge, which the enemy should offer to giue, that the third battell in the meane time might fortifie the camp. Which course would easily haue frustrated this stratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard lesse dangerous; but he little expected any such resolution,

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
so contrarie to the rules of militarie discipline, that an enemy should not sticke to passe ouer so broad a riuer, to clime vp such steepe and high rocks, to aduventure battell in a place so disaduantagious, and to hazard their fortune vpon such inequalities. And therefore, hee little mistrusted any such vnlikelie attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his owne ouerthrow, if the legions had beene ready to receiue them. Which may teach a generall that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses; nor too carefull in his best aduised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily bee preuented, and the safest course weakened with an vnexpected circumstance: so powerful are weake occurrences in the maine course of the waightiest actions; and so infinite are the waies, wherby either wisdom or fortune may worke. Neither did this warne him, to provide for that which an enemy might do, how vnlikelie soeuer it might seeme vnto him, as appeareth by that accident in the battell with Pharnaces: which practise of attempting a thing against reason and the arte of warre, hath found good successe in our moderne wars; as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding, it is to be handled sparingly, as no way fauoring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *temeritas non semper felix*, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefeft helpes which the Romaines founde, were first the aduantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Heluetian warre. Secondlie, the experience, which the soldiours had got in the former battailes, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they caried themselves as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and vndanted iudgment of the General, which ouerwaied the peril of the battell, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherin we may obserue, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battell rested vpon his directions, he wholly intended warines & circumspection, so in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valor, and ouertopt fury, with a higher resolution.

CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold,
and are taken by Cæsar.

Cæsar.
* either Doway
or Bosseduke
in Brabant.



HE * Aduatici before mentioned, comming with all their power to aide the Neruij, and understanding by the way of their ouerthrow, returned home againe; and forsaking all the rest of their townes, and castles, conuaied themselves and their wealth into one strong and wel fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and stiepe downefalls, sauing in one place of 200. foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent, which passage they had fortified with a double wal of a large altitude,

altitude, and had placed mightie great stones and sharpe beames upon the walles ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Tenthons, who in their journey into Italy had left such cariages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conveniently take along with them, in the custodie of these forces; who after the death of their fellowes, being many yeares disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes inuading other states, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in. At the first coming of the Romaine army, they sallied out of the towne, & made many light skirmishes with them; but after that Caesar had drawne a rampier about the towne of 12 foot in height, 75 miles in compasse; and had fortified it with castles very thicke about the towne, they kept themselves within the wall: And as they beheld the vines framed, the mount raised, and a towre in building a far off; at first they began to laugh at it; and with scoffing speeches from the wal, began to aske with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romaines were but little men in respect of the Gallies) a towre of that huge massie waight should bee brought vnto the walles? But when they saw it removed, and approaching nere vnto the towne, as men astonished at the strange and vnaccustomed sight thereof, they sent ambassadors to Caesar, to intreat a peace with this message: They beleued that the Romaines did not make war, without the special assistance of the gods, that could with such facility transport engines of that height, & bring them to incounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therefore they submitted both themselves, and all that they had, to Caesars mercy, desiring one thing of his meere clemency, that he would not take away their armes, forasmuch as all their neighbors were enemies vnto them, and enuied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliuer up their armor: so that they had rather suffer any inconuenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murdered by them, whom in former time they had held subiect to their command.

To this Caesar answered, that hee would saue the city rather of his owne custome, then for any desert of theirs; so that they yeelded before the Ram touched the wal: but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present deliery of their armes; for he would do by the as he had done by the Nerni, and giue commandment to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the city, they seemed contented to doe whatsoeuer hee commanded them, and thereupon casting a great part of their armour ouer the wall into the ditch, inso much as they fild it almost to the top of the rampier: and yet (as after ward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that daie caried themselves peaceably. Towards night Caesar commanded the gates to be shut, and the soldiours to be drawn out of the towne. But the Aduatici hauing consulted together before, forasmuch as they beleued that vpon their submission, the Romaines would either set no watch at all, or at the least, keepe it verie careleslie: partlie with such armour as they had retained, and partly with Targets, made of barke or wrought of wicker, which vpon the sodaine they had cowered ouer with leather, about the third watch where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest, they issued sodainly out of the towne with all their power: but signification thereof being giuen by fiers, as Caesar had commanded, the Romaines hastened speedilie to that place. The enemy fought very desperatelie, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romaines in a place of disadvantage, at length with the slaughter of 4000. the rest were driven backe into the towne. The

next daie when Cæsar came to breake open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the soldiors, and sold al the people and spoile of the towne: the number of persons in the towne amounted to 53000. bondslaves.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Circūuallatio

IN the surprise, attempted by the Belgæ vpon Bibract, I set downe the maner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their sodaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any aduantage in the course of the war) they then prepared for the siege, in that maner, as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inuironed the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the saide rampier, with many castles and fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any forraine succor or reliefe: and withal secured themselves frō sallies or other stratagems, which the townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of siege was called *circūuallatio*; the particular description wherof, I refer vnto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

*In the seventh
commentarie.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

*Aries or the
Ram.*

Cales.

Aries simplex

*Aries compo-
posita.*



He Ram, which Cæsar heere mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Romaine Engines, and helde that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention thereof, to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrow a castle, they tooke a long beame or timber tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees, they ouerthrewe the whole towre. The Romaines had two sortes of Rams, the one was rude and plaine; the other artificial and compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtraiited in the column of Traian at Rome.

The compound Ram is thus described by Iosephus; a Ramme (saith he) is a mighty great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end with a head of yron, fashioned like vnto a Ram; and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto an other beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars, and hanging thus equallie balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his yron heade: neither is there any towre so strong, or wal so broad, that is able to stande before it. The length of this Ramme was of a large scantling, for Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian warre had a Ram eighty foote long: and Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsuallie 106. and sometimes 120; and this length gaue great strength and force to the engine.

engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of souldiers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Centurie; and so the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermission. Iosephus saith, that Titus, at the siege of Ierusalem, had a ramme for euerie legion: it was oftentimes couered with a vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more safety. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vntill the ramme had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptation of rendrie; for as much as by their obstinacie, they had brought in perill the liues of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affoordeth such mercie as the victor pleaseth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small securitie, which one state can giue vnto another, that commendeth their safetie to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pythagorean saith, a bodie, a familie, and an Armie are then well gouerned, when they containe within themselves the causes of their safetie; so we must not looke for anie securitie in a state, when their safetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection. For the olde saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere*. Although in this case the matter was well qualified, by the maiestie of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia, wherof the Hedui with their associates were very gainful witnesses: but amongst kingdomes, that are better luted with equalitie of strength & auidority, there is small hope of safetie to be looked for, vnlesse the happy gouernment of both do mutually depend vpon the safetie of either nation. For that which Polybius obserued in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; That kings by nature esteeme no man, either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall finde them answerable to their proiectes. And contrariwise, it cutteth off many occasions of practises & attempts, when it is knowne that a state is of it selfe able and readie to resist the designes of forraine enemies, according to that of Manlius: *Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent*.

THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.



He manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great vse in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeed it is, for as much as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance cannot be discerned from the fire it selfe, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance: and contrariwise,

N iij.

in

To giue notice of an Alarm by fire.

in the daie time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the cleare brightnesse of the aire doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall bodie: and therefore their custome was to vse fire in the night, and smooke in the daie, suting the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie; that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.



And albeit after the victorie, the Romans inflicted diuers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as Flavius Lucanus saith in *Liuiē*, there was no nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romans were.

Lib. 25.

The punishments which the Romans laied vpon a conquered nation.

The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towards a conquered nation, were these; either they punished them by death, or solde them for bondslaves, *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub iugum*; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie states.

Of the first we finde a manifest example in the third of these *Commentaries*, where Cæsar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his ambassadours by force, contrarie to the law of nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus saith, that an enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, in as much as the captiues stood crowned in the market place, where they were set out to sale; as Cato saith in his booke *de re militari*, *ut populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus supplicatum eat: quam re male gesta coronatus vaneat*. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keepe them together; and this round-about-standing was called *Corona*. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: for as much as amongst the Greekes, by the speare or pike, was signified the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub iugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallows, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laide vpon their necke the yooke of thraldome. *Liuiē* saith, that Quintius the dictator dismissed the *Aequos sub iugum*; and this *iugum* was made of 3 speares, whereof two were stucke vpriight in the ground, and the third was tied ouerthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub iugum*, were vngirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe they tooke awaie their landes and territories, and either solde it for mony, & brought it into the treasure, or deuided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which *Liuiē* hath manie pregnant examples.

CHAP. XIII.


Craſſus taketh in all the maritime cities that lie
to the Ocean : the legions are carried into
their wintering camps.



HE ſame time Pub. Craſſus, whom he had ſent with one legion to the maritime cities that laie to the Ocean, aduertised him that al thoſe ſtates had yeelded themſelues to the people of Rome. The wars being thus ended, and all Gallia being ſetled in peace, there went ſuch a fame of this warre among other barbarous people, that from nations beyond the Rhene there came ambaffadors to Caſar, offering both hoſtages and obedience to whatſoeuer he commanded them. But Caſar willed them to repaire vnto him againe in the beginning of the next ſommer, for as much as he then haſted into Lumbardie, after he had placed his legions in their wintering camps. For theſe thinges, vpon the ſight of Caſars letters, a generall ſupplication was proclaimed in Rome for 15 daies together, which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the ſecond Commentarie.

Caſar.

Of this ſupplication I will ſpeake in the latter ende of the 4 booke.



OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS VPON THE THIRD BOOKE OF CÆSAR HIS COMMENTARIES.

THE ARGUMENT.

THis Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter end of the former sommer; wherein the Belgæ had so leane a haruest: and then it proceedeth to the warre betweene Cæsar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitæ: And Titus Labienus, with the Treuiri.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, being sent to cleere the passage of
the Alpes, was besieged by the Seduni
and Veragri.

Caesar.



CÆSAR taking his iourney into Italie, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen vnto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the riuer Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, vnto the tops of the highest Alpes. The end of this voyage was chiefly to cleare the Alpes of theues and robbers, that liued by the spoile of passengers that travelled betweene Italie and Gallia: Galba hauing order, if he found it expedient to winter in those partes, after some fortunate encounters and the taking of some castles and holdes, he concluded a peace, and resolved to place two cohortes of his legion, amongst the Nantuates; and himselfe to winter with the other cohortes, in a towne of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This towne being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mightie high hils, was deuided by a riuer into two partes, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for his wintering campe, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had spent many daies of wintering, and giuen order, that corne should be brought thither for prouision; he had intelligence vpon a sudden, that the Galles, in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was allotted vnto them; and that the hils which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne stood, were possest with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this sudden commotion were cheefly
the

the paucitie of the Roman forces, not making a compleat legion; for as much as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wanting upon necessarie occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such aduantage, that they were perswaded by reason of the steepe declinitie of the hill, that the Romans would not indure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it greened them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hostages; and the Alpes, which nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as boundes betweene two large kingdomes, to be seased upon by the Roman legions, and vnitied to their Prouince.

Vpon these aduertisements, Galba not hauing as yet finished the fortification of his campe, nor made prouision of corne and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of warre, being secured of their amitie, and obedience, both by hostages and rendrie: he presently called a counsell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which counsell the mindes of many were so amazed, with the terrour of so vnexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed soldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the enemy, and no hope left of any succour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other waie for their safetie, then leauing behind them their baggage and impediments, to sallie out of their campe, and so to saue themselves by the same waie they came thither: notwithstanding the greater part concluded, to referre that resolution to the last push; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the campe.

THE OBSERVATION.



Hich aduise although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better fured the valour of the Romans, and sauoured more of tempered magnanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their mindes, by their ouer hastie and too forward resolution. For as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troupes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselves by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terrour, and a stronger impressiion of feare, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for desperate and inconsiderate rashnes riseth sooner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a lesse troubled eie and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirite, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vpon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; I say, they so gaue greater scope to fortune and enlarged the boundes of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The enimie setteth vpon the wintering campe:

*Galba ouerthroweth them.**Cæsar.*

HE counsell being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such thinges, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enimie at a watchword giuen assaulted the campe, on all sides with stones and darts, and other casting weapons: the Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soeuer of their campe seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of helpe, thither they came with succour and reliefe; but herein they were ouermatched. For the enimie being spent and wearied with fight, when-soeuer anie of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwaies fresh combatants to supplie it: but the Romans by reason of their small number, had no such helpe. For their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for wearinesse nor woundes, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And hauing thus fought continually the space of sixe houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enimie persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch and breake downe the rampier, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation: P. Sex. Baculus the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Neruiian battell, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ranne speedily to Galba and tolde him, that the only waie of safetie was to breake out vpon the enimie, and to trie the last refuge in that extremitie. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease a while from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the campe; and so to rest themselues a little and recouer their strength: and then at a watchword to sallie out of their campe, and laie their safety vpon their vertue; which the souldiers executed with such alacritie and courage of spirite, that breaking out at all the gates of the campe, they gaue no leasure to the enimie to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a noueltie. And thus fortune being suddenly changed, they slewe more then the third part of 30000, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to staie vpon the hills neere about them.

OBSERVATIONS.



*W*hich strange alteration liuely describeth the force of noueltie, and the effectuall power of vnexpected aduētures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the campe, and the Galles charged it by assault, the victorie held constant with the Galles, and threatned death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any

meanes

*The force of
noueltie turn-
ing the for-
tune of a bat-
tell.*

meanes to recouer hope of better successe, but by trying another waie; which so much the more amazed the Galles, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victorie, by a set fight continuing the space of fixe houres, without any likelihood of contrarietie, or alteration. Which practise, of frustrating a desigine intended by an indirect and contrary answer, serued the Romans oftentimes to great aduantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentarie we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnellos, with the same stratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption and falling out, when they expected nothing but a defensiu resistance from the rampier. From whence a commander may learne, to auoide two contrarie inconueniences, according as the qualitie of the warre shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a iudicious eie will easily discouer) that a fallie made out at diuers portes of a holde, will much mitigate the heate of a charge, and controll the furie of an enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place what aduantage soeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himselfe of good fortune, if he appoint certaine troupes in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily imploied in the assault may prouide to answer it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galles had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceived.

C H A P. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelli

giue occasion of a new warre.



HE enemy being thus defeated, Galba was unwilling to trie fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corne and forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next daie he returned towards the Prouince, and without let or resistance, brought the legion safe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the * Allobroga, and there he wintered.

After these things were dispatched: Caesar supposing for manie reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of any new warre, the Belgæ being ouerthrowen, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alpes subdued and vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great desire to see those nations: there grewe a sudden tumult and dissention in Gallia vpon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the seuenth legion in Aniou neare vnto the Ocean, and finding scarcitie of corne in those partes; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes into the next cities to demaund corne, and other provisions for his legion, of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent vnto the * Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the * Curiosolita, Q. Velanius, and Titus Silius to the * Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authoritie amongst all the maritime nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping, with

Caesar.

* Santolens.

* Le Perche.
* Cornoaille
in Bretagne
* Vannes.

O ij.

which

which they did trafficke into Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour states in skill and experience of sea-faring matters; hauing the most part of such as vsed those seas, tributaries to their state: These Veneti first aduentured to retaine Silins and Velanius, hoping thereby to recouer their hostages which they had giuen to Crassus. The finitimate cities indaced by their authoritie and example, for the same reason, laide hold vpon Trebius and Terrasidius; and sending speedie ambassages one vnto another, coniuured by their Princes and chiefeſt magistrates, to approue their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same euent of fortune; solliciting also other cities and states, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Ancestors, then to indure the seruile bondage of a stranger.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He circumstance in this historie, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of things made promise of peace: sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse, in calculating the natiuitie of *After-chances*; which so feldome answer the iudgment we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speake of happinesse, we finde nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruel, if when almost all nations are at oddes, and in our best conceites, threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace; or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillitie, and through the vncertainty of our weake probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles: there follow greater wars in the ende, then the former time can truely speake of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our hautie politicians, that thinke to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premises of their weake proiectes, and predestinate succeeding ages, according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall breake the maine streame of our iudgment, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnderstanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander, to preuent an euill that may crosse his desigine, (how vnlikely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such manner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct meanes to resist the repugnancie of a contrarie nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



His practise of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eie ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mightie amongst the rest, then of any other inferiour state of the same nature and condition: for as example of
it

*The weakenes
of our iudge-
ment in re-
gard of the
knowledge of
future times.*

it selfe is of great Authoritie, making improbabilities seeme full of reason, especially when the intention shal sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Acte of superiour personages: it must needes be verie effectuell to stirre vp mens mindes, to approue that with a strong affection, which their owne single iudgment did no waie allow of. And therefore equalitie bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie can not afford, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

The Authority of example.

CHAP. III.

Caesar hauing aduertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia and prepareth for the warre.



AL the maritime states being by this meanes drawne into the same conspiracie, they sent a common ambassage unto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deliuer up the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Caesar being certified by Crassus, in as much as he was then a great way distant from his Armie, he commanded Gallies and shippes of warre to be built vpon the riuer * Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that Gallie men, Mariners, and Shipmasters should be mustered in the Prouince: which being speedely dispatched, as soone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Caesars arriual, and considering how haynous a fact they had committed, in detaining the ambasadours and casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred and inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, & especially such necessities, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.

Caesar.

* Ligeris.

THE OBSERVATION.



From hence I may take occasion, briefly to touch the reuerent opinion, which all nations, howe barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceived of the qualitie and condition of ambasadours: and what the groundes are of this vniuersall receiued custome, which in all ages, and times hath held Authentickall. And first we are to vnderstand, that all man kinde (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane sociery; that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselues are vnnaturall, as proceeding from corruption and defect) driue them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect:

The groundes of that reuerent opinion which is held of ambasadours.

yet without a necessarie entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discord it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bondes of nature, and so powerfull are the lawes which she enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vses thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it from falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the ende of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treatie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seeme so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onelie intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefeſt object, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill gouernment: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the meanes of amitie and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgment of all nations, as vnworthie of humane societie. Last of all, it is an iniurie of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extreme infamie, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish ambassadours for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefeſt dutie consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued, which may as well tende to the aduancement and honour of that cittie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire warre or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of ambassadours, is reuerently to be respected, and defended from brutish and vnaturall violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either partie, in the entrance of this warre.

Caesar.



HE Veneti conceived great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: for as much as all the passages by land were broken and cut off, with armes and creekes of the sea; and on the other side, navigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanel, and shelues of the coast. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to be had in those quarters. And if it happened, that the course of thinges were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themselues were strong in shipping: whereas the Romans had

none

none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallowes, Portes and Ilands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should finde the use of Navigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were accustomed vnto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with prouision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Caesar (as it was reported) would begin to make warre, taking the Osismi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambiuariti, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as consorts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred up Caesar to undertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yielded themselves by rendrie, and giuen hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so manie citties, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and states to the like insolencie. And therefore understanding, that almost all the Galles were inclining to noueltie and alteration, and of their owne nature, were quicke and readie to undertake a warre; and further, considering that all men by nature desired libertie, and hated the seruile condition of bondage: he preuented all further insurrections of the other states, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalrie, vnto the *Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rhene: to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgæ, to keepe them in obedience; and to hinder such forces, as might peradventure be transported ouer the riuer by the Germans, to further this rebellious humour of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12 legionarie cohortes, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurinus Sabinus with three legions, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolita, Vnelli, to disappoint any practise which rebellious mindes might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towards Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himselfe marched thitherward with the rest of the foote forces.

Lendriguer.
Lysieux.
Nantes.
Aurenche.
Leondoul.
Cities in the
Ile Britaine

*Triers.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first booke, I obserued the authoritie which the Roman leaders had to undertake a warre, without further acquainting the senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to undertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgments of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the benefit would answere their labour. And thus we finde the reasons particularly deliuered, that moued Cæsar first to undertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the necessitie of that warre with the Belgæ; and nowe the motives which induced him to this with the maritime cities of Britaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germanie, or what other enterprize he attempted: which he laith downe

downe as the groundes and occasions of those warres, and could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Galles, and to keepe them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that continent; and so settling the wauering disposition of the further skirtes, with the waight of his Armie, and the presence of his legionarie souldiers, which he sent readie to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the vpshot of that quarrell, that he had disperfed the greatest part of his Armie vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

CHAP. VI.

The maner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

Caesar.



THE scite, of almost all these cities was such, that being built in pointes and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twise in 12 houres, be approached by foot forces, nor yet with shipping neither; for againe in an ebbe, the vessalles were laid on the ground, and so left as a prairie to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equal to the wals of the town, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey, both themselves and their cariages, into the next townes, and there helpe themselves with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Caesar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman flecte by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not aduenture to put out of the river Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galles was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Roman shipping, the better to beare the ebbes, and shallowes of that coast: the foredecke was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the hugeness of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for the ribbes and seates were made of beames of a foote square, fastned with yron pins of an inch thicke: instead of cables, they used chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant of the vse thereof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman nauie, with this kinde of ships was such, that they onely excelled them in celeritie and speedie nimblenes, with force of oares; but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foule weather, were farre inferiour vnto them: for the strength of them was

such,

Porta Pr
THE ROMAINE



Principia



Prætorii





Quintana



Porta Decum

Prætoria
NE CAMPE



torium


Principia



Quintana

umana





such, that they could neither hurt them with their beake-heads, nor cast a weapon to anie purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if anie gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercie of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safetie shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chantes the Roman naue stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATIONS.



And here, let it not seeme impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulairs haue of nauigation, briefly to set downe the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seeme necessarie to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularitie, and well approued rules in our Arte of nauigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heauens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposall; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancie of motion, we esteeme of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalistes chiefly vnderstand celestiall influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is deuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betweene the east horizon and the noone meridian, which they cal a flowing quarter: the second, from the noone meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and againe, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrarie effects, are the sunne and the moone; as they are caried through these distinct partes of the heauen. And although experience hath noted the moone to be of greatest power in warrie motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that when the moone or the sunne begin to appeare aboue the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heauen which I termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high floud. And againe, as those lightes passing the meridian, decline to the west, and runne the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth and returneth againe from whence it came. Againe, as they set vnder the west ho-

*The causes
of the ebbing
and flowing
of the sea.*

rizon and enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth againe to flow, and still increaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then againe, it refloweth, according as the sunne and moone are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the east horizon.

Spring tides.

And hence it happeneth that in coniunction or new of the moone, when the sunne and the moone are caried both together in the same flowing, and ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebbes are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moone, when these lightes are caried in opposite quarters, which we haue described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, doe ioyne their forces, to make perfect this worke of nature in the ebbing and flowing of the sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moone is caried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sunne doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require: then are the tides lessened, as daillie experience doth witnesse.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, deuide euerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moone maketh in their reuolutions, into equall parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantitie of 6 houres: and therefore that which Cæsar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12 houres, there are alwaies 2 high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland citie, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him vnderstand that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceiued principally of the sea it selfe; and secondarily of such portes and hauens, as stand either neare or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought conuenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

*The manner
of their ship-
ping.*

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, whereof posteritie hath onely receiued the bare names, and some fewe circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critickes of these times haue laboured to set forth a fleet, answerable to that, which the tearmes and title mentioned in historie seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answere their charge. For manie men rest vsatisfied, first touching the names themselues, whereof wee finde these kindes,

Names	{	Longas.
		Onerarias.
		Actuarias.
		Triremes.
		Quadrirèmes.
		Quinqueremes.

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second ships
of

of burthen: the third, ships that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Nowe whether these Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a seuerall sorte of shipping by themselves; or the generall Names of the *Quadriremes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, for as much as euerie kinde of these might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*, as it yet remaineth in controuersie: so it is not much materiall to that which wee seeke after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Critickes, is in what sense they maie vnderstand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, whether they were so tearmed in regard of the number of rowers, or watermen that haled continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oares on either side, a *Quadrirème* foure, and a *Quinquerème* five: whereof they tooke their distinction of Names.

Such as holde, that a *Trireme* had on each side three rankes of oares, and so consequently, of a *Quadrirème* and *Quinquerème*, alleadge this place of *Liuius*, to make good their opinion. In the warres betweene Rome and Carthage, *Lælius* meeting with *Adherball* in the straighes of Gibraltar, each of them had a *Quinquerème*, and seauen or eight *Triremes* a piece, the current in that place was so great that it gaue no place to Arte, but carried the vessailes according to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertaintie the *Triremes* of the Carthaginean, closed with the *Quinquerème* of *Lælius*: which either because she was *pondere tenacior*, as *Liuius* saith, or otherwise, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regetur*; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which resisted the billowe and steamed the current, she sunke two of the *Triremes*, and so got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a *Quinquerème* had *plures remorum ordines*, then a *Trireme* had; and therefore it tooke the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret *Ordo Remorum*, to be a couple of oares one answering another, on each side of the vessaile, which we call a paire of oares: So that a *Quinquerème* being far greater and longer then a *Trireme*, had more paires of oares then a *Trireme* had, and those oares were handled with five men at one oare, according to the vse of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this, and come to their manner of sea-fights, wee must vnderstand that the Romans, wanting the vse of Artillerie and managing their ships of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vse of their Arte, in their conflicts and incounters by sea: for all their shippes of seruice, which we tearme men of warre, carried a strong beake-head of yron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ranne one against another, with as great violence and furie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Arte gaue great aduantage; for he that could best skill to turne his ship, with greatest celeritie, and so frustrate an offer; or with speedie and strong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victorie.

In the battell, which *D. Brutus* had with the *Massilians*, we reade that two

P ij.

Triremes

Lib. 27.

Their manner
of sea-fights.

Lib. 2. de
bello civili.

Triremes charging the Admirall, wherein Brutus was one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Marriners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from betweene them, and the two Triremes met with such a carriere one against another; that one brake her beakehead, and the other split with the blowe.

For this skill and fortune withall, Euphranor the Rodian was of great fame in Cæsars time; although his ende found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes reserueth to a harder destinie; as other seamen besides Euphranor, can truely witness.

This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, then the art and practises of their land seruices came in vse: for they erected turrets vpon their deckes, and from them they fought with engines and casting weapons, as slinges, arrowes, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionarie souldier finde any difference, when he came to the point, betweene their fight at sea and that at land: sauing that they could not be martialled in troupes and bandes, in regard wherof the sea seruice was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuersie, by slinges and casting weapons: which kinde of fight was of lesse honour, then buckling at handy-blowes.

CHAP. VII.

The battell continueth: and Cæsar ouercommeth.

Cæsar.



HE maner of their fightes being this, as I haue described, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his manie, knewe what to doe or what course of fight to take: for the shipping of the Galls was so strong, that the beake-head of their Quinquere-mes could performe no seruice vpon them: and although they should raise turrets according to their vse, yet these would not equall in height the poupe of the enemies shipping; so that therein also the Galls had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might foile so great a nauie, which amounted to the number of 230 shippes of warre. One thing there was amongst their provisions which stood them in great steed: for the Romans had provided great sharpe hookes or sickles, which they put vpon great and long poles; these they fastened to the tackling which held the maine yarde to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oares, they cutte the said tackling, and the maine yarde fell downe: Whereby the Galls, whose onely hope consisted in sayling and yare turning of their ships, lost at one instant, both their sailes and the vse of their shipping: And then the controuersie fell within the compasse of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Galls; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and

and the whole Armie, no valiant act could be smothered in secret; for all the hills and cliffs, which afforded neare prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yarges being cutte downe, and the Romans indeuouring with great furie to boord them, failed not to take manie of their ships: which the Galles perceiuing, and finding no remedie nor hope of resistance, began all to flie, & turning their ships to a forewind, were vpon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no waie at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a nauie, verie few through the helpe of the euening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8 houres: with which battell, ended the warre with the Veneti, and the rest of the maritimate nations. For all sort of people both young and olde, in whom there was either courage, counsell, or dignitie, were present at this battell, and all their shipping was taken and lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their townes any longer: and therefore yeilded themselves to Caesar, in whom be used the greater seueritie, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people, not to violate the law of nations: for he slew all the Senat with the sword, and sold the people for bondslaves.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune, which vsually attendeth vpon industrie: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made readie these hookes, not for this intent wherein they were imployed, but at all occasions & chances, that might happen, as seruiceable complements rather then principall instruments: and yet it so fell out, that they proued the only meanes, to ouerthrow the Galles. Which proueth true the saying of Caesar, that industrie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary labour: for industrie in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner diligence and laboursome industrie, by circumspect and heedefull cariage, seldom faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For euerie action is intangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interess'd in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherentes, some of them are by wisdom, foreseene; and directed to that course which may fortunatize the action: the rest being vnknowne, continue without either direction or preuention, and are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyonde the compasse of our wisest reach, and stand in the waie either to assist or disadvantage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authoritie; in as much as she armeth her selfe for all chances, whereby she is said to command fortune.

*The force of
industrie.*

CHAP. VIII.

Sabinus ouerthroweth the * Vnelli, with the
manner thereof.

* La Perche.

Caſar.

* Rhone.

* Emreux.



WHILE these things happened in the state of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entereth with his forces, into the confines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridoux was made chiefe commander, hauing drawne the* Auleri and the* Eburonices, with a great number of vagabondes and theeues into the same conspiracie: Sabinus incamping himselfe in a conuenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But Viridoux, being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his campe, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him oportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not onely to be suspected by the enemy of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reprochfull speeches of his owne souldiers; which opinion of feare being once settled in the mindes of the enemy, he vsed all meanes to increase it, and caried it so wel, that the enemy durst approach the verie rampier of the campe. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the Generall, to fight with an enemy of that strength, but upon some good oportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perswasion of feare, Sabinus chose out a subtil witted Gall, whom he perswaded with great rewards, and further promises, to flie to the enemy, and there to carrie himselfe, according to the instructions, which he should giue him. This Gall, comming as a reuolter to the enemy, laide open vnto them the feare of the Romans: the extremitie that Caesar was driuen into by the Veneti; and that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his campe, and to make all the haste he could to relieue Caesar. Vpon which aduertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this oportunitie was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other deuises, to go and assault the Roman campe. Many circumstances perswaded the Gales to this resolution; as first the lingering & doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battell: secondly the intelligence which this fugitive had brought: thirdly the want of victuals, wherein they had bin negligent and vnadvisedly carelesse: fourthly the hope they conceived of the warre of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly beleue that which they would haue come to passe. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridoux, nor the rest of the captaines, to dismisse the counsell vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and go to the Roman campe. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and fagots to fill vp the ditch, and with cheerefull harts, as though the victorie were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped, which was the toppe of a hill rising gently from a leuell, the quantitie of 1000 paces: hither the Gals hastened with all expedition; and to the intent the Romans might not haue so much time, as to put on their armour, the Gales for haste ran themselves out of breath.

Sabinus

Sabinus encouraging his souldiers, gave the signe of battell, and sallying out at two severall gates of his campe, it fell out that through the oportunitie of the place, the wearines and unexperience of the enemye, the valour of the Roman soldier and their exercise in former battells, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the first encounter; but presently tooke themselves to flight, of whom verie few escaped. And so it happened that at one time, Sabinus had newes of the overthrow at sea; and Caesar of Sabinus victory by land. Vpon these victories, all the cities and states yielded themselves to Titurinus: for as the Galles are prompt to undertake a warre; so are they weake in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATIONS.



His practise of a counterfeit feare was often put in vse by the Roman leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemye, as to draw them into an inconvienience, & so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battell. Caesar comming to succour the campe of Cicero made such vse of this Art, that he put to route a great Armie of the Galles, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly set downe by Caesar.

*The vse
which the
Romans made
of a counter-
feit feare.
Lib. 5.*

The chiefeft thing in this place, which brought them to their overthrow, was disappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digested in busineses of small consequence, to be frustrated of a setled expectation, when the minde shall dispose her selfe to one only intent, and in the vpshot meete with a counterbuss to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceede in a course of victorie, and humour our conceits with that we wish and would haue to happen; and in the end meete, either with bondage or death; must our best wittes be appauled? hauing neither respite nor means, to thinke how the euill may be best preuented. Which the wise Romans well vnderstood, and counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shamefull cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisedome; while they in the meane time foresaw their good fortunes, throwed vnder the cloake of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a leader, so to take the oportunitie of any such fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefeft points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the designe, as for his owne safety and the securitie of his Armie. For order is as the sinewes and strength of martiall discipline, vnitng the particular members into the firme composition of a well proportioned bodie: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited partes, how able or infinite soeuer. I might here alleadge infinite examples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux serue for all; wherein the protestantes ouercharging the catholike Army, followed the retrait so hard, that they quickly became masters of the field: and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more glorious

glorious by slaughter and mortallitie: the Duke of Guise all this while bouged not a foot: but in vnexampled patience kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their general that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise dispersed and broken; and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the Victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholike; he dissolued that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence, and so changing the fortune of the daie, that he tooke the chiefe of their Princes prisoners, with little or no losse of his owne men: so powerfull is order in the deedes of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victorie. And thus we haue first seene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well dissembled, may cast vpon a credulous and vnaduised enemy, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their owne credulitie doth afterward auouch: and secondly, what strength and safetie consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to set vp.

CHAP. IX.

The Proceedings of Crassus in Aquitanie.

Caesar.



* Enocati.

*A*t the same instant of time it happened also, that Pub. Crassus comming into Aquitania (which both in regard of the large extension of the countrey, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make warre in those partes, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slaine, and the Armie ouerthrowen, and where Lucius Manilius was faine to flie with the losse of his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therefore hauing made prouision of corne, and mustered many Auxiliarie forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouse and Narbone; he carried his Army into the confines of the* Sontiates, which was no sooner knowne but they lentied great forces both of horse & foote, and with their horse charged vpon the Romans in their march: which being easily repelled, as they followed the retrain, the infanterie of the Galles shewed it selfe in a valley as it laie in ambush. These setting vpon the Romans renewed the battell, and there the fight continued hot along time; the Sontiates being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitania relye vpon their vertue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to shew what they were able to doe of themselves, without their grand Captaine, and vnder the conduction of a young souldier: At length the enemy ouerwaged with promesse, and wearied with woundes, betooke themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number. And then marched directlie to the towne of the Sontiates, and laid siege vnto it; the siege grew hot on both sides; the Romans approached the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts: the townesmen defended themselves some time, by sallying out; sometimes, by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skilfull. But when they perceiued the industry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Crassus to accept their rendry: which

which being granted, and al the armie intending the deliuey of their Armes; Ad-
cantianus their chiefe magistrate, fled out in the meane time at an other port of the
citie, with 600. deuoted companions whom they called Soldurij: but as they attempt-
ed to escape, the soldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified
his euasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betooke themselves to armes, and so repe-
led him agasne into the towne, where he desired to bee taken in the number of the
submissiue multitude. Crassus hauing taken hostages of them, went into the con-
fines of the Vocontij.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THese skilfull and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all
the Cities in Aquitaine, were those, whom the Romans called *Euocati*:
such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their lawes from gi-
uing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy
which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priui-
ledge: And in that regard were sent for by letters, intreating their assistance in
the cariage of that war, as men wel acquainted with the nature of such busineses.
Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction,
although they had no part in command or authority.

Euocati.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this fight we may further obserue, their maner of defence against
Mountes, and Cavalieros; which we find chiefly to bee mines. Iose-
phus in the Iewish warre saith, that the Romans hauing raised an ex-
ceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art,
that as they digged vnderneath, they supported the mount with huge props and
planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage,
they set all the timber worke, which vnderpropped the mount on fire, which ta-
king fire with the helpe of brimstone and pitch, the mount fell vpon a sodaine,
to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

At the siege of *Auaricum*, we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take
the earth from the mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so
kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most parte
made of woode, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all meanes
to burne it; as it happened at the siege of *Masilia*: and oftentimes when both
burning and vndermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount with-
in the walles, to disappoint the disaduantage by equall contesting of it; and so
made it vnprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I saie, without prei-
udice to that Art: that the chiefeest points to be respected are these: First, the true
distance to a designed place, which is best got by instrument and helpe of
Geometrie, where other markes of certainty are wanting: secondlie, the
direction of the myne, that wee may not erre in our course which the com-
passe affoordeth: thurdlie, the strengthening of the mine with timber worke,

*Lib. 7. de bel.
lo Gall.*

Qj.

if

if neede require: lastly, the countermining and crossemeeting: All which parts haue very many circumstances, and require a larger discourse, then may bee thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their chieftaine, may wel deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especiallie considering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatsoever ill chance or disaster shoulde happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, tooke hold of their head, these deuoted were tied voluntarilie to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memory was there euer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloody league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dangerous in a well ordered state, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or sought to practise any thing contrarie to good gouernement: for hee himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts that were so interessed in his life & death.

CHAP. X.

The Galles raise new forces, against Crassus.

Caesar.



He barbarous Galles were much troubled, that a towne of that strength should so soone bee taken; and therefore they sent ambassadours into all quarters, coniured one with another, confirmed their conuenants with mutuall hostages, and leuied what power they were able to make: sending for aide out of Spaine, and from other states that bordered vpon Aquitaine; at the comming of these forces they began to make warre, with a great power, and with many soldiours of great fame. For they appointed such leaders as had seene the experience of Sertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men: for their skill and knowledge in the arte militarie: these according to the custom of the people of Rome, beganne to take places of advantage, to fortifie their campe, and to intercept the Romaines from free passage of conuoyes, and necessary entercourses. Which when Crassus perceined, and considering withall, that his owne forces were so few, that hee could not well dismember them vpon any seruice or advantages, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding, a sufficient garrison in his campe; by which meanes their corne and prouision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed euery daie stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to giue them battel.

The

The matter being referred to a council of warre, when hee understoode that all men were of the same opinion; he appointed the next daie to giue them battaile; and in the dawning putting his men in a double battaile, and placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middest, he attended to see what the enemy would doe. The Galles, although they were perswaded, that they might aduenture battel both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowes of warre, as also in respect of the paucitie of the Romaines; yet they thought it better to blocke up the passages, and so cut off all cariages, and conuoyes of corne; and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of corne should offer to make a retreat, they would then set upon them as they marched, wearied with trauell, and heauilie laden with their burthens. This resolution being approued by the whole councill of the Galles, when the Romans imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their campe.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder and younger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against Pompeie and Metellus; and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in the end was trecherously slaine by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; and vnder him were these captaines brought vp, which Caesar commendeth for their skil in armes.

Sertorius.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



N histories, propounding to our consideration the deedes and monuments of former ages, we may obserue two especiall meanes, which the great commanders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victory, and ouermaster their enemies: the first by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second, by forceable meanes & waging of battel; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and ability of the body. Concerning the first, it hath euer bin held more honorable, as better futing the worth of the spirit and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerser part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the projects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, & so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, & conclude the matter by termes of arte, taken from the directions of good prouidence. For to speake a truth, the action of battel, as it is the last part in that facultie; so it is the worst in regarde of christian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his second wife, which the Diuines do note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind, then the children of grace, whose ioy consisteth in peace and loue.

Two meanes
to atchieue
victorie and
to ouermaster
their enemiesTubalcaine
by war and
Naamah by
the floud.

Cæsar in the first of the ciuill warres respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for hauing shut vp Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disadvantage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enimie: *Cur etiam secundo pralio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?* And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Arte, and the Romaine industry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romans at their owne weapon. This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest waie in these vncertaine and casual euentues: for that which resteth vpon corporall strength, and maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is verie terrible euen to the better party, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For it were a miracle of fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoever, that the victor army shoulde buie so great a fortune without bloodshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophee to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure. And for the vncertaintie in a battell, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in every small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy and sorrow? and therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires. This I say is chiefly to be imbraced, if our meanes wil afford vs that happinesse: but howsoever I holde it wisdom so to entertaine this course of victorie, that we omit not the chiefeest helps of furtherance when it commeth to blowes, but to thinke of this conquest by arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes wil serue vs to compass it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discrete cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the latter, and by the helpe of battell, fought to free himselfe from those disadvantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Not to forgo
an aduantage

Obserue further out of this place, that what course soeuer be taken, a discreet leader wil not easily forgo an aduantage, without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, vpon probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For so he might forgo his fortune by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are oftner scene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

Either I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their vsuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not afford that commoditie, they then made two battells, that there might be the succour of a second supplie. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may be gathered by their histories.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

The last thing which I obserue, is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battell; which is here said to be, in *mediam Aciem*: for as their Armies were diuided into three battells; so euerie battell was deuided into three partes; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that in as much as he durst not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battell hath not such scope to sling out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischief, as the cornets haue: for wheresoever there hath beene set battells fought, the strength of their armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell; and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certaine on that part: for the cornets kept the enemy both from incompassing about the bodie of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie. At the battell of Cannas Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemy, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemy came to charge vpon the battell, they easily beat them backe, and as they followed the retrain fell in betweene the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted, and being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowen. And thus we see the aduantage which a Generall hath, when his two cornets stand firme; although the battell shrinke in the incounter. Hanniball in the battell he had with Scipio in Africke, placed the strangers in the front and in the rereward, according peraduenture as he found their number and the vse of their Armes, which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgment of a generall, then of anie prescription that can be giuen in this matter.

The place
where suspected
forces
are best be-
stowed in bat-
tell.

CHAP. XI.

**Crassus taketh the campe of the Galles : and
with their ouerthrow endeth that
warre.**

Caesar.



CRASSUS understanding their drift, and finding his men willing to set upon their campe, encouraged his soldiers; and to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill up the ditch; and others with casting weapons to beate the Galles from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount; that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to caste their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman souldier; the horsemen in the meane time riding about the campe of the Galles, brought worde to Crassus that their ampier at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the commanders of the horse, to encourage their men with great promises and rewardes; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, tooke foure cohorts that were left in the campe, and carrying them a further waie about, that they might not be discovered by the enemy; while all mens eyes and mindes were intent upon the fight, they speedely came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsemen had found to be weake, which being easily broken down, they had entered the campe before the enemy could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour & shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renewing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, began to charge them a fresh with great furie: the Galles being circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselves ouer the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger: But for as much as the country was open and champion, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of 50000 there scarce remaineth the fourth part.

THE OBSERVATION.

Lib. 3.
Auerimento
secundo.



Rom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, how an enemy that is strongly incamped, and for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great consequence, in matter of warre: and therefore deserueth due consideration. Concerning which he laieth this downe for a maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that campes and lodgings are taken by the head: By which

which is meant, that he who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and provided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then seale himselfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and eminent eleuations are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouertop them; which may be easily preuented by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall carie his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouertop the holdes. But all camps and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mountes and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemy shall make without. This foundation being laide, he proceedeth to discouer a waie, how to raise a mount maugre the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murther them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Caesar at the siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geometricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approach to anie place of most aduantage, where he maie in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to plaie vpon any quarter of the campe. The censure of this practise, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme in the behalfe of these workes, that they were of high esteeme amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to finde out the readiest meanes, both for security and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these workes, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practises: but our men had rather flie vpon desperat aduentures, and seeke victory in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

Lib. de bello Gallico.

CHAP. XII.

Caesar undertaketh the warre with the

Menapij and Morini.



*A*t the same time also, although the sommer was almost at an end, yet for as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the *Morini* only with the *Menapij* stood out in armes, and had neuer either sent ambassadour, or otherwise treated of peace; Caesar thinking that warre might quickly be ended, lead his arme into their country. At his comming, he found them to carrie the wars farre otherwise, then the rest of the Gallies had done: for understanding that the greatest nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Romans, were beaten and ouerthrowen, and hauing whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuaid both themselves and their goods into those quarters:

Caesar

Caesar.
* Terouine
* Cleue and
Guelldres.

Cæsar comming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his campe, not discovering any enemy neare about him; but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods and assaulted the Romans; but being speedely driven in againe with the losse of manie of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, had some few of their men slaine. The time that remained, Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting downe the woods; and lest the souldiers might bee taken unawares, while they were busied in that worke, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either side of the Armie; that they might serue for a defence, against sudden assaultes. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies; so that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened such a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue of the worke; and the souldiers could no longer indure, to lie in tentes of skins: and therefore Cæsar, after he had wasted and spoiled their countrie, burned their townes, and their houses; he carried backe his Armie, and placed them in such citties to winter in, as were subdued by the late warres.


OBSERVATIONS.

THE Irish rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogs, doe entertaine the like course of warre, as the Morini did with Cæsar: the meanes which he vsed to disappoint them of that practise, was to cutte downe the woods, which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of warre; let them consider that the Roman discipline wrought greater effectes of valour, then can bee made credible by the vse of these times. For besides their exquisite discipline, which of it selfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampled magnanimitie; their industrie was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with such vncessant trauell, that the souldiers thought it great happines when they came to wage battell with the enemie; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the hazard of their liues. Neither let it seeme strange, that the Romans vndertooke to cut downe the woods; but rather let vs admire their facilitie in so difficult a taske: for as the historie witneseth: *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*: a great quantitie of ground was rid in a few daies with incredible speede. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder anie sudden assault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deserueth as great admiration, as the former part. There is another place in the sixt booke of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serue to acquaint vs with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The Eburones or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods and bogges, and made vse of them in the warre they had with Cæsar: The matter (saith hee) required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie, (for there could no danger come from an enemie that was frightened and dispersed) as the safetie of euerie particular souldier, which in part did pertaine

pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For the desire of bootie caried manie of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thicke together or close imbattaile. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to bee rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, and deuide his men into many bodies: but if hee would haue the maniples to keepe at their ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Roman Army required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the ennemie: neither did they want courage to laie ambushments, and to circumuent such as they found alone, stragling from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; prouiding rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens mindes were set on fire with reuenge) then to hurt the ennemie with the losse of the Roman souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering states, to come out and sacke the Eburones, and they should haue all the praie for their labour: that the life of the Galles rather then his legionarie souldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that, with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might bee quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true motion of the Irish warres, which may be better obserued by such as know those warres by experience, then by my selfe that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to preuent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases: I will leaue it to be done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.



THE FOURTH COMMENTARIE.

THE ARGUMENT.

THe Vſipetes, and Tenchtheri are driuen to ſeek new ſeates in Gallia; they driue the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are ouerthrowen by Cæſar. That warre being ended, he made a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carried his Armie ouer into Germanie. He taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri; and giueth libertie to the Vbij: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Britanie, with the occurrences of that warre.

CHAP. I.

The * Vſipetes, and * Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, ouer the Rhene into Gallia: the nature of the Sueui.

* Those of
Zutphen.
* Of Haſſia.

Cæſar.

THE winter following, Pompeie and Craſſus being Conſuls, the Vſipetes and Tenchtheri, two Germane nations, paſſed ouer the Rhene, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the ſea. The reaſon of their ſitting, was the ill intreatie, which for manie yeares together they had receiued of the Sueui, the greateſt & warlikeſt nation amongſt the Germans. For theſe Sueui had one hundred Cantons or ſhires, which yearely furniſhed their warres, with 1000 men a piece; and kept as manie at home to maintaine both themſelues, and their Armies abroad: and theſe the yeare following were in Armes; and the other ſtaied at home, and performed the like dutie; and ſo by this meanes, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and matter of warre. They liued chiefly vpon cattell and milke, and vſed much hunting, which was the cauſe (what through the qualitie of their diet, their continuall exerciſe, and libertie of life, being neuer tied to any diſcipline, nor vrged to any thing againſt their diſpoſition) that they were ſtrong and of a large ſtature, vſing ſkins and hides for their cloathing, which couered but part of their body, the reſt being naked. Their horſemen oftentimes, in time of battell, forſooke their horſe, and fought on foot; being

being taught to stand still in one place, that when they would they might retorne unto them. Neither was there any thing more base, or dishonest in the course of their life, then to vse furniture for horses: & would aduenture to charge upon great troups of horse, that vsed Equipage, with a few of their owne qualitie. They admitted no wine to be brought in unto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them vnapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion, was to haue their bordering Territories lie wast and desolate: for so it would be thought, that manie states together, would not resist their conquering valour: and it was reported, that the country laie wast from them one waie 600 miles together.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practise of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour auaileth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuill discretion, to make vse of that greatnesse which prowesse hath obtained: for notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other ende, then to maintaine barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valour is alwaies subordinate to the preleruation of common weales, and is as the defensiuie armes of ciuill societie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it resembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular hauiour of our young gallants, whose naked valour reuelling it selfe onely in the lie and in the stabbe, for want of other assitant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a mettall, leadeeth them into such inconueniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddie headed rashnesse; and in lieue of vertues girdon, is repaide with irrisiō.

CHAP. II.

The motiues, inducing the Vspetes to
come ouer the Rhene into
Gallia.

NEXT unto these Sueui, inhabited the Vbij, a very ample and potent state: and through their entercourse and trafficke with marchants, somewhat more ciuill, then the rest of the Germans. With these, the Sueui had often waged battell: and albeit they could not expell them out of their country, forasmuch as their state was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them vnder, and much weakned their estate. In the same case were the Vspetes and Tenchtheri: for hauing made head against the Sueui

R ij.

Caesar.

* Geldres
and Cleine.

for many yeares together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three yeares through the continent of Germanie, at last they arrived where the * Menapij inhabited the bankes, on both sides the river Rhene: but being terrified with the arrivall of such a multitude, they forsooke all their dwellings beyond the river, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

The Vsipectes with their associates, having tried all meanes, and not finding themselves able to passe over by force, for want of boates; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapij, fained a retrait to their olde habitation: and after three daies iourney, their horsemen in one night speedely returned againe, and slew the Menapij, both unguarded and unprouided. For they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to returne ouer the river into their townes and houses: these being slaine, and their shipping taken, they got ouer the river, before the rest of the Menapij had anie notice of their comming: by which meanes they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lived that winter upon the provision they found there.

Cæsar understanding of these thinges, and fearing the weakenesse of the Galles in as much as they are sudden and quicke in their resolutions, and withall desirous of novelty: he durst no waie trust their unconstancie; for it was their practise and custome to staie tranellours and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew, concerning anie thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about marchants in faires and markets, and learne of them whence they came, and what newes they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearesaies they directed the maine course of their actions; wherof they could not but repent themselves, being grounded upon such weake intelligence, as was usually coined to please the multitude. Which custome being knowne, Cæsar to prevent a greater warre, hasted to his Armie sooner then he was wont to doe.

OBSERVATIONS.

SVch as haue spent their time in the contemplation of nature, and haue made diligent search of the temperaure & quality of climates and nations, haue all with one consent made choler the regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the saide humour vsually breedeth. Neither haue these conditions, which Cæsar so long agoe obserued in the ancient Galles, anie disresemblance from that, which the learned of this age haue deliuered, concerning the nature of the said inhabitants: but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such novelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same vnto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes, and people, or what els so long a time hath changed; which argueth the irresistible power of celestiall influence, establishing an uniformitie of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The cause of the diuersity in the temperaure of nations, which are differenced by

by North and south, is not without apparant cause, attributed to their propinquitie, or distance from the course of the sunne, which distinguisheth by heate and cold the Northren and Southerne climates of the earth; and separateth the inhabitants thereof, by the dominion of their actiue qualities. But the reason whie two nations which are both in the same climate, and vnder the same parallel, receiuing the vertue of the celestial bodies, by the same downefal and rebound of their beames, being differenced only by East and West; are so much disunited in nature, and so vnlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be as some haue imagined, for asmuch as the all inclosing sphere, which remaineth quiet and immouable about the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diuerly distinguished with varietie of properties; which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth; and so keepe a perpetuall residency of one and the same quality, in one and the same place; and make also the varietie of fashions in such partes, as otherwise are equall favorites of the heauens maiestie, by receiuing an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the saide quarters of the earth are in themselves diuerly noted, with seuerall qualities, which appropriate the selfe same influence to their particular nature; and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other vnknown cause: I wil leaue euery man to satisfie himselfe with that which seemeth most probable vnto him, and proceed to the discoverie of this cholericke passion. Wherein I will indeuor to shew how impatiencie, soudaine resolution, and desire of noueltie, are naturall adiuncts of this humor: And if Caesar made vse of this philosophie in the managing of that warre, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must laie for a maxime that which long experience hath made authenticall; that the motions of the minde are either quicke or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for as the flegmaticall humor, is of a moist, cold and heavy nature, begetting weake and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a liueles disability; so is the motion of the internall faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow maner, according to the qualitie of the instruments, whereby it moueth: and therefore men of this watrish constitution, are no way apt to receiue an impression, nor to entertaine any sensible apprehension, vnles it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceede as slowlie in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choise of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flaua bilis*, being of a hote piercing nature, and resembling the actiue vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the viuacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had bene oftentimes presented vnto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily receiued, and possesseth the apprehending facultie, with such facility of entrance, that it moueth the other powers of the soule, with as great efficacie at the first conception, as if it had bene brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of vndoubted truth: It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtil and

fit disposition of the instrumentes, which proceedeth from heate the chiefeſt qualitie in choler) that the object is at the firſt moment ſo ſtrongly ſetteled; in the firſt receiuing facultie, that the other powers of the minde, with as great ſpeede manifeſt their offices, concerning the apprehenſion; and deliuer a ſentence answerable to the ſtrength of the firſt conception: which maketh them ſo impatient of delaie, and ſo ſodainly to alter their former reſolutions, not ſuffering the diſcourſiue power to examine the ſubſtance thereof, by conference of circumſtances; nor to giue iudgment according to the courſe of our intellectual court. It behooueth therefore euery man, in that vnſteady diſpoſition, eſpecially in matter of moment, to be ſuſpicious of his owne credulity, and not to giue place to reſolution, before his iudgement be informed, by diſcourſe of the ſtrength or weakenes of the conceiued opinion.

But to leaue theſe ſpeculatiue meditations, to Philoſophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right uſe of paſſions is either true wiſdome, or commeth neereſt to the ſame; I will onely touch in a worde what degree of choler beſt beſitteth a ſoldier; or howe it auaileth, or diſaduantageth in matter of warre. And firſt it cannot bee denied, that there is almoſt no paſſion, that doth more eclips the light of reaſon, or ſooner corrupteth the ſinceritie of a good iudgement, then this of anger, which we now ſpeake of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaſeth it ſelfe in his owne actions, or followeth them with greater heate in the execution. And if the trueth chance to ſhewe it ſelfe, and conuince a falſe pretended cauſe, as the authour of that paſſion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage euen againſt truth and innocency. Piſo condemned a ſoldier for returning from forraging, without his companion, being perſuaded that he had ſlaine him: but at the inſtant of the execution, the other that was miſſing, returned, and with great ioy of the whole army, they were caried to the generall, thinking to haue much gratified him, with the manifeſtation of the truth: but hee through ſhame and deſpight, being yet in the torture of his wrath; redoubled his anger, and by a ſubtilty which his paſſion furniſhed him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the firſt, becauſe the ſentence of death was paſt againſt him, and was not to bee recalled without the breach of law: the ſecond, for that hee was the cauſe of the death of his companion: and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandement.

Concerning matter of warre, as it conſiſteth of differenced partes; ſo hath choler diuers effectes. In caſe of diſcourſe and conſultation, when as the powers of the minde ought to bee cleere of all violent affectiōs, it greatly darkeneth the vnderſtanding, and troubleth the ſincerity of a good iudgement, as Cæſar noted in his ſpeech to the ſenate concerning Carline: and therefore a commander muſt, by al meanes indeuor to auoid, euen the leaſt motions, of ſo hurtfull a paſſion; and ſeaſon his affectiōs, with that grauity and conſtancy of ſpirit, that no turbulent diſpoſition may, either hinder his vnderſtanding, or withhold his will from following that courſe, which reaſon appointeth, as the beſt means to a fortunate ſucceſſe: alwayes remembring, that al his actions are preſented vpon a ſtage, and paſſe the cenſure of many curious beholders, which applaud graue and patient motions, as the greateſt prooſe of true wiſdom; and

and disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how iust soeuer otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and furie of battaile, I take anger to be a necessarie instrument to set valour on foote, and to ouerwage the difficulties of terrour, with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the minde, stande in neede of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to bee the fittest meanes, to aduance the valiant carriage of a battaile: for as feare is trecherous and vn safe, so anger is confident and of an vnquenchable heate; and therefore a Commaunder ought by all meanes, to suggest matter of anger against an enimie, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the daie of battell, to satisfie their furie with the bloud of their aduersaries. If any vrge that it hath beene heretofore obserued of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the latter end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for seruice, as we seem to make it. I answer, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was obserued in the Galles, and the passion of anger, wel kindled in the minde: for the first is subiect to alteration and contrarietie of actions; but the other is furious, inuincible, neuer satisfied but with reuenge. And so that of Aristotle is proued true, that anger serueth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue; whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for wee doe manage other weapons, and this doeth manage vs; our hande guideth not it, but it guideth our hande; it possesseth vs, and not wee it, as it happened in the raigne of Tyberius, amongst the mutinous legions at *Vetera*: and therefore a Commaunder ought to take greate heede, whome he maketh the obiect of that anger, which kindleth in his army: for as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to bee wiselie directed; so is it dangerous in regarde of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiours.

*Tacit.
1. Anal.*

But to leaue this hastie matter, and fall neerer that which we seeke after. I may not omit the prognostication, which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the euent whereof proued the trueth of his predictions; which sheweth what aduantage a learned general that hath bin somewhat instructed in the schoole of nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the actiue rudiments of the war, & thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a seriant or lanceprizado containeth.

CAP.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth to his armie, marcheth towards
the Germanes, and by the way treateth of
conditions of peace.

Cæsar.



*Liege.

CÆSAR being come to his armie, found that to haue happened which he before suspected: for some of the states of Gallia had sent messengers vnto the Germanes, to leaue the bankes of Rhene, and to come further into the continent, where they should find ready, whatsoeuer they desired. Whereupon the Germanes began to make further incursions, and to waste the lande as far as the confines of the *Eburones. The Princes of the Galles beeing called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what hee had discovered, concerning their reuolt; and confirming their mindes with an approbation of their loialtie, hee commanded certaine troupes of horse to be leuied, and resolved to make warre vpon the Germans; and hauing made prouision of corne, hee directed his march towards them. From whom as he was on the way, within a few daies iourney of their campe, he receiued this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make warre vpon the Romans, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood, if they were iustly prouoked; for their ancient custome was to answer an enemy by force, and not by treaty; yet this much they would confesse, that they came thither very vnwillingly, being driuen by violence out of their possessions. If the Romaine people would accept of their friendship, and either giue them territories to inhabite, or suffer them to keepe that which they had got by the lawe of armes, they might proue profitable friends vnto them. They only yeelded to the Sueui, to whome the Gods in feates of armes were inferior; any other nation they wold easily conquer.

*Colonia Agripina.

To this Cæsar answered what hee thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keepe their owne, would get possessions out of other mens hands. Gallia had no vacant place to entertaine so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the *Vbij, whose agents were at that instant in his campe, complaining of the iniurie of the Sueui, and desiring aide against them; this much he himselfe would intreat of the Vbij. The messengers went backe with these Mandates, promising within three daies to retorne againe to Cæsar: in the meane time, they desired him, not to bring his armie any neerer their quarters; which request Cæsar denied: for vnderstanding that a few daies before, a great part of their Cavalrie were passed ouer the Mosa, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the retorne of their horsemen.

When Cæsar was come within twelue miles of their campe, their Ambassadors returned; and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them: but being denied of their suite, they besought him to sende to those troupes of horse, which marched before the army, that they should not fight nor make anie hostile incounter; and that he would giue them leaue to send messengers to the Vbij, of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes
and

and senate would sweare faith & safe continuance vnto their people: Neither would they require more then 3. daies, to negotiat this busines. Caesar conceived this treatie to import nothing else, then the returne of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within 3. daies; not withstanding hee promised them to march but foure miles further that day, to a conuenient waiting place: in the meane time he sent to the commanders of the horse that were before, not to prouoke the enemy to fight; and if they were set vpon to sustaine the charge, vntil he came neerer with the armie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

First we may obserue his dissembling of the practise of the Galles, with the Germans; & the encouragement which he gaue them in a faithful and loial affection to the people of Rome, when he himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honor and a good respect of their friendes required: for he well vnderstood that his presence did take away al scruple of any further motion in that kind; & therefore to haue objected vnto the their errors, had not been to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he tooke the way, to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the apparance of faithful friends, that they might not bee discouraged, by the detection of their reuolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, vpon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhene; we may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readines to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewell of Gallia, and plant themselues in the possessions of the Vbij; so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disaduantage his forcible constraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for he well knewe that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authoritie in a parlee, then any other motiue, howe reasonable foeuer.

Moreouer wee may obserue, howe carefull hee was not to impose vpon the Germanes a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding vnto them the association of the Vbij) by which they might auoide the hazarde of battaile. Which thing was alwaies obserued by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently teaching into the nature of thinges, founde that neither of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hande and the tongue) had euer brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, vnles they had bin forced thereunto by necessity:

*Vincitur
haud gratis
ingulo qui
pronocat bo-
stem.*

necessitie : and therefore wee are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict vpon a violent garde, we giue occasion to the enemy, by the way of *Antiperistasis*, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which *Vetius Melsius* calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appeare by these examples.

Lin. lib. 9.

Some few of the Samnites, contrarie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incursions into the territories of the Romaine confederates; the senate of that state sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But being reiected, *Claudius Pontius* generall of their forces, in an excellent oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but chose rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore necessity constrained them to put on armes: *iustum est bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.*

Lin. lib. 7.

Caius Manlius, conducting the Roman legions against the *Veij*, part of the *Veian* armie had entered the Romaine campe; which *Manlius* perceiuing, hee halted with a band of men to keepe the breach, and to shut in the *Veij*: which they no sooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew *Manlius*; and had ouerthrown the whole campe, had not a Tribune opened the passage, by which they fled away.

In like manner *Camillus*, the wisest of the Romaine Captaines, beeing entered into the citie of the *Veij*, that hee might take it with greater facilitie; and disarme the enemy of that terrible weapon of necessitie, hee caused it to bee proclaimed, that no *Veian* shoulde bee hurt, that was founde vnarmed. Whereupon euery man cast away his weapon, and so the towne was taken without bloodshed.

Let a soldiour therefore take such holde of occasions, and oportunities that are offered vnto him, that in time of battaile hee may seeme to cast necessitie vpon his own cause, and retaine it in his paie: considering how the power thereof altereth the workes of nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations, being neuer subiect to any ordinance or lawe; and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

CHAP. IIII.

The Germans, contrary to their owne request
made to *Cæsar*, set vpon the Romaine horse-
men, and ouerthrew them.

Cæsar.



Notwithstanding the Germans request, concerning the truce, as soone as they saw the Romaine horsemen, which were in number 5000, (whereas the Germans had not aboue 800. horse) they charged vpon the Romaines, not expecting any hostile incounter, inasmuch as their ambassadors were newly departed from *Cæsar*, and had obtained that daie of truce; but being

being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their vsuall custome, forsooke their horse, and fighting on foot, did easily put the Romaines to flight: who neuer looked backe, untill they came into the sight of the legions: in that battell were slaine 74. Romaine horsemen. After this battell, Caesar thought it not safe, either to harken to any conditions, or to receive any message from them, that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and meant nothing but war. And to attende any longer, until their horsemen returned, was but to give them that aduantage against him, especially considering the weaknesse of the Gallies, amongst whom the Germans by this battell had gained great reputation: and therefore he durst not give them space to thinke upon it.

OBSERVATIONS.



His cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speake somewhat concerning that maine controuersie of policie, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great commanders, are alwayes to bee attended with integrity, and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein I wil only set downe such arguments, and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we wil make it no question, in a Christian minde) and the daily practise of states men on the other side, alleadge, to make good their contrary assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend vertue in a shew, and not in esse and being, and study to maintaine their states onely with humane reason, not regarding the authority of diuine ordinance, set this downe as a maxime in their Art; That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an ende sorting to his contentment, must in all respects bee like qualified, both in iudgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himselfe strong in the matter, which he vndertaketh. For a wraстler that cometh with meere strength to incounter another that hath both strength & cunning, may beshrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skil, and be laught at, as an vnworthy chapion for serious sports: in like maner in this vniuersall confusion of infidelitie, wherein subtilty flieth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicitie of spirit to winde through the labyrinths of falshood, and auoide the snares of deceit, shall finde himselfe too weake for so difficult a taske, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity: for it is the course that euery man taketh, which must bring vs to the place, to which euery man goeth: and he that opposeth himselfe against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceit, and neuer attaine that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore, as craft and deceit are so general, it behooueth a man of publike negotiations, to carry a mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which ancient writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaure, half a man & half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of princely cariage; that of the brutish part, he might learn to strengthen himself, with force & courage; & of the humane shape, to to

manage reason, that it might bee a fit instrument to answer or preuent, what soeuer mans wit might forge to ouerthrow it. Neither ought a priuate man to wonder at the strangenesse of these positions; considering that the gouernment of kingdomes, and Empires is caried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affaires in a well ordered state: wherein truth-breakers and falthlesse-dissemblers are worthely condemned; inasmuch as they necessarie enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helme of gouernment, and are to shape the course of a state, according to the variation of times and fortunes, deriue their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferiour subjects are no more capable, then men are able to vnderstande the workes of the Godes: and therefore they are called *arcana imperij*, to bee reuerenced rather, then lookt into.

To conclude, the affaires of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compasse, that a meane capacitie may easily apprehend the aduantages or inconueniences, which may ensue vppon the contract: and therefore it is requisite they should stande to the aduenture, and their iudgement is worthely taxed with the losse; but the businesses of a common weale are, both subject to so many casualties of fortune, and relie vpon such vnexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, howe prouident soeuer, to foresee the issue, in that variety of channes. Besides that, euery particular subject is much interessed in the fortune of the euent, and may iustly challenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwracke through the error of their Pilot: And so the safety of the state doth balance out the losse of credit in the Gouernor.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirme vertue to be the same both in prince and people; neither doth condition of state, or calling, or the qualitie of publike or priuate businesses, alter the nature and essence of goodnes: for to deprive the young of truth and fidelitie were to breake the bond of ciuill societie, which is the basis and ground plot of all states and commonweales. They doe not denie but that a wise Prince maie so carrie a treatie, that he maie seeme to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he maie vse with great honour the practises and stratagems of warre, when the fortune of both parties consisteth vpon their owne industrie: but to breake any couenants agreed vpon, may well get a kingdome, but neuer honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the meanes, whereby a state is continued in happie gouernment: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this historie, that he who falsifieth his words vpon aduantage, howsoeuer he regardeth his honour, had neede to paie them home in regard of his owne safetie: for if they once recouer the losse, and get any aduantage against those truth-breakers, they will finde as little fauour, as the Germans did with Cæsar.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar marched directly to the campe of the Germans, and cut them all in pieces, and so ended that warre.



VPON these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Questor; there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next daie, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chieft of the Germans came vnto Cæsar into his campe, to excuse their fraudulent practises, and withall to continue their petition of truce. Whereof Cæsar was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant, brought his Armie out of the campe, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had beene daunted with so late an ouerthrow: And making a triple battell, marched speedely eight miles, and so came vpon the Germans, before they had notice what had happened; and being terrified with our sudden arriuall, and the departure of their owne leaders, knew not whether it were their best course, to bring forth their forces, or to defend their campe, or otherwise to seeke their safety by flight. Which tumult and feare was no sooner perceined by the Roman souldier, but calling to mind their perfidious trecherie, they brake into the campe, and were at first a little resisted; in the meane time, the women and children fled euery one awaie: which Cæsar perceiving, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and schrichings behinde their backs, and seeing their friends pursued and slaine, did cast awaie their weapons, and fled out of the campe, and comming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped cast themselues into the riuer; where, what through feare, and wearinesse, and the force of the water, were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man: the number of the enemy was 430000 with women and children. To them, whom he had retained in his campe, he gaue leaue to depart; but they fearing the crueltie of the Gales, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Cæsar agreed vnto.

Cæsar.

OBSERVATIONS.



His relation affoordeth little matter of warre, but onely a seuerer reuenge of hatefull trecherie: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion, to discouer the offices of the Questor and the Legates; and shew what place they had in the Armie. And first concerning the Questor, we are to vnderstand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same court, which was called to creat the Generall. His office was, to take charge of the publike treasure, whether it came out of their Ærarium, for the paie of the Armie; or otherwise was taken from the enemy. Of

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him the souldiers receiued their stipend both in corne and money; and what other bootie was taken from the enemie, he either kept them, or solde them, for the vse of the common-weale.

The Legates were not chosen, by the people, but appointed by the Senat, as assistants & Coadiutors to the Emperour, for the publike seruice, and were altogether directed by the Generall; in whose absence they had the absolute command: and their number was for the most part vncertaine; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Armie.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar maketh a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Germanie.

Cæsar.



HE German warre being thus ended: Cæsar thought it necessarie, to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene into the continent of Germanie, for manie causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded, to bring their colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia: he thought it good to make knowne vnto them, that the Roman people could, at their pleasure, carrie their forces ouer the Rhene into Germanie. Moreover, those troupes of horse, which were absent at the late ouerthrow of the Germans, were fled into the confines of the Sicambri; to whom, when Cæsar sent messengers to demand them to be sent vnto him, they answered, that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge any authority in their quarters? Lastly, the Vbi, who amongst all the rest of the Germans had only accepted of Cæsars friendship, and giuen pledges of their fidelitie, had made earnest suit vnto him, to send them aid against the Sueui; or at the least to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene: for the name and opinion of the Roman Armie was so great, and of such fame, what with Ariouistus ouerthrow, and this last seruice, that it sounded honourable amongst the furthest nations of Germany. For these reasons, Cæsar resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carrie his Armie ouer by boate, was neither safe, nor for the maiestie of the people of Rome. And albeit it seemed a matter of great difficultie, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse, and depth of the riuer, to make a bridge; yet he resolved to trie what he could doe, otherwise he determined not to passe ouer at all: and so he built a bridge after this maner.

At two foote distance, he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the riuer: these he let downe into the water with engines, and droue them in with commanders, not perpendicularly, after the fashion of a pile, but gable wise and bending with the course of the water: opposite vnto these he placed two other trees, ioyned together after the same fashion, being 40 foote distant from the former, by the dimension betweene their lower parts

in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the riuer: these two paire of couples thus placed, he ioyned together with a beame of two foote square, equall to the distance betweene the said couples, and fastened them at each ende on either side of the couples, with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the worke and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the streame was, and the faster it fell vpon the timber worke, the stronger the bridge was united in the couplings and iointes. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beames, untill the worke was brought vnto the other side of the riuer: and then he laide straight planks from beame to beame, and covered them with hurdles; and so he made a floore to the bridge. Moreouer, on the lower side of the bridge, he droue downe supporters, which being fastened to the timber worke, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boates, or what els the enemy might cast downe to trouble the worke: within ten daies, that the timber began to be cut downe and carried, the worke was ended, and the Armie transported. Caesar, leauing a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT shall not be amisse, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge; as wel in regard of the ingenious Architecture therof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Caesar, whom we may obserue to insist with as great plenty of wit & eloquence, in presenting vnto vs the subtilty of his inuention in such maner of handy works, as vpon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiently witnes: besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the intrenchments in Britanie, for the safetie of his shipping, with many other workes, which he might well record, as the greatest designs of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effectes of magnanimous industrie; that succeeding ages might not boast either of Arte or prowes, which his vertue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder at that worth, which they themselues coule not attaine vnto: And to that purpose hee entertained Vitruuius, the father of architecture, and as worthilie to bee imitated in that facultie, as his maister Caesar is in feates of armes. By whose example a great commander may learne howe much it importeth the eternitie of his fame, to beautifie his greatest designs with arte, and to esteeme of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall muses, to shew themselues vnder the shape of a sensible forme; which albeit through the rudenesse of the matter, fall farre short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beautie expresseth such a maiestie of Arte, that no time will suffer the memorie thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double postes, whereof the first order bending with the streame, and the lower ranke against the streame, when they came to be coupled together with ouerthwart beames, which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the streame fell vpon the worke, the faster

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the iointes of the building were vnited, as may better appeare by a modell of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of wordes.

*Lib. de
Machi.*

I might hence take occasion to speake of the diuersitie of bridges, and of the practises which antiquitie hath deuised to transport Armies ouer riuers: but inasmuch as it is a common subiect for all that vndertake this militarie taske, and hath beene handled by Lipsius, vpon the occasion of this bridge, I will refer the reader to that place; and only note the singular disposition of this action, in as much as Cæsar made the meanes correspondent to that end which he intended. For considering that the chiefe end of his passage was, to let the Germans vnderstand, that the power of the Roman Empire was not bounded with the Rhene; and that a riuier could not so separate their Territories, but that they were able to ioine both the continents together, and make a common roade waie, where it seemed most vnpassable: he thought it best to passe ouer his Army by a bridge, that so the Germans might know the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories, as vnited vnto Gallia; or to be vnited at the pleasure of the Romans, with a firme Isthmus & plaine passage by foot, which in times past had alwaies been separated by a mightie riuier. Neither would a transportation by boat haue wrought that effect, for as much as the daily vse thereof was so familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an vnaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, and so suddenly performed, they would easily vnderstand, that they were not so farre off, but that they might be ouertaken; and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to proue, that a passage ouer a riuier by a bridge, is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be deuised; especially if the riuier carrie any depth, such as the Rhene is: otherwise, if it haue either shallowes or foordes, whereby men may wade ouer, without any great incombrance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge, but rather to thinke of it, as of a place incombred with such hindrances, as men often meete with in a march.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri: giueth
*libertie to the Vbij; and returneth a-
gaine into Gallia.*

Cæsar.



HE Sicambri, vnderstanding that Cæsar was making a bridge ouer the Rhene, prepared themselues to flie; and at the perswasion of the Vsiptes, forsooke their country, and conuaied selues and their possessions into woods, and solitarie desertes. Cæsar continuing a few daies in their quarters, hauing set on fire their villages and houses, and burned vp their corne and prouision; he came to the Vbij, promising them aide against the Sueui: by whom he vnderstood, that assoone as the Sueui had intelligence, that he went

went about to make a bridge, calling a counsell according to their maner, they sent vnto all quarters of their state, that they should forsake their townes, and carie their wiues and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to beare Armes, should make head in one place, which they appointed to bee the midst of their countrey, and there they attended the comming of the Romaines, and were resolu'd in that place to giue them battell. Which when Caesar vnderstood, hauing ended all those thinges, in regard whereof he came into Germanie, which was chiefly to terrifie the Germans, to be reuenged vpon the Sicambri, to set the Vbij at libertie; hauing spent in all 18 daies beyond the Rhene, as well in regard of his owne honour, and the good of the common-weale: he returned into Gallia, and brake vp the bridge.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voiage into Britanie: he enquireth of marchants, concerning the nature of that people.



ALTHOUGH the sommer was almost spent, and that in those partes the winter hasteneth on a pace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding he resolu'd to go ouer into Britanie: forasmuch as he vnderstood, that in all the former wars of Gallia, the enemy had receiued most of their supply from thence. And although the time of the yeare would not suffer him to finish that warre; yet he thought it would be to good purpose, if he went only to view the Iland, to vnderstand the qualitie of the inhabitants, and to know their coast, their portes, and their landing places; whereof the Gallies were altogether ignorant: for seldome any man, but marchants, did trauell vnto them. Neither was there any thing discovered but the sea-coast, and those regions which were opposite vnto Gallia: And therefore calling marchants together from all quarters, he neither could vnderstand of what quantitie the Iland was, what nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of warre they had; what lawes or customes they used; nor what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great shipping.

Caesar.

OBSERVATIONS.



AS the Germans had oftentimes stirred vp motions of rebellion amongst the Gallies, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britaines had vpheld most of their warres, by furnishing them with such supplies, as from time to time they stood in neede of. So that if Cæsar, or the Roman people, would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable gouernment in Gallia, as they had chastised the info-

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science of the Germans, & sent them backe againe, with greater losse then gaine; so was it necessarie to make the Britains know, that their assistance in the warre of Gallia would draw more businesse vpon them, then they were well able to manage. For as I haue noted in my former discourses, the causes of an vnpeaceable gouernment are as well externall and forraigne, as internall and bred in the bodie; which neede the helpe of a Physition, to continue the bodie in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualifie their malicious operations, as any internall sicknesse wharsoeuer.

In the second Commentarie, I briefly touched the commoditie of good discouerie; but because it is a matter of great consequence, in the fortunate carriage of a warre, I will once againe by this example of Cæsar, remember a Generall not to be negligent in this dutie. Suetonius in the life of our Cæsar reporteth, that he neuer vnderooke any expedition, but he first receiued true intelligence of the particular site, and nature of the country, as also of the maners and qualitie of the people; and that he would not vndertake the voyage into Britanie, vntill he had made perfect discouerie by himselfe, of the magnitude and situation of the Iland. Which Suetonius might vnderstand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needes vndertake in the latter end of a sommer, although it were as he himselfe saith, but to discouer.

It is recorded by auncient writers, that those demigods that gouerned the world in their time, gaue great honor to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of warre in the resemblance of all parts, and namely in the discouerie and knowledge of a country; without which all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in warres were frivolumous and of no effect. And therefore Zenophon in the life of Cyrus, sheweth that his expedition against the king of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sportes, as he had vsed in hunting. Howsoeuer, if the infinite examples registred in historie, how by the dexteritie of some leaders it hath gained great victories, & through the negligence of others, irrecoverable ouerthrowes; are not sufficient motives to perswade the to this duty: let their owne experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weakenesse of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they haue in hand. But let this suffice in the second place, to proue the necessitie of good discouerie; and let vs learne of Cæsar, what is principally to be inquired after in the discouerie of an vnknowne country; as first the quantitie of the land: secondly, what nations inhabite it: thirdly, their vse of warre: fourthly, their ciuill gouernment: and lastly, what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great shipping. All which circumstances are such principall Arteries in the bodie of a state, that the discouerie of any one of these demandes would haue giuen great light, concerning the motion of the whole bodie.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volusenus, to discover the coast
of Britanie; and prepareth himselfe for
that voiage.



CÆSAR sent out Caius Volusenus, with a gallie to discover what he could concerning these things; and to returne againe unto him very speedely: he himselfe marched in the meane time, with all his forces, unto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence laie the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither he commanded that shippes should be brought from all the maritime cities of that quarter, and namely that fleet, which he had built the yeare before for the warre at Vannes. In the meane time his resolution being knowne, and carried into Britanie by merchants and others, manie priuate states of that Iland sent ambassadours unto him, promising him hostages of their loialtie, and signifying their readinesse to submit themselues to the Roman Empire. To these he made liberall promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them backe againe: And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made king of Arras, whose wisdom and vertue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authoritie in those Regions: to him he gaue in charge to go to as many of the states as he could, and perswade them to accept of the friendship of the Roman Empire, and that Cæsar himselfe would presently follow after.

Volusenus, hauing taken what view of the country he could; for he durst not go on shore to commit himselfe to the barbarisme of the enemy; after five daies returned to Cæsar: and while he staid in those places for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent messengers unto him, excusing their former faultes, and manifesting their readinesse to obey his mandates. Cæsar not willing to leaue any enemy behinde him, or to neglect his voiage into Britanie, for such small matters; hee willingly accepted of their submission, hauing first receiued manie hostages of them, and hauing made readie eightie shippes of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he deuised the Gallies to the Questor, the Legates and the commanders of the horse. There were also eightene shippes of burthen more, which laie windbound at a port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen: the rest of the Armie he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapij: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus, a Legate, to keepe the port, with a sufficient garrison.

Cæsar.
Teroanne, or
Monstrell.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie, and landeth
his men.

Cæsar.

THESE things being thus dispatched: hauing a good winde in the third watch, he put out to sea, commanding his horsemen to imbarke themselues at the further port, which was but slowly performed: hee himselfe arriued vpon the coast about the fourth houre of the daie, where he found all the cliftes possessed with the forces of the enemye. The nature of the place was such, that the hils laie so steepe ouer the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher ground vpon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place; notwithstanding he cast anker vntill the rest of the nauie were come vnto him. In the meane time calling a councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared vnto them what aduertisements he had receined by Volusenus, and told them what he would haue done; and withall admonished them that the course of militarie affaires, and especially sea matters, that had so sudden and an vnconstant motion, required all thinges to be done at a becke, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, hauing both wind and tide with him, he waighed anker, and sailed eight miles from that place, vnto a plaine and open shore. The Britaines perceiuing the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respectes: the ships were so great, that they could not be brought neere vnto the shore: the souldiers in strange and unknowne places, hauing their hands laden with great and heauie weapons, were at one instant to go out of the shippe, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemye; whereas the Britaines either standing vpon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in knowen and frequented places, and managed their horses as accustomed to such seruices.

The Romans being terrified with these thinges, and altogether vnskilfull of this kinde of fight, did vse the same courage, as they were woont to doe in land seruices: which when Cæsar perceiued, he caused the Galleies, that were both strange to the Britaines, and readier for vse, to be remoued from the shippes of burthen, and to bee rowed up and downe, and laide against the open side of the enemye; that from thence with slinges, engines & arrowes, the enemy might be beaten up from the water side, which stood the Romans in good steede: for the Britaines, being troubled with the strangenesse of the Galleies, the motion of their Oares, and the vnusuall kinde of engines; were somewhat dismaied, and began to retire backe, and giue waie to the Romans: but the souldiers still lingering, and especially for feare of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happely to the legion: If you will (saith he) forsake your Eagle, O ye souldiers, and betraie it to
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the enemy, for mine owne part I will do my duty both to the common weale, and to my Imperator, and hauing spoken this, with a loud voice, hee cast himselfe into the sea, and caried the Eagle towarde the enemy; the Romaines exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed; they all leaped out of the ship: which when others that were neere at hande perceiued, they followed them with as great alacritie, and pressed towards the enemy to incounter with them. The fight on both partes was very eager, the Romaines not being able to keepe any order of battell, nor to get any firme footing, nor to follow their ensignes, forasmuch as euery man kept with those ensignes, which he first met withal, were wonderfully troubled: But the enemy acquainted with the flats and shallowes, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, would set upon them in-combreed and vnprepared, and many of them would ouerlay a few; others would get the aduantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troupes of them: which when Caesar perceiued, he caused the shipboates and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiours, and where he sawe neede of helpe, he sent them to rescue such as were ouercharged. As soone as the Romaines got footing on the firme land, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight; but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Caesars fortune.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Pon this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuerfie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our coast; or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to giue him battell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion, that we ought not by any meanes to encounter an enemy at his landing; for so wee might much endanger our selues and our countrey; did ground themselves vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference betweene an Island and a continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon an other in the same continent: but where their territories are disioyned by so great a barre as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to surprise one an other, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Wherein I will first laie downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vn safe to oppose an enemy at his landing, not as beeing vrged by that party; for I neuer hearde any probable motiue from them which might induce any such opinion, but set down by such as haue looked into the controuerfies, both with experience and good iudgement.

And first, it may be obiected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertaintie of place, as of time: for beeing ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defende all

places of acceſſe, or our intentions will proue meere friuolous; and to performe that, it is requiſite that our deſenſiue forces be ſufficient, according to the particular qualitie of euery place ſubiect to danger: which conſidering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the manie landing places on our coaſt, will require a greater number of men, then this Iland canne afford. And although it coulde furniſh ſuch a competent number, as might ſeeme in ſome ſort ſufficient; yet the vncertainty of the time of the enemies arriual, would require that they ſhould be lodged, either vpon or neere the places of danger, manie daies at leaſt, if not many weekes, before the inſtant of their attempt, which woulde exhaust a greater maſſe of treaſure, then could bee well afforded by the ſtate.

Secondly, it may be obiected, that all our landing places are of ſuch diſadvantage, for the defendantes; that it were no ſafetie at all to make heade againſt him at the landing: for in aſmuch as ſuch places are open and plaine, they yeelde no commodity to ſhelter the defendantes from the fury of the artillerie, wherewith the enemy will plentifully furniſh their long boates and landing veſſailes; which beating vpon the beach (for moſt of our landing places are of that quality) will ſo ſcatter them, that no man ſhall bee able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The thirde obiection may ariſe from the diſparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the firſt it muſt needes bee granted, that the defendantes being to garde ſo many places at once, cannot furniſh ſuch numbers to euerie particular place for defence, as the aſſailants may for offence. Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without queſtion, that a great and potent Prince, (for ſuch a one it muſt bee, that vndertaketh to inuade the territories of ſo abſolute and well obeyed a Princeſſe as her Maieſtie is) woulde drawe out the floure of his ſolderie whereſoeuer; beſides the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which do commonly attend ſuch ſeruices. Now theſe being thus qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one body: how can it be reaſonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants ſhould equal them with forces of like vertue and experience?

Theſe are the reaſons, which may be drawne from the diſadvantage, which they haue that go about to oppoſe an enemy at his landing: the reſt that haue beene vrged, by ſuch as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the queſtion, or taken altogether from falſe grounds. But before I proceede to the anſwere of theſe reaſons, I will lay this downe for a principle. That it is impoſſible for any forraine Prince how puiſſant ſoeuer, to make ſuch a preparation as ſhal be fitting to inuade a ſtate ſo populous, and reſpectiue of their ſoueraigne, (notwithſtanding the pretenſes deuifed to diſſemble the ſame) but it muſt of neceſſitie be diſcouered, before it can bee made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for ſo great a fleet. But I will reſt my ſelfe in the example of the yeere 88. which proueth the diſcouery of the pretended inuaſion, before it could come to execution.

Concerning

*Answer to
the first ob-
jection.*

Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed bee denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of access: but that our defensue forces are not sufficient in a competent maner to garde all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question. To prooue that our forces are sufficient: wee must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritimate partes, as any other within this kingdom, for the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vitermost skirt vpon the coast of Suffex, vnto Margate vpon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twenty foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy, as wee speake of, partly in regarde of the hugeness of the cliffes, which do inclose a great part of that skirt; and partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an armie that shoulde put it selfe there on shore, shoulde find it selfe being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces. Further it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a nauie of great ships canne haue no commodity to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it wil appeare that this large skirt of Kent will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publike a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make it so euident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity and qualitie of the places themselves; as no man of an indifferent iudgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to afford euery of them such a safe and sure garde, as shall bee thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is vnfitting to giue such particular satisfaction in this publike discourse, giue me leaue, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall taste of that meanes as would secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Hauiing shewed you before the circuit of the maritimat parts of Kent, I would obserue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shall be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I will suppose the number to be 12000 of which I would lodge 3000. about the point of Nesse, and 3000. about Margate, & 6000. about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the center: for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succor one another in the same shire, but as euery shire bordereth one vpon another; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto another, as occasion should bee offered: as if the enemy shoulde attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the 6000. lodged as before, shoulde march to their succours, but such also of the Suffex

Sufflex forces as were neere vnto that part; and so likewise of the rest: by which you may see how great a force would in few houres bee assembled, for the reinforcing of any of these out skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one halfe of the whole forces are thus lodged in the center of the shire, which is neerer to all parts then any other place whatsoeuer. There would also in the quartering of them, an especiall care bee had to the places of daunger, as might bee answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the country might afford best oportunitie, to entertaine them.

Now concerning the latter part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncertainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I holde it most requisite that our defensue forces should be drawne into a heade, before the enemy should be discouered neere our coast ready to put himselfe on shoare: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine, that companies coulde vpon such a sodaine be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Nowe for that husbanding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremity, as it would be vsupportable for this state to beare: as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much out of season to dispute about vnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

*Vt ingulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,
Non expergeris, vt te ipsum serues?*

The enemy (peraduenture) hath kept 30000. men in paie 2. months before, to make hauocke of our countrey, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome; shal we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vpon our coast, to assure our selues, that no such enemy shall enter into our countrey? the extremity of this charge would bee qualified by our good espiall, which would proportion our attendance; with the necessity which is imposed vpon vs to bee carefull in busineses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are sufficient to keepe the sea coast; and that the vncertainty of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and countrey imposeth vpon euerie good subiect, which is the substance of the first reason, which I set downe in the beginning of this discourse.

Now concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disadvantage of the place, in regarde of the fury of the enemies artillery. True it is, that such places as yeelde the enemy commodity of landing, are for the most parte plaine and open, and afford naturally no couert at all. What then? shall a soldiour take euery place as hee findeth it, and vse no arte to qualifie the disadvantages thereof? or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of aduantage rather, then hee will relieue with industry the discommoditie of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious commander, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea vpon the beach

*The answer
to the second
reason.*

beach it selfe, which is vnapt to make defensible, as anie place whatloeu; woulde vse such industrie as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, and ouerwaie the enemy with aduantage of place; especially considering that this age hath afforded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that behalfe: but this cannot be done, if our forces doe not make head before the instant of the enemies attempt, that our commanders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, handbaskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble anie man; for I dare auouch it, that if our forces are not drawne into a heade before the enemy bee discouered vpon the coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attende them in some inlande place, to giue them battaile; our Commanders will bee farre to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessities, and we will easilie ouercome all these difficulties, and vse the benefit of the firme lande to repell an enemy, weakened with the sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with manie other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented vnto him both from the land and the sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Island of Fiall, in the yeere 97. can somewhat iudge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the sea, the steepnesse of the cliffes, the troublesomnes of their armes; the soldiours were so incombred, that had not the enemy beene more then a coward, he might wel with 200. men haue kept vs from entering any part of that lland.

Concerning the thirde obiection; this briefelie shall bee sufficient, that wee are not so much to regarde that our forces doe equall them in number, as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the enemies landing: for wee knowe that in places of aduantage and difficult acceffe, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not but all circumstances duely considered, wee shall proportionablie equall the enemy, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our state shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trained, and exercised in a competent maner, to defende their Countrey from forraigne enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to drawe on such as of themselves are but too forward, to make a praie of vs; and to make vs vnapt; not onelie to oppose an enemies landing, but to defende our selues from being ouerrunne, as other nations liuing in security, without due regarde thereof, haue beene.

And this much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seeme to prooue that an enemy is not to bee resisted at his landing. Nowe if we do but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the landing of an enemy, we shall easilie discouer the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leaue to liue vpon the spoile of our countrey, which cannot be prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our prouisions, in so plentifull a countrey as this is, especially considering that wee haue no strong townes

*The answer
to the third
reason.*

at all to repose our selves vpon. Whereof wee neede no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seuenth booke of these Commentaries, in that war, which Cæsar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly weakened at such times; whereby all necessary meanes to maintaine a war is hardly drawn from the subiect. Thirdly, oportunitie is giuen to malecontents and ill disposed persons, either to make head themselves, or to flie to the enemy. Fourthly, the madnes to aduenture a kingdom vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disadvantages, which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Of the name
Imperator.



He worde *imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romaine leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploite, and after a iust victorie obtained; and then in the place where the battaile was fought, and the enemy ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of *Imperator*, with the triumphant shoute of the whole armie; by which acclamation, the soldiours gaue testimonie of his worth; and made it equiualent with the most fortunate Commanders.

3. *Annal.*

This ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Romaine Empire, as appeareth by manie histories, and namelie by Tacitus, where hee saith, that Tyberius gaue that honour to Blesus, that hee should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Captaines, after they had foiled the enemy, with an eminent ouerthrowe. For euerie victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might chalenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the enemies to be slaine. Apian in his second booke saith, that in olde time, the name of Imperator was neuer taken, but vpon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000 of the enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero saith, that 2000 slaine in the place, especiallie of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles, did worthely merit the name of Imperator. Howsoever it seemeth by the same author, that there was a certain number of the enemy required to be slaine, where he saith, *Se infra victoria Imperatorem appellatum.*

Phil. 14.

Lsb. 2. epist. 9

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

The Britains make peace with Cæsar, but breake it againe, vpon the losse of the Romain shipping.



THE Britaines being overthrowne in this battaile; as soone as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreate for peace, promising hostages and obedience, in what soeuer he commanded. And with these ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britanie. Cæsar complained, that, whereas they sent vnto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his coming they made warre against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded hostages to be deliuered vnto him: which they presently performed in partie; and the rest being to bee set further off, shoulde likewise be rendered within a short time; in the meane while, they commanded their people to returne to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their states to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded; foure daies after that Cæsar came into Britanie, the eighteen shippes which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle winde, and approaching so neere the coast of Britanie, that they were within viewe of the Romaine campe: there arose such a sodaine tempest, that none of them were able to holde their course, but some of them returned to the porte from whence they came; other some were cast vpon the lower part of the Ilande, which lieth to the West ward; and there casting anchor tooke in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselves againe to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moone being in the full, the tides were verie high in those seas; whereof the Romaines being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies which were drawne up vpon the shore were slide with the tide, and the shippes of burthen that laie at anchor, were shaken with the tempest; neither was there anie helpe to be giuen vnto them: so that many of them were rent, and split in peeces; and the rest lost both their anchors, Gables and other tackling: and by that meanes became altogether vserviceable. Whereat the whole armie was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarrie them backe againe: Neither had they anie necessaries to newe furnish the olde: and euerie man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia; for as much as there was no prouision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing beeing knowne to the Princes of Britanie, that were assembled to confer of such thinges as Cæsar had commanded them to performe, when they understood that the Romaines wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and prouision of corne, and coniecturing of the paucitie of their forces, by the small circuit of their camp; and that which was more important then all the rest, that Cæsar had transported his soldiours without such necessarie cariages, as they vsed to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keepe the Romaines from corne and conuoies of prouision, and so prolong the matter, until winter came on. For they thought that if these were once overthrowne

Cæsar.

Vj.

and

and cut off from returning into Gallia, neuer any man would afterward aduenture to bring an army into Britanie: therefore they conspired againe the second time, and conuased themselves by stealth out of the campe, and got their men priuily out of the fields, to make head in some conuenient place against the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already beene handled in the second booke, to which I will adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romaines became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and new of the moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogether directed by the course of the moon, wherein she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And for asmuch as all mediterranean seas, and such gulfes as are inclosed in sinues and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallnes of their quantity, are not so capable of celestially power; as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuscan sea, wherewith the Romaines were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the maine sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the moone. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking his course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a currant between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channel between England and France, with great swelling tides; and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other partes of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it cometh, and hauing withall a plaine leuelled belly, and a very small fresh currant, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known riuer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the ful of the moone.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the gouernment of common weales, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation, that either hath long liued in liberty, or bin gouerned by commanders of their own choosing, is made subiect to the yoke of bondage, or reduced vnder the obedience of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill societie; so by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our selues and possessions, as the cheefest end of the saide societie: And therefore in the gouernment of a subdued state, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the victor, or how indirectlie

foeuer

soeuer it concerneth the bond of their thralldome, the captiue people behold it as a part of their aduersaries ouerthrow; and conceiue thereupon such spirites, as answere the greatnes of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwaies maketh that seeme easie to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason, that the Britaines altered their resolution of peace, ypon the losse which the Romans had receiued in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken nauie: the Britaines set vpon the Romans as they haruested; but were put off by Cæsar.



CÆSAR although he had not discovered their determination, yet coniecturing of the euent by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of giuing vppre hostages; hee provided against all chances; for he brought corne daily out of the fields into his camp; and tooke the huls of such ships as were most dismembred, and with the tymber and brasse thereof hee mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessaries to bee brought out of Gallia, which being handeled with the great industrie and trauell of the souldiers, he lost onely twelue shippes, and made the other able to abide the sea.

While these things were in action, the seuenth legion being sent out by course, to fetch in corne, and little suspecting any motion of warre; as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came betweene them and the campe, the station that watched before the gate of the campe, gaue aduertisement to Cæsar, that the same way which the legion went, there appeared a greater dust then was vsually scene. Cæsar suspecting that which in deede was true, that the Britaines were entered into some new resolution, he tooke those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arme themselves, and presently to follow him, and went that waie, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the campe, he saw his men ouercharged with the enemy, and scarce able to sustaine the assault, the legion thronged together on a heape, and weapons cast from all partes amongst them. For when they had haruested all other quarters, there remained one piece of corne, whither the enemy suspected the Romans would at last come; and in the night time conuaied themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued, untill the Romans were come into the field, and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed and occupied in reaping; they suddenly set vpon them, and slaying some few of them, rowted the rest and incompassed them about with their horsemen, and chariots. Their manner of fight with chariots, was first to ride vp and downe and cast their weapons, as they saw aduantage; and with the terrour of their horses & ratteling of their wheelles, to disorder the companies; and when

they had wound themselves betweene anie troupes of horse, they forsooke their chariots and fought on foot: in the meane time the guiders of their chariots would driue a little aside, and so place themselves, that if their maisters needed anie helpe, they might haue an easie passage vnto them. And thus they performed in all their fightes, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firme stabilitie of footmen; and were so readie with daily practise, that they could staie in the declinitie of a steepe hill, and turne short or moderate their going, as it seemed best vnto them; and runne along the beame of the coach and rest vpon the yoake, or harnesse of their horses, and returne as speedely againe at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæsar came to rescue them in verie good time: for at his comming, the enemy stood still; and the souldiers gathered their spirits vnto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Cæsar, thinking it an vnfit time, either to prouoke the enemy, or to giue him battell; he continued a while in the same place: And then returned with the legions into the campe. While these thinges were a doing, and the Romaines thus busied; the Britaines that were in the field, conuained themselves all awaie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

BY this wee plainly finde, that there were vsually two cohortes (which according to the rate of 120 in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the campe, and were alwaies in readinesse vpon any seruice. The commoditie whereof appeareth by this accident, for considering that the aduertisement required halte and speedie recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue to haue so manie men readie to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, vntill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THeir manner of fight with chariots, is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to bee stood vpon any longer: onely I obserue, that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the vse of chariots is neuer mentioned: but they haue euer bene attributed, as a peculiar fight, vnto the easterne countries, as futable to the plaine and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scripture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troie in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Hirdly we may obserue, the discrete or moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes he vsed to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for notwithstanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a present reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inasmuch as his men had beene somewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britaines) hee thought it best to expect some other oportunitie. And againe, to auoid the inconueniences of a fearefull retrait, he continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his souldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safetie; which gaue his me resolution when they were caried vpon seruice, being assured that what seruice soeuer they were imployed vpon, was most diligently to bee performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that warre: whereas if they had perceiued that headstrong furie, which carrieth men on with a desire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes whereby it may be obtained, had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason haue drawne backe from such imployments, and valewed their safetie about the issue of such an enterprise. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the souldiers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of a warre.

CHAP. XIII.

The Britaines make head, with their forces; and
are beaten by Cæsar: his returne in-
to Gallia.

AFTER this; for manie daies together, there followed such tempests and foule weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keepe their campe, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing against them: But in the meane time, they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the small number of the Roman forces, and amplifying the greatnesse of the bootie, and the easie means offered vnto them of perpetuall libertie, if they could take the Roman campe. Shortly vpon this, hauing gathered a great companie, both of horse and foote; they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæsar (although he foresaw the euent by that which before had happened, that if the enemy were beaten backe, he would auoid the danger by flight) yet hauing some 30 horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his

Cæsar.

comming

comming into Britanie; he imbattailed his legions before his campe; and so gaue them battell. The enimie not being able to beare the assault of the Roman souldiers, turned their backs and fled: the Romans followed them, as farre as they could by running on foote; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their townes farre and neare, they returned to their campe. The same daie the Britaines sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himselfe to the winter sea, with such weake shipping: and therefore hauing got a conuenient time, he hoised saile a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe vnto the continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same hauen, put in somewhat lower into the land: the soldiers that were in them being about 300, being set on shore, and marching towardes their campe: the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a bootie, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them vpon paine of death to laie downe their weapons; and as the Romans, by casting themselves into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000 of the enemy. Which thing being knowne, Cæsar sent out all the horsemen to relieue them: in the meane time the Romans sustained the force of the enimie, and fought valiantly the space of foure houres; and receiuing themselves some few woundes, they slew many of the enimie. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the enimie cast awaie their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

OBSERVATIONS.



Fal the figures which the *Tactici* haue chosen to make vse of in mili-
tarie affaires; the circle hath euer beene taken for the fittest, to be ap-
plied in the defensue part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all
partes whatsoeuer is contained within the circumference of that
Area: and therefore Geometrie tearmeth a circumference a simple line, for as
much as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place
of another; the figure notwithstanding will remaine the same, because of the e-
quall bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which proper-
tie, as it proueth an vniformitie of strength in the whole circuit, so that it can-
not be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is
flanke. So doth that, which Euclide doth demonstrate in the 3 of his Elements,
concerning the small affinitie betweene a right line, and a circle (which being
drawen to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the
greatnes of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken.
Which, howsoeuer they seeme, as speculatiue qualities, conceiued rather by in-
tellectuall discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch
as experience hath proued the strength of this figure, in a defensue part, aboue
any other maner of imbattailing; let vs not neglect the knowledge of these na-
turall properties, which discouer the causes of this effect: neither let vs neglect
this

this part of militarie knowledge, being so strong a meanes to maintaine valour, and the sinew of all our abilitie: for order correspondent to circumstances, is the whole strength and power of an Armie: Neither ought there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or voide of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eate nor sleepe, without the direction of the Confull, or chiefe commander; otherwise their valour might rather haue beene tearmed furie then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order; and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it neuer failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therfore, how important it is for a commander to looke into the diuersitie of orders for imbattailing, and to waigh the nature thereof; that hee may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans tearmed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concaue, and a conuex surface: in resemblance whereof, I vnderstand this Orbe of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peradventure consist of fise or more or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so manie circles, described about one Center: so that either the middest thereof remained voide, or otherwise contained such cariages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This forme of imbattailing was neuer vsed, but in great extremitie: for as it was the safest of all other; so it gaue suspition to the souldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battell, as wil herafter appeare by the testimonie of Caesar himselfe, in the fift Commentarie, vpon the occasion which happened vnto Sabinus and Cotta.

CHAP. XIII.

THE next daie, Caesar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of Britanie, against the reuolted Morini; who hauing no place of refuge because their boggs & fens were dried up, where they had sheltered themselves the yeare before; they all fell vnder the power of his mercie. Q. Titurius, and A. Cotta the Legats, who had led the legions against the Menapij, after they had wasted their fieldes, cut up their corne, burned their houses, for the Menapij were all hid in thicke woods; they returned to Caesar: these things being thus ended, Caesar placed the wintering campes of all his legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the cities in Britanie, sent hostages vnto him: the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: vpon the relation of Caesars letters, the senate decreed a supplication for the space of 20 daies.

Caesar.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN the ende of the second Commentarie, we reade of a supplication granted by the senate, for 15 daies; which was neuer granted to anie man before that time, since the first building of the citie: but forasmuch as in this fourth yeare of the warres in Gallia, it was augmented from 15


X j.

vnto

Li. 15. fami.
Cicero.


vnto 20 daies, I thought it fit to referre the handling thereof, vnto this place. We are therfore to vnderstand, that whensoever a Roman Generall had carried himselfe well in the warres, by gaining a victorie, or enlarging the boundes of their Empire; that then the senate did decree a supplication to the Gods, in the name of that captaine. And this dignitie was much sought after, not onely because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their Gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourse and gratulation of the Roman people: but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honour in the Roman government: And therfore Cato nameth it the prerogatiue of a triumph. And Liuie in his 26 booke saith, that it was long disputed on in the senate, how they could denie one that was there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured, with supplication, and thankesgiuing to the Gods, for things happily effected? The manner of the Ceremonie was; that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this forme or stile, *quod bene & faciliter rempublicam administrasset*; the Roman people cloathed in white garmentes and crowned with garlands, went to all the temples of the Gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victorie in the name of the Generall. In which time they were forbidden all other busineses, but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplication, was at first included within one or two daies at the most, as appeareth by Liuie in his third booke, where he saith, that the victorie gained by two seuerall battels, was spitefully shut vp by the senat in one daies supplication: the people of their owne accord keeping the next daie holie and celebrating it with greater deuotion then the former.

Vpon the victorie which Camillus had against the Veij, there were granted foure daies of supplication; to which there, was afterward a daie added, which was the vsuall time of supplication vnto the time that Pompei ended the warre, which they called Mithridaticum; when the vsuall time of five daies was doubled, and made 10, and in the second of these Commentaries, made 15, and now brought to 20 daies. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewardes of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as indououred to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their common-wealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentarie.



THE FIFT COMMENTARIE OF THE WAR, WHICH CÆSAR MADE IN GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

æsar caused a great nauie to be built in Gallia: he caried 5 legions into Britany, where he made war with the Britains, on both sides the riuer Thames: at his returne into Gallia, most of the Galles reuolted; and first the Eburones vnder the conduction of Ambiorix, set vpon the campe of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumvented by subtilty; and then besieged the campe of Cicero: but were put by, and their Armie ouerthrowen by Cæsar.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great
*store of shipping made by the souldiers, and com-
mandeth them to be brought to the
hauen Iccius.*



VCIVS Domitius, and Appius Claudius, being Consuls; Caesar at his going into Italie, gaue order to the Legats to build as manie ships that winter, as possibly they could; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch then those which are used in the mediterranean sea, for the speedier lading & unlading of the, and because the tides in these seas were verie great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottome then such as were vsuall in other places, and all of them to be made for the vse of Oares, to which purpose their low building serued verie conueniently. Other necessaries and furniture for rigging, he gaue order to haue it brought out of Spaine. Caesar after the assembly of the states in Lombardie, and that he set free Illiricum from the incursions of the Pirustæ, he returned into Gallia; where he found 600 ships built, by the extraordinarie industrie of the souldiers, notwithstanding the penurie and want of all necessarie matter, with 28 Gallies ready furnished, which in a few daies might be lanched: hauing commended the souldiers and overseers of the worke, he commanded them to be brought to the port called Iccius, from whence he knew the passage into Britanie, was not aboue thirtie mile ouer.

Caesar.

THE OBSERVATION.



His Iccius Portus Floide thinketh to be Caleis; others take it to bee Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it selfe verie lowe, hath notwithstanding very high bankes, which incompasse the towne about; and in times past was a verie large hauen. To this maie be added the distance from this towne, to the next continent of the Iland of Britany; which Strabo maketh to containe 320 stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leagues. Cæsar maketh it thirtie mile: this is the hauen, which Pliny calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

CHAP. II.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie: landeth his forces,
and seeketh the enemye.

Cæsar.



CÆSAR hauing prepared all things in readinesse, he left Labienus in the continent with three legions, and 2000 horse, both to keepe the hauen and make prouision of corne; and also to obserue the motion of the Galles: and with fise legions and the like number of horse, as he left in the continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea, with a soft south winde, which continued untill midnight; and then ceasing, he was carried with the tide untill the morning, when he perceiued that the Iland laie on his left hand: and againe, as the tide changed, hee laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Iland, where he had found good landing the yeare before: wherein the souldiers deserved great commendation; for by strength and force of Oares, they made their great ships of burthen to keepe waie with the Galleies. About high noone, they arrived in Britanie, with all their ships: neither was there any enemye scene in that place; but as afterward Cæsar understood by the captiues, the Britains were there with a great power; but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping, which they discouered from the shore (for there were in all about 800) they forsooke the shore, and hid themselues in the upland countrie. Cæsar hauing landed his men, and chosen a conuenient place to incampe, as soone as he understood by the captiues where the enemy laie, in the third watch of the night, he marched towards them; leauing ten cohortes and 300 horse, for a garizon to his shipping: which he the lesse feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore: he marched that night about 12 mile before he found the enemye. The Britaines sending out their horse, and chariots to a riuer that ran betweene them and the Romans, and hauing the aduantage of the upper ground; began to hinder the Romans, and to giue them battell, but being beaten backe with our horsemen, they conuaided themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by art and nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their ciuill wars: for all the entrances were shut.

shut up with great trees, laid overthwart the passages. And the Britaimes shewed themselves out of the wood but here and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification: but the soldiers of the seauenth legion, with a Testudo which they made, and a mount which they raised, tooke the place and drove them all out of the woods, without any losse at all; sauing some fewe wounds which they receined. But Caesar forbade his men to follow after them, with any long pursuit, because hee was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that daie being spent; he would imploy the rest thereof in the fortification of his campe.

OBSERVATIONS.



Caesar, hauing taken what assurance of peace he could with the Galles, both by carrying the chiefeest of their Princes with him, and by leauing three legions in the continent, to keepe the vulgar people in obedience: he embarked al his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties, and take the benefit of the same aduentures, which being neglected the yeare before, drew him into many inconueniences for want of horse, which being embarked at an other haven met with other chances, and saw other fortunes; and neuer came to him into Britanie: The place of landing in this second voiage, was the same where he landed the yeere before: and by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath deliuered of Deale in Kent, where it is said that Caesar landed. In the first yeere we finde, that he neuer remoued his campe from the sea shore, where he first seated himselfe; although his men went out to bring in corne, as far as they might wel returne againe at night: but now hee entered further into the Iland, and within twelue miles march came vnto a riuer, which must needs be that of Canturbury, which falleth into the sea at Sandwich.

In that he saith that the garizon of his shipping consisted of ten cohortes, which I haue said to be a legion: we must vnderstande, that Caesar left not an entire legion in that garizon; but he tooke ten cohorts out of his whole forces, peraduenture two out of euerie legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.

CHAP. III.

Caesar returneth to his nauies to take order for
such losses as had happened by tempest
the night before.



HE next daie earlie in the morning, hee deuided his forces into 3. companies, and sent them out to pursue the enemy: but before they had marched any farre distance, and came to haue the rereward of the enemy in vewe; there came newes from Q. Atrius, with whom he left the ten cohorts,

Caesar.

X ij.

cohorts,

coboris, and the charge of the shipping, that the night before there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole navy was either fore beaten or cast on shore; and that neither anchor nor Gable coulde holde them, nor yet the Sailers indure the force of the weather, and that there was great losse in the shipping, by running against one another, in the violence of the tempest. Vpon these newes, Cæsar caused the legions to be called backe againe, and to cease for that time, from following the enemy any further, he himselfe returned to the navy, where he found 40. ships lost, and the rest not to be repaired but with great industry and paines: first therefore he chose shipwrights and Carpenters out of the legions, and caused others to bee sent for out of Gallia; and writ to Labienus to make ready what shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour; yet he thought it best, to hale vp all the ships on shore, and to inclose them within the fortification of his campe: in this businesse he spent ten daies, without intermission either of night or day, vntill hee had drawn vp the ships, and strongly fortified the campe, leauing the same garrison which was there before to defend it.

THE OBSERVATION.



Herein we may behold the true image of vndanted valour, and the horrible industry (as Tully tearmeth it) which hee vsed to preuent fortune of her stroke in his busines, and comprehend casualties and future contingents, within the compas of order and the bounds of his owne power, being able in tenne daies space, to set almost eight hundred ships from the hazarde of winde and weather; and to make his campe the Roade for his nauie, that so he might rest secure of a meanes to returne at his pleasure.

CHAP. IIII.

The Britains make Cæsiuellaunus generall in this warre: the Iland, and the maners of the people described.

Cæsar.



CÆSAR returning to the place from whence hee came, founde far greater forces of the Britans there assembled, then he left whē he went to the nauie. And that by publike consent of the Britaines, the whole gouernment of that war was giuen to Cæsiuellaunus, whose kingdom lay deuided from the maritimate states, with the riuer Thames, beginning at the sea, & extending it selfe 80. mile into the Iland. This Cæsiuellaunus, made continuall war with his neighbor states: but vpon the comming of the Romans, they all forgot their home-bred quarrels, and cast the whole gouernment vpon his sholders, as the fittest to direct that war.

The

The inner part of Britanie is inhabited, by such as memory recordeth to be borne in the Ilands; and the maritime coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make incursions or inuasions; and after the war was ended, they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the cities from whence they came: the countrey is very populous, and well inhabited with houses, much like unto them in Gallia. They haue great store of cattell, and vse brasse for money, or yron ringes waighed at a certaine rate. In the mediterranean partes there is found great quantity of Tyn, and in the maritime parts yron: their brasse was brought in by other nations. They haue all sorts of trees that they haue in Gallia, excepting the figge and the Beech. Their religion will not suffer them to eat, either Haire, Hen, or Goose; notwithstanding they haue of all sorts, as well for novelty as variety. The country is more temperate, and not so colde as Gallia. The Ilande lieth triangle wise, whereof one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that angle, wherein Kent is pointed to the East, and the other angle to the South: this side containeth about 500. mile. An other side lieth toward Spaine and the West, that was where Ireland lieth, being an Ilande halfe as big as England; and as farre distant from it as Gallia: in the midway between England & Ireland, lieth an Iland called Mona, besides many other smaller Ilands, of which some write that in winter time for 30. daies together, they haue continuall night, whereof we learned nothing by inquirie, only we found by certaine measures of water, that the nights in England were shorter than in the Continent. The length of this side, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth 700. mile. The thirde side lieth to the North and the open sea, sauing that this angle doth somewhat point towards Germanie; this side is thought to contain 800. miles: And so the whole Iland containeth in circui: 2000. miles. Of all the inhabitants, they of Kent are most curteous and ciuill; all their countrey bordering vpon the sea, and little differing from the fashion of Gallia. Most of the inlande people sow no corne, but liue with milke and flesh, clothed with skins, and hauing their faces painted with a blew colour, to the end they may seeme more terrible in sight: they haue the haire of their head long, hauing al other parts of their body shauen, sauing their upper lip. Their wiues are common to ten or twelue, especially brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are borne, are put vnto them, vnto whom the mother was first giuen in marriage.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN the descriptions of the ancient Britains, we may first obserue their pedigree, according to the Haraldray of that time: wherein we must vnderstand that in those ages, the Nations of the worlde thought it no small honor, to deriue their descent from a certaine beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some man of a famous memorie, the father of that progenie, and founder of their state; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their government, being first laide and established by so powerfull a meanes. But if this failed, they then bragged of antiquitie, and cast all their glory vpon the fertility of their soile, being so strong and fruitful, that it yeelded of it selfe such a people, as they were: and so we read howe the Athenians, for as much as they were ignorant from whence they came,

were

were an Oaken leafe, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon also grew the controuersie, betweene the Egyptians and the Scythians, concerning antiquity: wherein the Egyptians seemed to haue great aduantage, because of the fertility and heat of their countrey; whereas the Scythians inhabited a colde climate, vnfruitfull and an enemy to generation. Of this sort were the Britains, that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Ilande: who not knowing from whence they came, nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common receiued opinion, that they were borne and bred of the earth. The sea coast was posselt by such as came out of the continent and retained the names of the cities from whence they came, as a memoriall of their progenitors.

The forme of the Iland is very well described, and measured out, according to the scale of our moderne Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Easterne angle of Kent, and the furthest point of Cornwall, they make it eight degrees; which in a maner iumpeth with Cæsars dimensionation: the other sides are somewhat longer; and therefore Tacitus in the life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that side which bordereth vpon France to resemble the Edge; and the other two sides to incline by little and little, one towards an other; and so make the Ilande narrower at the top, according to the forme of that instrument. Hee setteth downe the whole compasse of the Iland, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers, who by the quantity of the circuit, did vsually iudge of the content, not considering that the *Area* of euery figure dependeth as well of the quantity of the angle, as the length of the side. Concerning the temperature of Britanie, in regard of the colde winters in France, we must vnderstand that Britanie hath euer beene found of a more temperate constitution, in regarde of sharpe and colde winters, then any other countrey lying vnder the same parallell: whether the cause thereof may bee imputed to the continuall motion of the sea about the Iland, which begetteth heat, as some haue imagined; or to the site thereof, in regard of other Continents from whence the winde alwaies riseth, and carrieth with it the nature of the countrey by which it passeth; and so the Ilande hauing no other continent lying North to it, from whence the winde may rise, but all for the most part vpon the South, hath no such colde windes to distemper it, as other parts of Germany, which are vnder the same parallel; but the Southern wind, which is so frequent in Britany, tempereth the ayre, with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warme; or whether it be some other vnknowne cause, our Philosophers rest vn-satisfied. But, as touching Gallia, it may bee saide, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South, then this Iland doth, the aire thereof by reason of the continuall heate, is of a farre purer disposition; and so pierceth more then this grosser aire of Britany, & carrieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper and of a far colder disposition.

This Iland, which Cæsar nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of *Man*, and lieth betweene Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemie calleth it *Monada*, Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of *Mona*, peraduenture from the nomination of the Britains, who calleth it *Tyr-mon*, the land of Mon.

Concer-

Concerning those places, where the night continueth in the midst of winter for 30. daies together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle Arctique, and haue a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he found the nights in Britanie shorter then in the continent, we must vnderstand it to be only in summer: for the more oblique the horizon is, the more vneuen are the portions of the diurnall circles which it cutteth; and the neerer it commeth to a right horizon, the neerer it commeth to an equality of daie and night: and hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in France are longer then here in England; and in winter shorter. The like wee must vnderstand of al Southerne and Northerne countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the ciuility of the Kentish men, and their courteous disposition, aboue the rest of the Britains, which must be imputed to that ordinarie course which brought ciuility vnto all other nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained societie, were the first that brought in ciuill conuersation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of ciuill gouernment. So we find that first Assirians and Babilonians (as neere to the mountaines of Armenia where the Arke rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their states into commort weales of monarchies of exquisite gouernment, flourishing with al maner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other countries laie either waste, or ouerwhelmed with Barbarisme. From thence it flowed into Egypt; out of Egypt into Greece; out of Greece into Italie; out of Italie into Gallia; and from thence into England: where our Kentishmen first entertained it, as bordering vpon France; and frequented with marchants of those countries.

CHAP. V.

Diuers skirmishes betweene the Romans and the Britaines.

THE Canalic of the enemy and their chariots, gaue a sharpe conflict to the Romaine horsemen, in their march: but so, that the Romaines got the better euery way, driuing them with great slaughter to the woods and hills, and loosing also some of their owne men, beeing too venturous in the pursuit. The Britaines after some intermission of time, when the Romans little thought of them, & were busied in fortifying their campe, came sodainly out of the woods and charged vpon those that kept station before the campe. Caesar sent out two the chiefeest cohorts of two legions, to second their fellows: these two cohortes standing with a small alley betweene them, the other that were first charged, being terrified with that strange kinde of fight, boldelie brake through the thickest of the enemy, and so retired in safetie to their fellows. That daie Quintus Laberius Durus a Tribune of the soldiours, was slaine; the Britaines were repelled with moe cohortes, which Caesar sent to second the former.

Caesar.

Ti.

And

And for asmuch as the fight happened in the vewe of all the campe, it was plainly perceiued, that the legionarie soldiours, being neither able for the waight of their armor, to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go far from his ensigne; was not a fit aduersarie to contest this kind of enemy: and that the horsemen likewise fought with no lesse danger, inasmuch as the enemy would retire backe of purpose, and when they had drawne them a little from the legions, they would then light from their chariots and incounter the, with that aduantage, which is between a footeman and a horseman. Furthermore, they neuer fought thicke and close together, but thin and in great distances, hauing stations of men to succour one another, to receiue the wearie, and to send out fresh supplies.

OBSERVATIONS.



Vpon this occasion of their heauie armour, I will describe a legionarie soldiour in his compleat furniture, that we may better iudge of their maner of warfare, and vnderstand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learne, that their legionarie soldiours were called *Milites grauis armaturæ*, soldiours wearing heauie armour, to distinguish them from the Velites, the Archers, slingers, and other light armed men. Their offensive armes were, a couple of Piles, or as some wil, but one Pile, and a Spanish sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensive armes were, a helmet, a corslet, and boots of brasse, with a large Target; which in some sort was offensive; in regarde of that *umbonem* which stucke out in the midst thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first booke, and the Target in the second: the sword (as Polybius witnesseth) was short, two edged, verie sharpe, and of a strong point: and therefore Liuius in his 22. Booke saith, that the Galles vsed verie long swordes without pointes; but the Romaines had short swordes, readier for vse; these they called Spanish swordes, because they borrowed that fashion from the Spaniards. The olde Romaines were so girt with their swordes, as appeareth by Polybius, and their monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung vpon their right thigh, contrary to the vse of these times, which as I haue noted before, was in regard of their target, which they caried on their left arme: this sword was hung with a belt of leather, beset with studs as Varro noteth, and these were their offensive weapons.

Lib. 4.

Plinib. 10

Their Helmet was of brasse, adorned with three Ostrich feathers of a cubite in length, by which the soldiour appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the enemy, as Polybius saith in his 6. booke. Their brest plate was either of brasse, or Iron, ioyned together after the maner of scales, or plated with little rings of yron: their bootes were made of battes of brasse; from the foote vp to the knee. And thus were the legionarie soldiours armed, to stand firme rather then to vse any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a bodie of that strength which might not easilie recoile, at the opposition of anie confrontment; for agilitie standeth indifferent to helpe either a retreat

or

or a pursuit, and nimble footed soldiors are as readie to flie backe, as to march forward; but a waighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffle: so that whensoever they came to firme buckeling, and felt the enemy stand stiffe before them, such was their practise, and exercise in continual workes, that they neuer fainted vnder any such taske; but the victorie went alwayes cleere on their side. But if the enemy gaue waie to their violence, and came not in but for aduantage, and then as speedilie retired, before the counterbuffle were well discharged; then did their nimbleness much helpe their weakenesse, and frustrate the greatest parte of the Romaine discipline. This is also proued in the ouerthrowe of Sabinus and Cotta, where Ambiorix finding the inconuenience of buckeling at handy blowes, commaunded his men to fight a far off; and if they were assaulted, to giue backe; and to come on againe as they saw occasion: which so wearied out the Romaines, that they all fell vnder the execution of the Galles. Let this suffice therefore to shew, how vnapt the Romans were to flie vpon any occasion, when their armour was such, that it kept them from al starting motions, and made the futable to the staied and wel assured rules of their discipline, which were as certaine principles in the execution of a standing battaile; and therefore not so fit either for a pursuit, or a flight.

Concerning the vnequall combat betweene a horseman and a footeman, it may be thought strange, that a footeman shoulde haue such an aduantage against a horseman, beeing ouermatched, at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agilitie: but wee must vnderstande, that as the horse is much swifter in a long carriere; so in speedie and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the combat consisteth, the footeman farre exceedeth the horseman in aduantage, hauing a larger marke to hit by the Horse, then the other hath. Besides, the horseman ingageth both his valour, and his fortune in the good speede of his horse, his woundes and his death doe consequentlie pull the rider after, his feare or furie maketh his maister either desperate or slowe of performance, and what defect soeuer riseth from the horse, must bee answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soeuer draweth vs into the societie of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible, be contained in the compasse of our owne power. The sword which we manage with our owne hand, affoordeth greater assurance then the harquebuse, wherein there are many partes belonging to the action, as the poulder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof if the least faile of his part, we likewise faile of our fortune: but howe probable soeuer this seemeth, this is certaine, that in the course of the Roman wars, the horse were euer defeated by the foot, as is manifestly proued in the first of these bookes,

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar giueth the Britains two ſeuerall
ouerthrowes.

Cæsar.



HE next daie, the enimie made a ſtand vpon the hils a far off from the campe, and ſhewed themſelues not ſo often; neither were they ſo buſie with our horſemen, as they were the day before: but about noone, when Cæſar ſent out three legions, and al his Cauallry to get forrage, vnder the conduction of the Caius Trebonius a legate, they made a ſodaine aſſault vpon the forragers, and fell in cloſe with the Enſignes, and the legions. The Romans charged very fiercely vpon them, and beate them backe; neither did they make an end of following them, untill the horſemen truſting to the ſuccour of the legions which were behinde them, put them all to flight, with the ſlaughter of a great number of them; neither did they giue them reſpite either to make head, to make a ſtand, or to forſake their chariots. After this ouerthrow, all their Auxiliarie forces departed from them; neither did they afterwarde contend with the Romans with any great power. Cæſar vnderſtanding their determination, caried his armie to the riuer Thames, and ſo to the confines of Caſſiuellaunus, which riuer was paſſable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly; at his comming hee found a great power of the enemy to be imbattailed on the other ſide, and the banck fortified with many ſharpe ſtokes, and many other alſo were planted couertly vnder the water. Theſe things being diſcouered to the Romans by the Captiues and fugitiues, Cæſar putting his horſe before, cauſed the legions to followe ſodainlie after, who not withſtanding they had but their heades cleere about the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bancke and betooke themſelues to flight.

THE OBSERVATION.



His attempt of Cæſar ſeemeth ſo ſtrange to Brancatio, that hee runneth into as ſtrange concluſions, concerning this matter, as firſt that he that imitateth Cæſar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great commander hath nothing common with other leaders: but eſpecially, he crieth out at the baſeneſſe of the Britains, that woulde ſuffer themſelues ſo cowardly to be beaten. But if wee looke into the circumſtances of the action, we ſhal find both Art & good direction therein; for being aſſured by the fugitiues, that the riuer was paſſable in that place, & in that place onlie, he knew that he muſt either aduẽture ouer there, or leaue Caſſiuellaunus for another ſummer, which was a very ſtrong inducement to vrge him to that enterpriſe. The

difficultie

difficultie wherof was much relieued by good direction, which consisted of two pointes, first, by sending ouer the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better indure the charge of the enemy, then the footmen could, that were vpp to the necke in water; and withall, to shelter the footmen from the furie of the enemy. Secondly, he sent them ouer with that speed, that they were on the other side of the water, before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the seruice, and giuen the enemy leaue to find the aduantage which he had by experience, his men had neuer bin able to haue indured the hazard of so dangerous a seruice. It is hard to coniecture at the place, where this seruice was performed; for since the building of London bridge, manie foordes haue bene scoured with the current, and fall of the water, which before that time carried not such a depth as now they doe.

CHAP. VII.

The conclusion of the British warre: Cæsar
returneth into Gallia.



Asiusellaunus hauing no courage to contend anie longer, dismissed his greatest forces, and retaining onely foure thousand chariots, obserued their iourneies, keeping the wood countries, and driving men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, for feare of the Romans; and as their horsemen straid out either for forrage or bootie, hee sent his chariots out of the woods by unknowne waies, and put their horsemen to great perill: in regard whereof, the horsemen durst neuer aduenture further then the legions, neither was there anie more spoile done in the countrey, then that which the leginarie souldiers did of themselues. In the meane time, the *Trinobantes*, being almost the greatest state of all those countries (from whom *Mandubratius* had fled to Cæsar into Gallia, for that his father *Imanuentius* holding the kingdome, was slaine by *Cassiuellaunus*) sent Ambassadours to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat that *Mandubratius* might be defended from the oppression of *Cassiuellaunus*, and sent vnto them to take the kingdome. Cæsar hauing receiued from them fortie pledges, and corne for his Armie, sent *Mandubratius* vnto them. The *Trinobantes*, being thus kept from the violence of the souldiers, the *Cenimagni*, *Seguntiaci*, *Ancalites*, *Bibrocasti*, yielded themselues to Cæsar. By these he vnderstood, that *Cassiuellaunus* his towne was not farre off, fortified with woods and bogges, and well stored with men and cattell. The Brittaines call a towne a thicke wood, inclosed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retrait when they stood in feare of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæsar with his Armie, and found it well fortified both by arte and nature: And as he assaulted it in two seuerall places, the enemy vnable to keepe it, cast himselfe out of the towne by a backe waie, and so he tooke it. Where he found great store of cattell, and slew manie of the Brittaines.


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
While

While these things were a doing, Cassiellaunus sent messengers into Kent, wherein there were foure severall kinges, Cingetorix, Caruilus, Taximagulus, and Segonax, them he commanded with all the power they could make, to set upon the campe where the navie was kept. These kinges comming to the place, were overthrowne by a sallie which the Romans made out upon them, manie of them being slaine, and Cingetorix taken prisoner. This battell concurring with the former losses, and especially moued thereunto with the reuolt of the forenamed cities, Cassiellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar by Comius of Arras. Cæsar being determined to winter in the continent, for feare of sudden commotions in Gallia, and that the summer was now farre spent, and might easilie be lingered out, hee commanded pledges to be brought vnto him, and set downe what yearly tribute the Britaines should paie to the Romans: the hostages being taken, he caried backe his Armie to the sea, imbarked his men and arriued safe with all his ships vpon the coast of Gallia.

THE OBSERVATION.

AND thus ended the warre in Britanie, which affoordeth little matter of discourse, being indeede but a scrambling warre, as wel in regard of the Britaines themselues, who after they had felt the strength of the Roman legions, would neuer aduenture to buckle with them in any standing bartel, as also in regard that there were no such townes in Britany as are recorded to haue been in Gallia, which might haue giuen great honour to the warre, if there had been any such to haue been besieged, and taken in by Cæsar. And although Tacitus saith, that Britanie was rather viewed then subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we finde here, that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt, or the heart of Britanie, (for our Historians doe vnderstand them to haue inhabited that part, which lieth as farre as Yorkeshire and Lancashire) were brought vnder the Roman Empire by Cæsar: who was the first that euer laide tribute vpon Britanie, in the behalfe of the people of Rome; or cast vpon them the heauie name of a subdued people.





TO THE VV O O R T H I E
KNIGHT SIR ROBERT
DRVRIE.



IR, my purpose was to haue concluded these discourses, with the ende of the Brittish warre: reseruing the latter part of this fift booke, for an entrance vnto such obseruations, as may be gathered from the sixt and seauenth Commentaries, which I intend to make a second part of this worke: but your desire to see the errours of Sabinus and Cotta discovered, and the famous fight of Q. Cicero in his wintering campe, hath brought them forth somewhat before their time, annexing that to the first part which was meant for the latter. If my labour shall be found too weake to deserue well of militarie designes; yet I thinke it verie well imploide in that it pleaseth you to giue it the reading, and so rest

Readie to doe you service,

C. EDMVNDs.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their wintering camps.

Cæsar.
*Either Cambray, Amiens
or S. Quintin



AFTER he had put his ships in harbour, and held a councell of the Galles at * Samarobrina; forasmuch as that yeare by reason of the drought there was some scarcitie of corne in Gallia; he was constrained to garizon his Armie, and to disperse them into more cities then he had done the years before. And 1 he gaue one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Q. Cicero, to be carried to the Neruij; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Essui; a fourth he commanded to winter amongst the men of Rheimes, in the marches of the Treuiri vnder T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgia, with whom hee sent Marcus Crassus his Questor, L. Munatius Plannus, and C. Trebonius Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had last inrolled, beyond the riuer Po in Italie, with five cohortes, vnto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose cuntry lieth betweene the Maze and the Rhene; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Arunculeius Cotta. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedie the scarcitie of corne; and yet the garrizons of all these legions, excepting that which Roscius carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of 100 mile: and until his legions were settled, and their wintering camps fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Hauē heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that vnderstand not the waight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Armie keeping head continually in one part of a kingdome, was more burthenfome to the common-wealth in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and inrolement: for (say they) in the generall account of the publike weale, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000 men be maintained with necessarie prouisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout euerie part of the cuntry: forasmuch as euerie man hath but a competent quantitie allotted vnto him, which hee cannot want in what sort or condition of life soeuer he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are vnited together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wherefoeuer. But such as looke into the difference with iudgement, shall finde a maruellous inequality, both in regarde of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the meanes whereby it is provided: for first we must vnderstand,

stand, that an armie lying continually in one place, falleth so heauie vpon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fatte and the flesh (as they say) and leaueth nothing vnspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of prouisions, would in a small time come to vtter destruction. This want then must be relieued by taking from the plentie of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be obserued that proportion of moderate taking, to vitaille the Armie with a sufficient competence, but the partiall respect which the purueiers, and vittailers will haue to their priuat commodity, wil quickly make an inconuenience either in the countrey, from whence it is taken; or in the Armie, for which it is provided; according as the error may best aduantage their particular, what discipline soeuer be established in that behalfe. Whereas on the contrarie part, when euery particular man of that multitude shal be billeted in a seuerall family, throughout all parts of the kingdome, the charge will be so insensible, in regard of the expence of the said families, that the country will neuer feele any inconuenience. And if euery housholder that had receiued into his house one of the said army, should giue a true account of that which riseth aboute his ordinary expence; by the addition of one man, it would fall farre short of that treasure, which is necessarily required, to maintaine the saide number of men vnited together into one bodie. Neither doth the difference consist in the quantitie of vittailles, which euery man hath for his portion, whether they be disperfed or vnited; but in the maner of prouision, and the meanes which is vsed to maintaine them: wherein euery master or steward of a familie, endeouoreth to make his prouisions at the best hand, & so to husband it, that it may serue for competence, and not for superfluitie; and by that means, the general plenty of the country is maintained, & the comon-wealth flourisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualling of an army, there is no such respect had, which may any way aduantage the publike good; for there the gaine of the purueier riseth by experience & superfluous wastage, rather then by thrift and sauing frugalitie: and so the common-wealth is weakned by the ill husbanding of that great portion of vitaille, which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should haue such varietie of viands in an Armie, as they haue when they are in seuerall families, it were vnpossible it should continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithstanding the exactnesse of their discipline, could afford their armies no other prouision but corne, and larde, as well in regard of the commoditie which that kinde of diet afforded them in the course of their warres, as also for the good of that countrey, wherein they were resident. And if it so fell out, that the extremitie of the season, or any other cause, had brought a dearth into the lande, there was no readier waie to helpe that inconuenience, then by disperfing their Armies into diuers quarters; which Caesar disposed with that care, that they might be as neere together as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning the choice of their souldiers and their maner of inrolment, I had rather referre the reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such grauitie and religious ceremonies, as might best serue to possesse their mindes of the waight and consequence of that businesse: but for as much as the largenesse of their Empire, and the necessitie of their occasions would not admit, that the enrolment should still be made at Rome amongst the citizens, as it appeareth by this legion which was inrolled beyond the riuer Po; it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speake of that which the olde Romans did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued vnto Cæsars time. But he that desireth to see the maner of their choise, with such complements as might adde both a reuerent respect, and a Maiestie to the worke; let him reade Polybius of that argument.

CHAP. IX.

Ambiorix attempteth to surprise the campe of
Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, practi-
seth to take them by
guile.

Caesar.



FIFTEENE daies after the legions were settled in their wintering campes, there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the meanes of Ambiorix, and Catiunculus, who, hauing receiued Sabinus & Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corne to the place, where they laie; at the inducement of Induciomarus of Triers, they stirred up their people to rebellion: and suddenly surprising those that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the campe. But when our men had tooke Armes, and were got vppon the rampier, and had ouermatched them in a skirmish of horse, which made a sallie out of the campe vpon the Galls: Ambiorix despairing of good successe, withdrew his men from the assault; and then after their manner, they cried vnto vs, that some of our companie should come and speake with them: for they had somewhat to discover touching the publike state, whereby they hoped all controuersies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineius a Roman horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar friends, and one Iunius a Spaniard, who diuers

diuers times before had beene sent by Caesar to Ambiorix; were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himselfe much indebted to Caesar; for manie curtesies, in that by his meanes hee was freed from a pension which hee paid to the Aduatici; and for that both his own sonne, and his brothers sonne, whom the Aduatici had held in prison vnder the name of hostages, were by Caesar released and sent home againe. And touching the assault of the campe, hee had done nothing of himselfe, but by the impulsion of the state, among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authoritie ouer him, as he himselfe had in regard of the people: who were likewise inforced to this warre, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Galles, whereof his small meanes might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to thinke himselfe able with so small a power to ouerthrow the people of Rome; but it was a generall appointment throughout all Gallia, vpon this daie to assault all Caesars garrisons, to the end that one legion might not giue reliefe vnto another: Galles could not easily denie the request of Galles, especially when it concerned their publike libertie. Nowe hauing satisfied that duetie which he owed to his countrey, hee had respect to Caesar and his benefites, in regard whereof, he admonished them, and praised Titurius for the hospitalitie that had beene betweene them, that he would looke to the safetie of himselfe, and his souldiers. There were a great number of Germanes that had alreadie passed the Rhene, and would be here within two daies: and therefore let them aduise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceiued it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering places, either to Cicero or Labienus, of who the one was not past fiftie mile off, and the other a little further: for his owne part, he promised them this much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should haue safe passage through his territories; for so he should both doe a pleasure to his countrey, in disburdening it of garrisons, and shew himselfe thankfull to Caesar for his benefits. This speech being ended, Ambiorix departed, and Carpineius and Iunius made report thereof to the Legates.

OBSERVATIONS.

Eander his counsell, to vse the foxes skin where the Lyons faileth, doth shew, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, then the powers of our bodie are overcome with force. For oftentimes the minde is so disquieted, with the extremitie of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the iudgment determine of that which is most for our good: but according as any passion shall happen to raigne in our disposition; so are we caried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding: where as the bodie continueth firme in his owne strength, and is subiect onelie to a greater waight of power, by which it maie bee subdued and overthrowen. It behooueth vs therefore to take good heed, that our surest holde bee not vnfastened by the subtiltie of the foxe, when it

hath continued firme against the force of the Lyon : and that the trecherie of the spirit doe not disaduantage those meanes, which either our owne power or oportunitie, hath gained in our actions. Wherein a commander cannot haue a better rule for his direction, then to beware, that violence of passion doe not hinder the course of sound deliberation : and withall, to bee iealous of whatsoeuer an enemy shall, either by speech or action, seeme to thrust vpon him, how colourable soeuer the reasons maie be, which are alleadged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the minde be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitlesse apprehensions, it may easily bee seduced either by feare or vaine imagination, diffident conceptions or ouer easie credulitie, with manie other such disturbing powers, from that waie, which a good discretion and an vnderstanding, free from passion, would haue taken. First therefore I holde it necessarie, to haue the consistorie of our iudgment well settled, with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the minde, before wee enter into deliberation of such things, as are made happie vnto vs by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will giue some helpe to a good conclusion ; when we consider how improbable it is, that an enemy, whose chiefeest care is to weaken his aduersarie, and bring him to ruine, should aduise him of anie thing that maie concerne his good ; vnlesse the profite, which he himselfe shall thereby gather, doe farre exceede that which the contrarie part may expect. I grant that in ciuill warres, where there are many friends on either partie, and haue the aduerser cause as deere vnto them as their owne ; there are oftentimes many aduertisements giuen, which proceede from a true and sincere affection, and maie aduantage the partie whom it concerneth, as well in preuenting any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause ; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be waied by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected ; whereof wee haue manie pregnant examples in the ciuill warres of France, and particularly in *Monsieur La Nou* his discourses : But where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humor, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth vnto one of them ; where care to keepe that which is dearest vnto them, possesseth the one, and hope of gaine stirreth vp the other ; there is commonlie such an vniuersall hatred betweene them, that they are to looke for small aduantage, by aduertisements from the enemy : which if the Romans had well considered, this subtile Gall had not dispossessed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

CHAP. X.

The Romans call a councell vpon this aduertisement, and resolute to depart, and ioyn them-
selues to some other of the
legions.



HE Romans being troubled at the sodainnesse of the matter, albeit those things were spoken by an enemy, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but especially it moued them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, beeing base and of no reputation, durst of themselves make war against the people of Rome: and therefore they propounded the matter in a councell, wherein there grew a great controuersie among them: L. Arunculeius and most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashlie, nor to depart out of their wintering campes, without expresse commandement from Caesar; forasmuch as they were able to resist neuer so great a power, yea euen of the Germans, hauing their garizons well fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the enemy, and giuen them many wounds. Neither wanted they anie victuals, and before that prouision which they had was spent, there would come succor from other garizons and from Caesar. And to conclude, what was more dishonorable, or saoured of greater inconstancy, then to consult of their waightiest affaires, by the aduertisement of an enemy? Titurius urged vehementlie to the contrarie, that it then would be too late for them to seeke a remedie, when a greater power of the enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when anie blow were giuen to anie of the next wintering campes: hee tooke Caesar to be gone into Italie, for otherwise the Eburones would not haue come so proudly to the camp. Let them not respect the antheur, but the thing it selfe; the Rhene was not far off, and hee knewe well that the ouerthrow of Ariouistus, and their former victories, were greuous to the Germans. The Galles were vexed with the contumelies they had receined, being brought in subiection to the Romaine Empire, and hauing lost their former reputation in deedes of armes. And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter, without any ground, or certaintie thereof? but howsoeuer things stood, his counsell was sure, and could bring no harme: for if there were no worse thing intended, they should but goe safelie to the next garizons; or otherwise, if the Galles conspired with the Germans, their onelie safetie consisted in celeritie. As for the counsell of Cotta, and such as were of the contrarie opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not present danger, yet assuredly famine was to be feared by long siege. The disputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders, earnestly repugning it; doe as please you, since you will needes haue it so, saith Sabinus; and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the soldiers might well heare him. For I am not he that most feareth death among you,

Caesar.

Z. iij.

let

let these be wise: and if any mischance happen vnto them, they shall aske account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldest let them, they might ioine themselves within 2. daies to the next garizons, & with them sustaine what chance soeuer their common destinie should allot them; and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellowes. After these wordes, they began to rise out of the councill; but holde was laide vpon them both; entreatie was made that they would not obstinatelie bring all vnto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staied, so that they all agreed vpon one thing; whereas in disagreeing, there was no likelihood of well doing: the disputation was prolonged untill midnight; at length Cotta yeelded, and the sentence of Sabinus tooke place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the breake of day: the rest of the night was spent in watching, euery soldior sought out what he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leaue behind him of such necessaries, as he had prepared for winter: all things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldours belecue, that they could not stay without danger.

OBSERVATIONS.

BY the resolution in this disputation, it appeareth how little a graue and wise deliberation auaieth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former obseruation; for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded vpon things certaine, and well knowne to the whole councill: and yet the feare of Sabinus was such, that it caried the conclusion by such supposed assertions, as the qualitie of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether vpon that which the enemy had suggested, and not vpon any certaine knowledge of the truth: neither is it often seene, when a Councell disputeth vpon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether cleere from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partialitie of a strong affection; so powerfull is passion in the government of the soule, and so interessed in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the vncertainty of mans iudgement, from whence all contrarie and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a councill of warre should so much varie in case of deliberation, when as many especiall points of military discipline remaine yet vndecided; hauing the authoritie of the great Commaunders of all ages, to ratifie the trueth on either parte; whereof I coulde alleage many examples. But concerning the issue and euent of our deliberations, what can bee more truelie saide then that of the Poet?

*Et malè consultis pretium est, prudentia fallax,
Nec fortuna probat causas, sequiturque merentes;
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur:
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque
Mains, & in proprias ducat mortalia leges.*

Notwithstan-

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our wisdom is not so subject to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it selfe, the good direction of most of the occurrences, which fall within the course of our businesse; or if we must needs miscarrie, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to thinke, that we went vpon best probabilities; it shall not be amisse to set down some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend onely particularities, which being caried vnto the apprehension, are disposed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their seuerall properties: from whence there arise intellectual notions, and rules of Arte; wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so hee that intendeth to debate a matter, with sound deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions and a knowledge in generall, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the materiall substance of euery action: he therefore that can giue best direction, either by experience, or iudicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best aduise which is the safest way to auoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I will alleage 2. examples: the one moderne in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seeme not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meere Apology, yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may giue great light to that which we seeke after.

The moderne example is taken out of Guicherdin, from the warres which Lewis the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the state of Ferrara and the Duchie of Milan: wherein there arose a controuersie among the French captaines, whether it were better to go directlie to seeke the enemy, who albeit were lodged in a strong and secure place, yet there was hope, that with the virtue of armes and importunitie of artillerie, they might bee dislodged and driuen to a retreat: or otherwise, to take the way either of Modena or Bologna, that so the enemy for feare of loosing either of those townes, might quit their holde, and by that meanes Ferrara should bee freed from the warre. Monsieur Chamont the Generall of the French, inclined to the former aduise: But Triulce, a man of great authoritie and experience, hauing beene an executioner in 18. battailes, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seeke the enemy to fight with him; and I haue alwaies heard great captaines holde this as a firme principle: Not to attempt the fortune of a battell, vnlesse there be either an offer of an especiall aduantage, or otherwise, compulsion by necessitie. The rules of warre giue it to the enemy that is the inuader, and hath vnderaken the conquest of Ferrara, to seeke to assaile and charge vs; but to vs, to whom it is sufficient to defende our selues, it cannot be but impertinent to vndertake an action, contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by euident reason, that there is no possibility to execute that deuise, but to our harmes and disadvantage: for we cannot go to their campe but by the side of a hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot be imployed; and yet they

Lib. 9.

they with small numbers will make resistance, having the oportunitie of the place favourable to their vertues: wee must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another; neither haue we anie other waie to draw our Artillerie, our baggage, our cartes and bridges, but by the streight of the hill: and who doubteth not but in a waie so narrowe and, combrous, euerie artillerie, euerie carte, or euery wheele that shall breake, will not stay the Armie a whole houre at the least? By which impediments euerie contrarie accident may put vs to disorder. The enemy is lodged in couert, provided of victuals and forrag; and wee must incampe all bare and naked, not carying with vs that which should serue for our necessarie nouriture, but expect the things to come after; which in reason ought to go with vs. To attempt newe enterprises, whereof the victorie is lesse certaine then the perill, is contrarie to the grauitie and reputation of a leader; and in actions of the warre, those enterprises are put to aduenture, that are done by will and not by reason. Many difficulties may compell vs to make our aboade there, two or three daies; yea the snowes and raines ioyaed with the extremitie of the season, may suffice to detaine vs: how shall we then doe for victuals and forrages? What shall we be able to doe in the warres, wanting the thinges that should giue vs strength and sustenance? What is he that considereth not, how dangerous it is to goe seeke the enemy in a strong campe, and to be driuen at one time to fight against them, and against the discommoditie of the place? If we compell them not to abandon their campe, wee cannot but be enforced to retire; a matter of great difficultie in a countrey so wholly against vs, and where euerie litle disfauour will turne to our great disadvantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that graue discourse, in the discouerie of the particular occurrences, incident to that enterprise; which being laied open to their confused iudgments, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages, which were to be vndergone, by that attempt.

Anal. 6.

The other example is of more antiquitie, taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the arraignment of certaine senatours, for the friendship that had past betwene Seianus and them. Amongst whom M. Terentius thus answered for himselfe; according as it hath of late been published by translation.

It would be peraduenture lesse behoouefull for my estate to acknowledge, then to denie the crime I am charged with: but happe what happe maie, I will confesse that I haue beene Seianus friend, and that I desired so to bee, and that after I had obtained his friendship, I was glad of it, I had seene him ioint officer with my father, in the government of the pretorian cohort; and not long after in managing the cittie affaires, and matters of warre; his kinsemen and allies were aduanced to honour, as euerie man was inward with Seianus, so he was graced by Cæsar: and contrariwise, such as were not in his fauour, liued in feare, and distressed with pouertie. Neither doe I alleadge any man for an example of this; all of vs who were not priuie to his last attempts, with the danger of my onely estate I will defend: not Seianus the Vulsinensis, but a part of the Claudian and Iulian familie, which by alliance, hee had entered into; thy sonne in law Cæsar, thy companion in the Consulship, and him, who tooke vpon him thy charge of administring the common-wealth, wee did reuerence and

and honor. It is not our part to iudge of him, whom thou doest exalt about the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest iudgement of thinges the gods haue giuen; and to vs the glory of obedience is left. We looke into those thinges which we see before our eies, whom thou doest enrich, whome thou doest aduance to honours, who haue greatest power of hurting or helping, which Seianus to haue had, no man will denie. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift, it is not lawfull to sound, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the ende reach vnto them. Thinke not onely Lordes of the senate, of Seianus last daie; but of fixteene yeeres, in which wee did likewise fawne vpon and court Satrius, and Pomponius; and to be knowne vnto his freed men and partners, was reckoned for a high fauour. What then? shall this defence bee generall, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his latter actions? no, but let it by iust boundes and tearmes be deuided: let the treasons against the common wealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour bee punished; but as for the friendships, dueties, pleasures and good turnes, the same ende shall discharge and quit thee, O Cæsar, and vs! The constancie of this Oration preuailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus wee see howe particularities decide the controuersie, and make the waie plaine to good direction.

CHAP. XI.

The Romaines take their iourney towards
the next legion; and are set vpon by
the Galles.



As soone as the daye light appeared, they set forth of their Campe, like men perswaded that the counsell had bene giuen them not by anemie, but by Ambiorix an especiall friende, with a long tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carrie. The Galles vnderstanding of their iourney, by their noise and watching in the night; secretlie in the woodes some two miles off layed an Ambuscado, in two seuerall places of aduantage, and there attended the comming of the Romaines; and when the greatest part of the troupes were entered into a valley, sodainlie they shewed themselues on both sides the vale, pressing harde vpon the rereward, and hindering the formost from going vpper the hill; and so beganne to charge vpon the Romaines in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could be. Then at length Titurinus, as one that had provided for nothing before hande, began to tremble, ran

Cæsar.

A i.

vp

up and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearefully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him, as it happeneth for the most part to such, as are forced to consult in the instance of execution.

THE OBSERVATION.



Inowe plainelie appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the vnlooked for incounter which the Galles gaue the, that feare had ratified in the iudgment of Sabinus the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certaine truth; and laied that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would haue discerned to be but weake, and of no probabilitie: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by howe much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betraied good counsell to a course full of danger; which as Cæsar noteth, must needs fall vpon such, as are then to seeke for direction when the businesse requireth execution. I haue handled alreadie the inconueniences of disappointment; and therefore at this time wil but bring it only into remembrance, that wee may take the greater care to preuent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedie for an euill is to foresee it, according to the saying, *prauisa pereunt mala*; so the greatest mischiefe in an euill, is when it commeth vnthought of, and besides our expectation; for then it falleth vpon vs with a supernaturall waight, and affrighteth the minde with a superstitious astonishment, as though the diuine powers had preuented our designements, with an irremediable calamitie, and cut off our appointment with a contrarie decree: although peraduenture the thing it selfe carie no such importance, but might be remedied, if wee were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen. It were no ill counsell therefore, what resolution soeuer bee taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likelie to happen from the direction of our chiefeft projects; and so we shall be sure to haue a present mind in the midst of our occasions, and feele no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

CHAP. XII.

The Romans cast themselves into an Orbe;
and are much discouraged.



BUT Cotta, who had before thought that these things might happen by the waie, and for that cause would not bee the author of the iourney, was not wanting in anie thing that concerned their common safetie: for both in calling vppon the soldiours and incouraging them, hee executed the place of a Commaunder; and in fighting, the dutie of a soldiour. And when they found, that by reason of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their owne persons to see all things doone, and to giue direction in euerie place; they caused it to bee proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselves into an Orbe: which direction, although in such a case bee not to be reprooued; yet it fell out illfaouredlie: for it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gaue the enemy greater incouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken, but vppon a great feare and in extremitie of perill. Moreouer, it happened, as it coulde not otherwise chosse, that the soldiours went from their Ensignes, to take from the cariages such things as were most deere vnto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Galls were not to learne howe to carrie themselves: for their Commaunders caused it to bee proclaimed, that no man shoulde sturre out of his place; for the praie was theirs, and all that the Romaines had laide aparte, was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victorie. The Romans were equal to the Galls, both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Captaines, and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their manhoode al the hope of their safety: and as often as any cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the enemy on that part.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



HAUE already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a circle; wherein I shewed the conueniencie of this figure, in regarde of safe and strong imbattailing: I will now add this much concerning the vse thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattailing for a defensue strength, and therefore neuer vsed but in extremitie; so we must be very carefull, that the sodaine betaking of our selues to such a refuge, doe not more dismaie the soldiours, then the aduantage of that imbattailing canne benefit

A a ij

them.

them. For vnlesse a leader be carefull to keepe his men in courage, that their hearts may bee free from despaire and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or bodie soeuer, when the particular members shall bee sencelesse of that duty, which belongeth vnto them? for order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giuing meanes to manage our valour with aduantage. In the warre of Affricke wee reade, that Cæsars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quicklie turned it to a better vse, by aduancing the two Cornets two contrary waies, and so deuided the enemy into two partes; and then beate them backe to their great disaduantage.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Neede not stand vpon this order which the Galles heere tooke, concerning pillage, that no soldior should forsake his station, or disfranke himselfe in hope of spoile; which is a thing that from the very infancie of warres hath often changed the fortune of the day, and solde the honor of a publike victorie, for priuate lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battell of Taro, suffice to wame a well directed armie, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, receiued at that time, as by the losse which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seeke after pillage vntil the victory be obtained.

Lib. 20


THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Cæsar now complaineth as the only want, which these Romans had to cleere themselves of this daunger; bringeth to our consideration that which former times haue made a question, which is, whether it were the vertue of the Roman leaders, or the valor of their soldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatnes, and made their people and senate Lords of the world? Polybius waighing the causes of a victorie, which the Carthagineans gained of the Romans, by the counsell and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, hauing before that time receiued diuers ouerthrowes, during the time of those warres in Affricke; concludeth, that it was more in the worthines of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the soldiours, that the Romans achieued so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hannibal; who from the beginning of the second punicke warre, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightening the iurisdiction of mightie Rome; vntill it had got a leader matchable to that suble Carthaginian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that famous

SABINVS AND COTTA





famous battell betweene the olde Romans, and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballaunced, both in number and quality of their souldiers, hauing both the same Armes, the same vse of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had beene in a Ciuill warre: neither could fortune tell by the presence of their Armies, where to bestowe her fauour, or where to shewe her disdain; but that the worthinesse of the Roman leaders brought the oddes in the triall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of an Armie, to haue a leader worthie of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequalitye betweene two equall Armies, then the wisdom and experience of a graue commander, or the disabilitye of an vnskillfull leader; which are so powerfull in their seuerall effectes, that there is greater hope of a heard of Hartes led by a Lyon, then of so many Lyons conducted by a Harre.

CHAP. XIII.

Ambiorix directeth the Galles how they might
best fight with aduantage, and frustrate
the weapons of Romaine
souldiers.

TH E which thing when Ambiorix perceiued; he commanded his men to throwe their casting weapons a farre off, and keepe themselves from comming neare at hand, and where the Romans charged vpon them to giue waie; and againe, as they sawe them retire to their ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandement was so diligently obserued by the Galles, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orbe to giue an assault, the enimie gaue backe as fast as they could; and in the meane time there was no help, but that part must be left naked and open to the inconuenience of casting weapons; and againe, as they retired to their place, they were circumuented as well by them that had giuen place vnto them, as by such as stood next about them: And if they went about to keepe their ground, they could neither helpe themselves by their manhood; nor standing thicke together, auoide the dartes that such a multitude cast vpon them: and yet notwithstanding these inconueniences besides the woundes which they had receiued, they stood still at their defence, and hauing so spent the greatest part of the daie (for they had fought eight houres together) they counted nothing dishonourable or unworthie of themselves.

Caesar.

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THE

THE OBSERVATION.

HAue spoken already of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattailing, and in firme standing, and buckling at handy-blowes: as may appeare by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to giue backe and follow on againe, as the lightnesse of their Armes gaue them opportunitie. In like manner in the first booke of the Ciuill warres, in the battell betweene Cæsar and Afranius, it appeareth, that Cæsar his souldiers were bound to keepe their arraie, not to leaue their ensignes, nor without a waightrie occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranians fought thinne, and scattered here and there; and if they were hard laied vnto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and giue backe, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous nations.

CHAP. XIII.

The Romans are ouerthrowen.

WHEN T. Baluentius, who the yeare before had bene Primipile of that legion, a valiant man and of great authoritie, had both his thighes darted through with a Iavelin: and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his sonne, was slaine: and L. Cotta the Legate, as he busilie encouraged all the Cohortes and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moued with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix a farre off encouraging his men, sent C. Pompeius vnto him, to intreat him that he would spare him and his souldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtaine so much of the people, to saue the souldiers: but for himselfe he should haue no harme at all; for the assurance whereof, he gaue him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, who absolutely denied to go to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes and Centurions that were present, to follow him; and when he came neere to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast awaie his armes, hee obeyed, and willed those that were with him, doe the same. In the meane time while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemne protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little and little incompassed about and slaine. Then according to their custome, they cried victorie, and taking vp a howling, charged the Romans with a fresh assault, and routed their troupes. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly was slaine, with the most part of the souldiers with him. The remnant retired into their campe, amongst whom L. Petrosidius the eagle-bearer, when he sawe himselfe overcharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the rampier, and fighting with a great courage,

rage, before the campe was slaine. The rest with much adoe indured the assault untill night, and in the night being in despaire of all succour slewe themselves euerie man: a few, that escaped from the battell, came by vnknowne waies through the woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

OBSERVATIONS.



And thus haue we heard of the greatest losse, that euer fel at any one time vpon Caesar his Armie, from the time that hee was first Proconsull in Gallia, vnto the ende of his dictatorship. For in the two ouerthrowes at Ditrachium, he lost not aboute 1000 men, and in that at Gergouia not so manie: but here fiftene cohortes were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice, and ill direction the more hatefull, in regard that the great victorie, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the liues of two hundred men. The resolution of such as returned to the campe, witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman souldier, if a valiant leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had bene absolute commander, there had bene great hope of better fortune in the successe: but here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equall sharers in the chiefe authoritie, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a propertie rather of passion then of iudicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperat opposition of a true discerning vnderstanding; and so consequently it falleth out, that one coward, hauing place and authoritie in the counsell, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the leaders: for his timorousnesse flieth alwaies to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptorie in opinion, and base in case of perill; all which are enemies to good direction, and the onely instruments of mischieuing fortune.

CHAP. XV.

Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero; and stirreth
up the *Aduatici*, the *Nervi*; and so
raiseth a great power.



AMBIORIX tooke such spirites vnto him vpon this victorie, that with his horsemen he went immediatly vnto the *Aduatici*, being the next borderers vpon his kingdome, without intermission of night, commanding his footmen to follow him: The *Aduatici* being stirred up to commotion, the next daie after he came to the *Nervi*, exhorting

ing them not to let slippe this occasion of taking to themselves perpetuall libertie, and reuenging them of the Romans for the wrong they had receiued. He tolde them that two Legates were already slaine, and a great part of the Armie ouerthrowne: it was now no great matter, suddenly to surprize the legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof, he offered himselfe to be their assistant. These remonstrances easilie perswaded the Neruij, and therefore they dispatched speedie messengers to the Centrones, Grudij and other people under their dominion, and raised verie great forces, and with them they hasted to the campe where Cicero wintered, before anie inkling of the death of Titurius was brought vnto him.

THE OBSERVATION.

He ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the baseness of a small and ignoble state, to so high a point of resolution, that they durst aduventure vpon the Roman legions, being settled in the strength of their Empire, by the memorie of so manie victories in Gallia: wanted now no meanes to make an ouerture to a vniuersall commotion, propounding libertie and reuenge to the Gales, two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people, if they would but stretch out their hands to take it, and follow that course which his example had proued sure and easie. Which maie serue to shewe, that he that will attempt vpon doubtfull and vn safe Principles, will take great aduantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient meanes for his greatest designs.

CHAP. XVI.

Cicero defendeth his campe from the surprife
of the Neruij, and prepareth himselfe
against a siege.

It happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that manie of the souldiers, that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the sudden approach of the enemies horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Neruij, and Aduatici, with all their confederates and clientes, began to assault the campe. The Romans betooke them speedily to their weapons; and got vpon the rampier, with much adoe they helde out that daie: for the Gales trusted much vpon celeritie, hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors euer after. Cicero dispatched letters

letters with all speede to Caesar, promising great rewardes to him that should carie them: but all the waies were so forelaid, that the messengers were taken. In one night there was built in the campe 120. towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification, & whatsoener wanted of the rest of the worke, was perfected. The enemy the next daie with a farre greater power assaulted the campe, and filled up the ditch: the Romans made the like defence, as they had done the daie before; the like was continued diuers daies after. The Romaines made no intermission of their worke at anie part of the night, nor gaue anie rest either to the sicke or the wounded. Whatsoeuer was needfull for the next daies assault, was provided in a readinesse the night before; a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and manie murall piles were made; the towers were floored in their stories, Pinacles and Parapets were set up of hurdles: and Cicero himselfe being sickly, and of a weake constitution, tooke not so much leasure as to rest himselfe in the night time; so that the souldiers of their owne accord compeld him, by intreatie, to spare himselfe.

THE OBSERVATION.



His Q. Cicero is said to bee the brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Oratour, & to him were the letters sent which are found in his Epistles, directed *Quinto fratri*. In this action his cariage deserued as great reputation, in the true censure of honor, as euer his brother did for his eloquence, *pro Rostris*. And if it had been the others fortune to haue performed the like seruice, he would haue made it the greatest exploit that euer Roman had atchieued by armes: wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and industrie, which was vsed in raising so manie towers, in so small a time; for providing the night before, such thinges as were necessarie for the next daies defence; for making so manie stakes hardened at the ende with fire, for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these murall piles, which resembled the forme of the ordinarie pile, but were farre greater and waightier in regard they were to be cast from the rampier; which gaue them such aduantage, by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practised arme, they were verie effectuall and of great terrour.



CHAP. XVII.

The Neruij propound the same things to Cicero
which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus;
 but are reiected.

THEN the Princes and chiefe commanders of the Neruij, which had anie entrance of speech and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speake with him: which being granted, they propounded the same things they had used to deceiue Sabinus; all Gallia was in Armes; the Germans were come ouer the Rhene; Caesar and the rest were besieged in their wintering campes; Sabinus and his men were cut in pieces; notwithstanding they carried this minde to Cicero, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them, they might depart in safetie whither they would, without disturbance or feare of danger. Cicero onely made this answer: that it was not the custome of the people of Rome, to take anie article or condition from an armed enemy; but if they would laie their armes aside, let them use his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiat it with Caesar; there was great hope in regard of his iustice and equitie, that they should not returne unsatisfied.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe first attempt, which Ambiorix made vpon the campe of Sabinus and Cotta, was but short; but here whar with the pride of the former victorie, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carrie it by assault: for the first assault of a place, especially when it cometh by waie of surpris, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, then such as afterward are made in the sequell of the warre: for after the first brunt, the heate of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth colde and remisse, as also with the harmes and perill which they meete with in the incounter; and on the contrarie side, the defendants hauing withstood the first furie, wherein there is most terrour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength stand firme against anie charge whatsoever.

F. Edward Gifford

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Neruij besiege Cicero, with a ditch and a
 rampier, and worke meanes to set fire
 on their tents.

THE Neruij disappointed of this hope, carried a ditch and a rampier round about the campe; the rampier was 11 foot high, and the ditch 15 foote deepe; which they had learned of the Romaines, partly by being conuersant among them certaine yeares before, and partly by the prisoners and captiues which they had taken; but they had no yron tooles fit for that purpose, but were driuen to cut up turfe with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carrie it away with their mantles and gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered, what a multitude of men there were at the siege; for in lesse then three houres, they finished the fortification of fiftene miles in circuit. The daies following, the enemy built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great hooks and strong penthouses, or sauegardes of boords and timber, according as the captiues had giuen them instruction. The seauenth daie of the siege being a very windie daie, they cast hoat bullets of claie out of slinges, and burning dartes upon the cabines of the Romans, which after the manner of the Galles, were thatched with strawe: these cabines were quickly set on fire, which by the violence of the winde was carried ouer all the campe; the enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victorie were already gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Testudines to the rampier, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman souldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and ouer-charged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their faces, yet no man forsooke the rampier, or scarce looked backe at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis one example may serue to shew the excellencie of the Romaine discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Arte: for they perceiuing that the fortune of warres consisted chiefly in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their souldiers in that forme of discipline, as might struggle with inconueniencies, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so ouerwage all difficulties and hinderances, with a constant perseueration and a courage inuincible. For the great attempting spirit of an ambitious commāder, that seeketh to ouertop the trophes of honour, with the memorie of his exploits, will quickly perish by his owne direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker, then the meanes which

lead him to his designments. For where the waight is greater then the strength, the engine will sooner breake, then lift it vp. Let a discreet leader therefore so leuell his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceede the abilitie of his particular means; but first let him be well assured what his souldiers can doe, before he resolue what he will doe: or otherwise, let him so inable them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth maie answere the height of his desires and follow his aspiring minde, with a resolution grounded vpon knowledge and valour; and so making their ability the ground of his designes, he shall neuer faile of meanes to performe what he intendeth. The want of this consideration hath, within these late yeares, repaide our commanders in many partes of Christendome with losse and dishonour; when as they measured the humour of their poore needie and vndisciplined souldier, by the garbe of their ambitious thoughtes, and so laide such proiects of difficultie, as were verie vsuable in the particularitie of occurrences to that, which their souldiers were fit to execute.

CHAP. XIX.

The emulation betweene two Centurions, Pulpio, and Varenus, with their fortunes in the encounter.




HERE were in that legion two valiant men, Titus Pulpio, and L. Varenus Centurions, comming on a pace to the dignitie of the first orders: these two were at continuall debate which of them should be preferred one before another. Every yeare contended for place of preferment, with much strife and emulation. Pulpio at a time, that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now stood doubtfull? or what other place he did looke for to make triall of his manhood? this is the daie (saith hee) that shall decide our controversies, and when he had spoken these wordes, he went out of the fortification, and where he saw the enemy thickest, he fiercely set vpon them: then would not Varenus hold himselfe within the rampier, but followed after in a reasonable distance. Pulpio cast his pile at the enemy, and strooke one of the multitude through that came running out against him; he being slaine, all cast their weapons at him, giuing no respite or time of retrait: Pulpio had his target strooke through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle: this chance turned aside his scabberd and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword, in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard vpon him; Varenus came and rescued him: immediately the whole multitude, thinking Pulpio to be slaine with the dart, turned to Varenus, who speedely betooke him to his sword, and came to handy-strokes, and hauing slaine one he put the rest somewhat backe. But as he followed ouerhastely vpon them, he fell downe: him did Pulpio rescue,

being

CICERO BESIEGED





being circumvented and in danger, and so both of them hauing slaine manie of the enemy, retired to their campe in safety, to their great honour. Thus fortune caried as well the contention, as the incounter of them both, that being enemies, they neuertheless gaue helpe to saue each others life, in such sort, that it was not to bee iudged which of them deserved greatest honor.

OBSERVATIONS.



Æsar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthy to be related amongst the deeds of armes contained in these commentaries: wherein we are first to obserue the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual strife for place of preferment, which they fought after by shewing their valour in time of danger, and approouing their worth by the greatnesse of their desert; a contention worthy the Roman discipline, and may serue for a paterne of true honour full of courage, accomplished with vertue. For these *Simultates*, which desire of honor had cast between them, brought forth emulation which is the spur of vertue, far from enmitie or hatefull contention: for the difference betweene these two qualities is, that enmitie hunteth after destruction, and onely reioiceth in that which bringeth to our aduersary vtter ruine, dishonour or ill archieurement: but emulation contendeth only by well deseruing, to gaine the aduantage of an other mans fame, that useth the same meanes to attaine to the like end; and is alwaies mixed with loue, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the sympathie of their desires, not seeking the ouerthrow of their Competitor, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foule and vnfortunate calamitie, that he may still continue to shew the greatnes of his worth by the opposition of inferior actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and vnknowne in these daies, and would hardly find subiects to be resident in, if she should offer her helpe in the course of our affaires, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositiō of our times: for we can no sooner conceiue the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the vttermost of our malice, and resteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed partner, then with thousand of Trophes deservedly erected to our honor. Which maketh me wonder, when I looke into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time, which brought forth such honest effectes of vertue, to their glory and our ignominy, hauing learned better rules then were known vnto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring forth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in those daies; or what other cause hath made our worst affections so violent, and our better faculties so remisse and negligent, that vertue hath no part in vs but wordes of praise, our whole practice being consecrated to actions of reproch. The iniuries, murthers, scandalous cariages of one towards an other, which in these daies are so readily offered

red, and so impatientlie digested, will admit no satisfaction but priuate combate, which in the first monarchies was granted only against strangers, and foraine enemies, as the only objects of armes and wrath, and capable of that iustice, which the priuate sworde shoulde execute: for they well perceiued that these single battels were, as sparkles of ciuill discorde, and intestine warres; although not so apparant in the generall viewe of their state, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good government. And if there were a true recorde of such, as haue beene either slaine or wounded within these fortie yeeres, either in this kingdome, or in France, or in Germanie, by this licentious and brutish custome; I make no question, but they woulde amount to a number capable of that fearefull stile, which is attributed to ciuill warres.

Neither is there any lawe howe rigorous or harde soeuer, that can giue reliefe to this disorder, but the restraint will drawe on as great enormities, and as vntollerable in a good government. Rotaris king of the Lumbardes forbade his subiectes this manner of combate; but shortlie after, hee was constrained to recall the edict, for the auoiding of greater evils; although hee protested the thing to bee both inhumane, and barbarous. The like edict was published in France by Philip the Faire, but was within two yeeres renoked againe, at the instant request of his subiectes, in regarde of the murders and assassins committed in that kingdome. The onelie remedie, that I finde to take effect in this case, was that of late time, which the Prince of Melphie in Piemont, inuented to preuent this euill: for perceiuing howe ordinarie quarrels and bloudshed were in his campe, hee assigned a place betweene two bridges for the performance of the *Duellum*, with this charge; that hee that had the worst shoulde alwaies bee slaine, and cast from the bridge into the water; the daunger ioyned with dishonour (which by this decree attended such as vndertooke priuate combate) made the soldours wiser in their cariage, and put an end to their sedition and ciuill discordes. But that which is yet worst of all, is that custome hath now made it so familiar, that euery trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a priuate combate; a crosse looke calleth an others mans honour in question; but the word lye is of as great consequence, as any stabbe or villanie whatsoeuer. Whereat we may well wonder howe it happeneth, that wee feele our selues so much exasperated at the reproch of that vice, which we so ordinarilie commit; for in the custome of these times to cast vpon vs the lie, is the greatest iniurie that wordes can doe vnto vs; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a propertie in our nature, to stand chiefly in the defence of that corruption vnto which wee are most subiect: I speake not this to qualifie the foulnesse of this vice; for I holde a lier to bee a monster in nature, one that contemneth God and feareth man, as an ancient father saith; but to shew the crookednesse of our disposition in disdaining to acknowledge that fault, which wee so commonlie commit. But I would faine learne when honor first came to be measured with words, for from the beginning it was not so. Cæsar was often called to his face theefe, and dronkard, without any further matter; and the liberty of inuectiues, which
great

great personages vied one against an other, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I thinke our lie might too, for I take him that returneth the lie, and so letteth it rest vntill further prooffe, to haue as great aduantage in the reputation of honor, as the former that first gaue the disgrace.

CHAP. XX.

Cicero sendeth to Cæsar, at whose comming
the siege was raised, and the Galles
ouerthrowne.



*A*t length Cicero found meanes, by a Gall to aduertise Cæsar of the danger wherein he was: who speedily hasted with two legions to giue him succour; the Neruij vnderstanding of Cæsars approach, forsooke the siege and went to meet him. Cæsar finding the enemy to be 60000. strong, and himselfe not to haue about 7000. men, incamped himselfe in a place of aduantage; and sought by counterfeiting feare, to draw the enemy to come and assault his campe, which he handled with that dexteritie, that the Galles came vp vnto him, with a full assurance of victory: but Cæsar sending out two sallies at two seueral gates of the campe, ouerthrew the greatest part of them, and dispossessed the rest of their armes; and so ended that war.

FINIS.

